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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Analysis of the Landing/Deceleration Subsystem
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, i00ctobe-{ 1986. The IOA
approach features a top-down analysis of the-hardware to
determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents (Appendix C) the
independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter
Landing/Deceleration Subsystem hardware.
The Landing/Deceleration Subsystem is utilized to allow the
Orbiter to perform a safe landing, allowing for landing-gear
deploy activities, steering and braking control throughout the
landing rollout to wheel-stop, and to allow for ground-handling
capability during the ground-processing phase of the flight
cycle. Specifically, the Landing/Deceleration hardware
consists of the following components:
o Nose Landing Gear (NLG)
NLG Shock Strut Assembly
NLG Doors and Uplock Mechanism
NLG Wheels and Tires
o Main Landing Gear (MLG)
MLG Shock Strut Assembly
MLG Doors and Uplock Mechanisms
MLG Wheels and Tires
o Brake & Antiskid (B&AS)
B&AS Controls
Brake Mechanisms
o Electrical Power Distribution and Controls (EPD&C)
o Nose Wheel Steering (NWS)
o Hydraulics Actuators
The IOA analysis process utilized available Landing/Deceleration
hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware
assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hard-
ware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and
effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the
effect for each failure mode.
Figure 1 presents a summary of the failure criticalities for five
of the six major subdivisions of the Landing/Deceleration
Subsystem. The NWS analysis is not included with this report. The
NWS was originally included with this subsystem, but in order to
1
w
conform with NASA alignment it has been identified as a separate
subsystem. A summary of the number of failure modes, by
criticality, is presented below with hardware criticality first
and functional criticality second.
Summary of Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F)
Criticality: i/i 2/IR I 2/2 i 3/IR 3/2R 3/3
Number : 63 27 i 0 I 63 0 103
TOTAL
256
For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
potential critical items is presented as follows:
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Summary of Potential Critical Items (HW/F)
Number : II163 27 0 34 0 124
Due to the lack of redundancy in the Landing/Deceleration
Subsystems there is a high number of critical items.
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Figure 1 - LANDING/DECELERATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY OVERVIEW.
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL reevaluation results for completeness and
technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
reevaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is
performed and documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
1.1 Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
4
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Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
D
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2.4 Landing/Deceleration Ground Rules and Assumptions
The Landing/Deceleration ground rules and assumptions used in
the IOA are defined in Appendix B. The subsystem specific ground
rules were defined to limit the analysis to single-failed parts
for each failure.
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3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The Landing/Deceleration Subsystem consists of the hardware
required to perform landing and rollout to a safe stop. In
addition, the Landing/Deceleration Subsystem performs the
function of transporting the Orbiter during the landing phase and
towing during post mission operations. The Landing/Deceleration
Subsystem consists of the following components:
i , The Nose Landing Gear Shock Strut Assembly (NGSSA) is
the assembly that supports the nose of the Orbiter
during landing and ground-handling operations. The
NGSSA consists of the Shock Strut, Axle, Steering/
Damping Actuator, Torque Arms, Drag Brace, Lock Brace,
and attaching hardware (Figures 2 and 3)
, The Nose Landing Gear Doors and Uplock/Release
Mechanisms (Figures 2 and 3) consist of the following
components that function when the landing gear deploy
switch is activated:
o Extend/Retract Hydraulic Strut Actuator
o Door Extend Retract Mechanism
o Door Over-Center Bungee
o Gear Uplock Hook
o Door Hooks
o Door Hook Actuation Linkage
o NLG Uplock Release Hydraulic Actuator
o Backup Pyro Uplock Release Actuator
o NLG Extension Booster Pyro Actuator
o Door Bungee Assist Assembly
, The data for the Nose Landing Gear Wheels and Tires are
not currently available for use in the evaluation of
the wheels or the tires. B. F. Goodrich drawings were
requested through NASA, Rockwell International (Downey
Operations) and through B. F. Goodrich (Troy, Ohio).
Some analysis has been performed using the Rockwell
Procurement Specifications which were available through
NASA.
• The two Main Landing Gear Shock Strut Assemblies
(MGSSA) support the aft portion of the Orbiter during
landing and ground handling activities. The MGSSA
consists of the Shock Strut, Axle, Torque Arms, Drag
Brace, Lock Brace, and attaching hardware
(Figures 4 and 5).
u
, The Main Landing Gear Doors and Uplock Mechanisms
(Figures 4 and 5) consists of the following components
that function when the landing gear deploy switch is
activated:
o Extend/Retract Hydraulic Strut Actuator
o Door Extend Retract Mechanism
o Door Over-Center Bungee
o Gear Uplock Hook
o Door Hooks
o Door Hook Actuation Linkage
o MLG Uplock Release Hydraulic Actuator
o Backup Pyro Uplock Release Actuator
o Door Bungee Assist Mechanism
.
•
The data for the Main Landing Gear Wheels and Tires are
not currently available for use in the evaluation of
the wheels or the tires. B. F. Goodrich drawings were
requested through NASA, Rockwell (Downey Operations)
and through B. F. Goodrich (Troy, Ohio). Some analysis
has been performed using the Rockwell Procurement
Specifications which were available through NASA.
The data for the Brake and Antiskid Controls are
limited and the assessment was performed using the data
available in the Space Shuttle Systems Handbook, the
Shuttle Flight Operations Manual, Volume 10D, the
Rockwell Procurement Specification, Brake/Skid
Control Subsystem, wheel Brakes - Main Landing Gear,
Orbiter, and the NASA Training Document on Landing/
Deceleration Subsystems, LNDG/DECEL 2102. Data were
requested on the Mark III Skid Control System, but we
were informed that the data were proprietary and that
the data would not be made available for the assess-
ment. Current data were requested through NASA and
Rockwell International, Downey Operations. The Brake
and Antiskid Controls consist of the Rudder/Brake
Pedal Assembly and the Brake/Skid Control System as
identified in Figure 6.
. The data for the Brake System are not currently
available for use in the evaluation of the system.
B. F. Goodrich drawings were requested through NASA,
Rockwell International, Downey Operations, and through
B. F. Goodrich (Troy, Ohio). Some analysis has been
performed using the Rockwell Procurement Specifications
which were available through NASA. Some data were
found on the Orbiter braking system through Lockheed
in Clear Lake through the notes from the AD HOC
COMMITTEE - ORBITER BRAKING SYSTEM ASSESSMENT
documents. The brake system consists of four electro-
hydraulic disc-braking systems. Each assembly has nine
discs: four rotors and five stators. The rotors are
splined to the inside of the wheel and rotate with
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the wheel. The stators are splined to the outside of
the axle assembly and do not rotate, when the brakes
are applied, eight hydraulic actuators in the brake
assembly press the discs together, thus providing the
braking torque. The hydraulic brake actuators are
distributed evenly around the discs. Four of the
actuators are manifolded into a brake chamber and are
powered by a single hydraulic system• The remaining
four are manifolded into a second braking chamber and
are powered by a different hydraulic system.
The Rudder/Brake Pedal Assembly (R/PBA) is the mechanical
assmebly that allows the crew to make manual inputs
into the Landing/Deceleration Subsystems. The R/BPA
converts the manual inputs into electrical data that is
transmitted to the flight control systems, the brake
controls, and the nose wheel steering. Each R/BPA
contains two brake-pedal transducer units called the
Rudder Pedal Transducer Assemblies (RPTA). Each unit
has four Linear Variable Differential Transducers
(LVDT) which output 0-5 VDC brake signals to the
brake/skid control boxes A and B. Each of the
transducer units output four separate braking signals
for the respective left/right-brake control for the
associated braking system.
The Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD&C)
consists of two subsystems within the Landing/
Deceleration Subsystem: Landing Gear Control and Brake
and Antiskid. The landing Gear Control system
provides power to the Nose and Main Landing Gear Doors
and uplock/Release Mechanisms on the orbiter (Figure
7.) The Brake and Antiskid subsystem transfers brake
and skid control power to the Brake/Skid Control Boxes
A and B (Figure 6). Power is also provided to the
hydraulic brake-line heater coils for orbiter hydraulic
fluid heating. EPD&C powers the electronics for
sensing and monitoring the discrete position of moving
parts and assemblies within the Landing/Deceleration
subsystem.
The responsibility for the Nose Wheel Steering system
has been assigned to the NWS Group. The FMEA's for the
NWS were originally included in the Landing/Deceleration
Subsystem. The mechanical-linkage portions of the NWS
are still included in the Landing/Deceleration IOA
reports as a portion of the Nose Landing Gear reports.
The Hydraulics Actuators on the Landing/Deceleration
Subsystem consists of six actuators. Three actuators,
one in each wheel well, activate the landing gear
uplock mechanism that initiates the landing gear deploy
sequence for that landing gear, and three actuators
perform the task of extending or retracting the landing
8
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gear. Landing gear retraction can only be performed by
Ground Support Eq_/ipment (GSE); a landing gear retrac-
tion cannot be supported on orbit. These actuators are
actually components of the subsystems listed in
paragraphs 3.1.2 and 3.1.5 of this section. However,
for this report they are broken out separately for the
purpose of clarity
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The Landing/Deceleration hardware consists of six major
subcomponents located in the Orbiter's cabin area and on the
under carriage of the Orbiter. The interfaces for the subsystem
are relatively simple in that there is a limited number of inter-
faces with the other subsystems on the Orbiter. The interfaces
with the other subsystems are basically limited to interfaces
with the Data Processing System (DPS) for backup flight control
for the NWS and for instrumentation on the Landing/Deceleration
hardware, and the Hydraulics System (HYD) for hydraulics system
pressure for the subsystem actuators and for the brakes. The
remainder of the subsys£em is capable of direct control, via
wire, from the control device to the subsystem hardware.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 8 illustrates the hierarchy of the Landing/Deceleration
Subsystem hardware and the corresponding subcomponents. Figures
2 through 7 comprise the detailed subsystem representations.
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Figure 2 - NOSE LANDING GEAR - STOWED POSITION
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Figure 3 - NOSE LANDING GEAR - EXTENDED POSITION
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Figure 4 - MAIN LANDING GEAR - STOWED POSITION
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Figure 5 - MAIN LANDING GEAR - EXTENDED POSITION
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Figure 6 - BRAKE/SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
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Figure 7 - LANDING GEAR CONTROL SYSTEM OVERVIEW
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4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
Detail analysis results for each of the identified failure modes
are presented in Appendix C. Table I presents a summary of the
failure criticalities. Further discussion of each of these
subdivisions and the applicable failure modes is provided in
subsequent paragraphs.
+
m
TABLE I Summary of Possible Failure Modes and Criticalities
Criticality :
NLG
MLG
B&AS
EPD&C
NWS
HYD
TOTAL
i/i
26
24
5
0
63
2/IR
0
0
1
i0
16
27
2/2
w
m
3/1R
2
1
2
52
63
3/2R 3/3
6
6
6
59
26
103
TOTAL
34
31
14
121
56
256
Of the 256 failure modes analyzed, 63 resulted in the immediate
loss of the crew or the vehicle, and 90 resulted in the loss of
the crew or the vehicle with the failure of redundant operations.
There were no failures that were identified that would result in
the direct loss of the mission without the loss of the crew or
the vehicle. A summary of the potential critical items (PCIs) is
presented in Table II. Appendix D presents a cross reference
between each PCI and a specific worksheet in Appendix C.
TABLE II Summary of Potential Critical Items
Criticality:
NLG
MLG
B&AS
EPD&C
NWS
HYD
TOTAL
i/i
26
24
5
0
8
63
2/1R
0
0
1
l0
16
17
2/2
0
3/IR
2
1
1
28
2
34
3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
28
25
7
38
26
124
4.1 Analysis Results NLG.
The NLG consists of the NLG Shock Strut Assembly, the NLG Doors
and Uplock Mechanisms, and the NLG Wheels and Tires. Assessment
of the wheels and tires were limited due to the nonavailability
of data on these parts. Twenty-eight PCIs were identified, these
items are listed in Appendix D.
i 17
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4.2 Analysis Results MLG.
The MLG consists of the MLG Shock Strut Assembly, the MLG Doors
and Uplock Mechanisms, and the MLG Wheels and Tires. Assessment
of the wheels and tires were limited due to the nonavailability
of data on these parts. Twenty-five PCIs were identified. These
items are listed in Appendix D.
4.3 Analysis Results B&AS.
The B&AS consists of the Rudder/Brake Pedal Assembly, the
Brakes, the Brake Control System, and the Antiskid Control
System. Only seven PCI items were identified due primarily to
the nonavailability of data on the hardware that was being
assessed. The PCis are listed in Appendix D.
4.4 Analysis Results EPD&C.
EPD&C provides power to the Landing Gear Control subsystem, Brake
and Antiskid subsystem, and to sensing and monitoring functions
within the Landing/Deceleration subsystem. Thirty-eight PCIs
were identified and are listed in Appendix D.
4.5 Analysis Results NWS.
The analysis for the Landing and Deceleration, NWS, was performed
by a separate working group that was established to align with
the NASA alignment. Their report is separate and will not be
incorporated with this repor%i T_e reason for the mention _ of
their report is that the NSTS 82-0013_document included the FMEA
reports for the NWS. The mechanical hardware required by the
NWS is included in the NLG portion of this report.
4.6 Analysis Results HYD.
The hydraulics subsystem is the primary system supporting the six
hydraulic actuators responsible for deploying the landing gear
and for providing pressure to operate the orbiters brakes.
Twenty-six PCIs were identified; all are listed in Appendix D.
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Orbiter. Revision D, Date Unreadable.
45. 1170301 MENASCO - Drag Brace Assembly - Lower - Main Landing
Gear - Orbiter. Revision A, Date Unreadable.
46. 1170350 MENASCO - Lock Brace Assembly - Main Landing Gear -
Orbiter. Revision E, 20 July 1976.
47. 1170493 MENASCO - Layout - Shock Strut - Main Landing Gear -
Orbiter. Revison F, Date Unreadable.
48. Landing/Deceleration - LDG/DECEL 2102 - Training Document.
22-02-83
49. MC287-0034 Rockwell Procurement Specification, Actuator
Strut, Landing Gear, Hydraulic. Revision H-6, 1 August 1983.
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50. VS70-958102
Subsystem.
Integrated System Schematic - Hydraulics
Revision F-10, 23 April 1986 mm
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
m
m
E
AOA
ATO
B&AS
BFC
BFS
BITE
C&W
CIL
CPU
CRT
D/A
DPS
EPDC
EVA
FMEA
GFE
GPC
GSE
HDC
HYD
IOA
LCA
- Abort-Once-Around
- Abort-To-Orbit
- Brakes and Antiskid
- Backup Flight Control
- Backup Flight System
- Built-In Test Equipment
- Caution and Warning
- Critical Items List
- Central Processing Unit
- Cathode-Ray Tube
- Digital to Analog
- Data Processing System (Subsystem)
- Electrical Power Distribution and Control
- Extravehicular Activity
- Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
- Government Furnished Equipment
- General Purpose Computer
- Ground Support Equipment
- Hybrid Driver Controller
- Hydraulics
- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- Load Controller Assembly
LNDG/DECEL - Landing and Deceleration
LVDT
MDAC
MGSSA
MLG
NA
NASA
NGSSA
NLG
NSTS
NWS
OMRSD
OPS
PCA
PCI
PIC
R/BPA
REG
RI
RPTA
RTLS
SFTWE
STS
TAL
TD
THC
- Linear Variable Differential Transformer
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Main Gear Shock Strut Assembly
- Main Landing Gear
- Not Applicable
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- Nose Landing Gear Shock Strut Assembly
- Nose Landing Gear
- National Space Transportation System
- Nose-Wheel Steering
- Operational Maintenance Requirements and
Specifications Document
- Operations Sequence
- Power Control Assembly
- Potential Critical Item
- Pyro Initiator Controller
- Rudder/Pedal Brake Assembly
- Regulate, Regulator
- Rockwell International
- Rudder Pedal Transducer Assembly
- Return-to-Landing Site
- Software
- Space Transportation System
- Transatlantic Abort Landing
- Touch Down
- Thruster Hand Controller
A-I
VAC
VDC
WONG
WOW
- Volts, ac
- Volts, dc
- Weight on Nose Gear
- Weight on Wheels
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
u B.I
B.2
B.3
Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS mm
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 198---6, were used with the glowing
_plifications and additi_.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
_-o OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to 0PS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-r-ansition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
_ed end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or _ of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transitio-n out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at _-_ition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and en--_at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ens-_ith the completion of post-landing
safing operations
u
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS I
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, i00c---_ober 1986, was employe--_--with the
following amp-[ifications and addition.
m
i
•
•
,
•
•
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown•
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawlngs.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance•
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser•
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis•
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection•
Analysis of welds or brazed Joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection•
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
B-5
APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
w
I
B.3 Landing/Deceleration - Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
The IOA analysis was performed to the assembly or component level
in the Landing/Deceleration Subsystem. The analysis considered
the worst case effects of the hardware and the functional
failures of the subsystem and their impacts on the mission and
crew and vehicle safety.
i , Pyrotechnic devices were not considered as emergency
devices that were to be used in contingency operations.
RATIONALE: The NLG Extension Booster Pyro Actuator
functions every time that the NLG is
operated to insure that the system is able
%o overcome any wind forces that are acting
on the landing gear doors.
RATIONALE: The Backup Pyro Uplock Release Actuator is a
backup or redundant actuator that operates
one second after the deploy command is
issued if it does not receive a signal that
the Uplock Release Hook has functioned
properly.
, The Landing/Deceleration Subsystem considers that all
ABORT MODES will be terminated post landing at the
time of vehicle egress.
RATIONALE: Under the I0A specific rules an abort would
fall under two definitions, deorbit and
landing, the intent of this subsystem rule
is to simplify the abort analysis.
3. Component age life will not be considered in the
analysis.
RATIONALE: Component age analysis is beyond the scope
of this task.
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED ANALYSIS
This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets generated
during the analysis of this subsystem. The information on these
worksheets is intentionally similar to the NASA FMEAs. Each of
these sheets identifies the hardware item being analyzed, and the
parent assembly, as well as the function. For each failure mode,
the possible causes are outlined, and the assessed hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase is listed, as
described in the NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA
and CIL, i0 October 1986. Finally, effects are entered at the
5-_to--_f--each sheetT-_d the worst case criticality is entered
at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
w
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 _ All others
Functional Criticalities:
1R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R z Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
C-I
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORESHEET
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
i0101 ABORT:
ITEM: TIRES, NLG TYPE II
FAILURE MODE: RUPTURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) NOSE LANDING GEAR - TIRES
2) TIRES
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
.....
CRTT_ALITIES_
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS:
3/3 TAL:
3/3 AOA:
3/3 ATO:
!/i
HDW/FUNC
i/i
I/I
1/1
I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NOSE LANDING GEAR .....
006-836 B, F/_OODRICH, = MC194-0007-O002
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, CUTS, CONSTRUCTION FLAWS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A RUPTURE OF A NOSE LANDING GEAR TIRE ON TOUCHDOWN WOULD PLACE
TORQUE ON THE NOSE LANDING GEAR STRUT WHICH WOULD CAUSE THE AXLE
TO ROTATE. THE SIDE LOADING ON THE SINGLE TIRETHAT_REMAINS PLUS
THE WEIGHT OF THE NOSE ON THE SINGLE TIRE WOULD CAUSE THE
SECOND TIRE TO FAIL. OTHER CO_ICATIONS THAT COU_ OCCUR
INCLUDE FRACTURI_ THE AXLE, BREAKING THE_STE_: COL_,
SHEARING THE NOSE WHEEL STEERING ATTACH POINTS, AND OVERLOADING
THE TORQUE ARM.
REFERENCES: MC194-0007 - THE ONLY DOCUMENT AVAILABLE FOR THE
EVALUATION IS THE PROCUREMENT SPECIFICATION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10201 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NOSE LANDING GEAR TRUNION
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) NOSE LANDING GEAR
2) SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
3) SHOCK STRUT ATTACHING TRUNIONS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: i/1
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: 1170623 MENASCO, V070-782214 (001/002)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, PIECE
PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE - CORROSION - CRACKING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF ONE OR BOTH OF THE SHOCK STRUT TRUNIONS
WOULD RESULT IN A COLLAPSE OF THE NOSE LANDING GEAR. A FAILURE
AT TOUCHDOWN COULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE CREW AND THE
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: MC621-0012, V070-510501, VO70-510502
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-3
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10202 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
1/l
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRAG BRACE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) NOSE LANDING GEAR
2) SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
3) DRAG BRACE ASSEMBLY
LOWER DRAG BRACE STRUT
CRiTICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: I/i
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
_CATION: NOSE _DING GEAR .... _ _'_i _.....
PA_T _MBER: 1170801-1 MENASCO (LOWER DRAG BRACE), MC621-00i2 _
0003
CAUSES: _ PIECE'PART STRUCTURAL FA_LUR_ -c_cK_NG ' MECHANICAL _i_
SHOCK, MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, OVERLOAD.
........ : =
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_ =_ _ __ _! _!.... _, _!__
A LOWER DRA_GBRACE FAILURE WOULD cAusE AN IMMEDIATE COLLAPSE OF
THE NOSE LANDING GEAR THAT WOULD ALLOW THE NOSE OF THE ORBITER TO
IMPACT THE RUNWAY SURFACE. A FAILURE OF THIS NATURE WOULD RESULT
IN THE LOSS OF THE CREW AND THE VEHICLE. _
REFERENCES: MC621-0012, VO70-510501, VO70-510502
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10203 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRAG BRACE TRUNION
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
DRAG BRACE ASSEMBLY
DRAG BRACE TRUNION (AT LOCK BRACE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: l/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORB IT: l/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/I
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: 1170804 MENASCO (AT LOCK BRACE)
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE - CRACKING - MECHANICAL
SHOCK, MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, OVERLOAD.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LOSS OF THIS TRUNION AT TOUCHDOWN WOULD CAUSE A COLLAPSE OF THE
NOSE LANDING GEAR. THE LOSS OF THE CREW AND THE VEHICLE WOULD BE
A PROBABLE RESULT OF A FAILURE OF THIS NATURE.
REFERENCES: MC621-0012, V070-510501, V070-510502
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 10204 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LOCK BRACE ASSEMBLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) NOSE LANDING GEAR
2) SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
3) LOCK BRACE ASSEMBLY
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : I/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NOSE LANDING GEAR
1170850-503 MENASCO, MC621-0012-0006
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE , MISHANDLING OR ABUSE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A STRUC_L FAILURE OF TH_CK BRAC_ASSEMBLYWQULDALLOW THE
NOSE IA_ING GE_ TO COLLAPSE AT TOUCHDOWN. A FAILURE OF THIS
NATURE WOULD CAUSE A LOSS OF THE CREW AND THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: MC621-0012, VO70-510501, VO70-510502
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10205 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DOWNLOCK BUNGEE
PHYSICAL BINDING / JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
LOCK BRACE ASSEMBLY
DOWN LOCK BUNGEE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NOSE LANDING GEAR
1170683-101 MENASCO
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE , MISHANDLING OR ABUSE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE BUNGEE IS NOT FUNCTIONING AS REQUIRED THE NOSE LANDING
GEAR DOWNLOCK WILL BE SECURED BY HYDRAULICS SYSTEM 1 ONLY. A
FAILURE OF THE HYDRAULICS WOULD ALLOW THE NOSE LANDING GEAR TO
COLLAPSE AT TOUCHDOWN. FOLLOWING NORMAL SHUT-DOWN AND EGRESS
THE HYDRAULICS SYSTEM WiLL BE TU_D OFF BEFORE EGRESS. WHEN THE
HYDRALUICS NO LONGER PROVIDES THE HOLDING POWER, THE NOSE LANDING
GEAR COULD COLLAPSE CAUSING A LOSS OF THE VEHICLE AND POSSIBLY
PERSONNEL UNDER OR IN THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: MC621-0012, V070-510501, VO70-510502
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 10206
ITEM: DOWNLOCK BUNGEE
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
HDW/FUNC
1/1
I/I
SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIE_CHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
LOCK BRACE ASSEMBLY
DOWN LOCK BUNGEE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: 1170683-101 _NASCO
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: I/1
3/3 TAL: i/i/
3/3 AOA: i/i
i/I ATO: 3/3
1/1
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUC_L FAILURE , MIS_DLING OR ABUSE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE BUNGEE IS NOT FUNCTIONING AS REQUIRED THE NOSE LANDING
GEAR DOWNLOCK WILL BE SECURED BY HYDRAULICS SYSTEM 1 0NL_Y_ A _
FAILURE O?THE HYDRAULICS WOULD ALLOW THE NOSE LANDING GEAR TO
COLLAPSE AT TOUCHDOWN. FOLLOWING NORMAL SHUT-DOWN AND EGRESS
THE HYDRAULICS SY_ _LL___BE?ORE EGRESS.= _EN THE
HYD_UICS NO,_N_R_0V_S _THE'_'HOLDING_O_R7 _TH_-_OS_I_D_ _
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GEAR--COULD COLLAPSE CAU_A LOSS OF T_ V_CLE AND POSSIBLY
PERSONNEL UNDEROR IN THE VEHICLE. _
REFERENCES: MC621-0012, VO70-510501, VO70-510502
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10207 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: NLG - DOWN AND LOCK SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED - OPEN / CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
NOSE LANDING GEAR - DOWN AND LOCK SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: V070-510340
C [NA ]
CAUSES:
WIRES
CORROSION, VIBRATION, LOOSE CONNECTION, WORN OR DAMMAGED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE SIGNAL IS NOT ACTIVATED UNTIL THE ARM ON THE TORQUE TUBE
ASSEMBLY CONTACTS THE ELECTRICAL SENSOR. THE SENSOR SENDS THE
SIGNAL OF GEAR DOWN AND LOCKED TO THE NOSE LANDING GEAR
INDICATOR. IF THE NOSE LANDING GEAR HAS NOT BEEN DEPLOYED AND
THE SENSOR
IS SHORTED OPEN THE SIGNAL IN THE COCKPIT WILL SHOW BARBERPOLE,
IF THE SENSOR IS SHORTED CLOSED AN ERRONEOUS DOWN AND LOCKED
SIGNAL WILL BE SENT.
REFERENCES: MC621-0012, VO70-510501, VO70-510502
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
_DING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10208 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: NLG - DOWN AND LOCK SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
S)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
NOSE LANDING GEAR - DOWN AND LOCK SENSOR
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: NOSE U_DING GEAR
PART NUMBER: VO70-510340
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECHANICAL SHOCK. _................
THE SIGNAL IS NOT ACTIVATED UNTIL THE ARM ON THE TORQUEIITUBE
ASSEMBLY t_OHTACTS THE ELE_R_CAL SENSOR. _ IF THE_ iS BROKEN
OR DAMMAGED NO CONTACT WILL BE MADE AND THERE WILL BE A LOSS OF
INPUT , ...... _
REFERENCES: MC621-0012, VO70-510501, VO70-510502
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10209 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: STEERING COLLAR ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
NOSE WHEEL STEERING ASSEMBLY
STEERING COLLAR ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORB IT: 3/1R ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NOSE LANDING GEAR
i170604-i01 MENASCO, MC621-0012
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECHANICAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE IMMEDIATE LOSSES WILL BE THE LOSS OF NOSE WHEEL STEERING AND
THE LOSS OF NOSE WHEEL DAMPING.
REFERENCES : MC621-0012, V070-510501, VO70-510502
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-II
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 10210 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM: STEERING DISCONNECT LOCK
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
NOSE WHEEL STEERING ASSEMBLY
TORQUE ARMASSEMBLY
STEERING DISCONNECT LOCK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : I/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBiT: 3/3 AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NOSE LANDING GEAR ...._ _i_
1170622-101 MENASCO, 1170640-101 MENASCO
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MEC_AL SH_L_K/-_VIBRAT_N. - ...... - -
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE STEERING DiSCO_ECT _CK MALFUNCTIONS AND THE TOR_UE_M$
DEGREES. IF THE NOSE WHEEL ROTATES BEYOND THE SAFE RANGE BEFORE
TOUCHDOWN THE NOSE LANDING GEAR WILL COLLAPSE.
REFERENCES: MC621-0012, V070-510502
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10211 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TORQUE ARMASSEMBLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
NOSE WHEEL STEERING ASSEMBLY
TORQUE ARM ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 1/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: i/I
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC621-0012, 1170605 MENASCO, 1170629 MENASCO
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECHANICAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE TORQUE ARM ASSEMBLY AT THE NOSE
LANDING GEAR SLAPDOWN COULD CAUSE A NOSE WHEEL ROTATION BEYOND
THE SAFE RANGE RESULTING IN A NOSE LANDING GEAR COLLAPSE.
PROBABLE LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE.
RATIONALE: THE NOSE WHEEL IS DESIGNED TO BE ABLE TO ROTATE 360
DEGREES IF IT IS NOT RESTRICTED BY THE TORQUE ARM ASSEMBLY.
m
REFERENCES: MC621-0012, VO70-510502
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-13
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10212 ABORT:
NOSE WHEEL RETAINING BOLT
CORROSION, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
HDW/FUNC
i/I
1/l
SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
AXLE ASSEMBLY
NOSE WHEEL RETAINING BOLT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
HDW/FUNC
i/I
i/i
1/1
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: NASI004-6, MC621-0012 ....
C [NA ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECHANICAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE OF THE BOLT COULD CAUSE SEPARATION OF ONE OF THE NOSE
WHEELS AT OR SHORTLY AFTER TOUCHDOWN, CAUSING PROBABLE LOSS OF
THE VEHICLE AND THE CREW.
REFERENCES: MC621-0012, V070-510502
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10213 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
i/i
ITEM: AXLE
FAILURE MODE: CORROSION, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) NOSE LANDING GEAR
2) SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
3) AXLE ASSEMBLY
AXLE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NOSE LANDING GEAR
1170631-1 MENASCO, MC621-0012-0001
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECHANICAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A HARD NOSE WHEEL SLAPDOWN COULD CAUSE THE STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF
THE AXLE
REFERENCES: MC621-0012, VO70-510502
_i_ REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-15
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 10214 ABORT:
ITEM: WEIGHT ON WHEELS SENSORS - NLG
FAILURE MODE: ERONEOUS OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) NOSE LANDING GEAR
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
WEIGHT ON WHEELS SENSOR
SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART _UMBER: VOV0-SI0340
c[p]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECHANICAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ...._ ...... _ _........._ ;;_!
SIGNAL APpEAR$_E_LY OR INTERMITTENTLY GIVING SIGNA_ TO THE NOSE
WHEEL STEERING THAT COULD CANCEL THE STEERING CAPABILITY
REFERENCES: MC621-0012, VO70-510502
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10215 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
1/l
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHOCK STRUT
INTERNAL / EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (HYDRAULIC FLUID)
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
SHOCK STRUT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: 1170600-507 MENASCO, MC621-0012-0008
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, MISHANDLING OR ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COLLAPSE OF SHOCK STRUT DURING LANDING CAUSING MECHANICAL SHOCK
TO SHOCK STRUT UPPER STRUCTURE AND TRUNIONS RESULTING IN NOSE
LANDING GEAR COLLAPSE AT LANDING. A LOSS OF THE CREW AND THE
VEHICLE WOULD BE PROBABLE.
REFERENCES: MC621-0012, V070-510502
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-17
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10216 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: SHOCK STRUT
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL / EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (NITROGEN)
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY_
i) NOSE LANDING GEAR
2) SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
3) SHOCK STRUT
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART_MBER:
NOSE LANDING GEAR
1170600-507 MENASCO, MC621-0012-0008
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, MISHANDLING OR ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PARTIAL LOSS OF EFFECTIVENESS. THE LOSS OF NITROGEN PRESSURE IN
TH_ S_0CKST_UT'_SE_BLy_'WO_D_NOT P_EI_I_TH_CTiONING OF THE
HYDRAULIC P0_TT_ OF THE SHOCK STRUT. THE SHOCK DESIGN
SPECIFICATION REQUIRES A SAFETY FACTOR THAT WILL ALLOW A LANDING
WITH ONE ATMOSPHE_ OF NITROGEN PRESS_ IN THE SHOCK STRUT.
REFERENCES: MC621-0012, V070-510502
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-18
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10217 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
UPLOCK ROLLER RETAINING ASSEMBLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
UPLOCK ROLLER RETAINING ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/I
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC621-0012, VO70-510550, 1170666 MENASCO
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE NOSE LANDING GEAR WOULD NOT LOCK IN POSITION AND THE SHOCK
STRUT ASSEMBLY AND ITS ATTACHMENTS WOULD BE LOOSE IN THE NOSE
WHEEL AREA. THE WEIGHT OF THE NOSE LANDING GEAR AGAINST THE DOOR
COULD CAUSE AN INADVERTANT LANDING GEAR DEPLOY DURING LAUNCH OR
DURING DEORBIT
REFERENCES: VO70-510550
w
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10217 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
I/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
UPLOCK ROLLER RETAINING ASSEMBLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) NOSE LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
UPLOCK ROLLER RETAINING ASSEMBLY
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL:
ONORBIT: _/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: I/I _
HDW/FUNC
i/i
1/1 _i
I/I
i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC621-0012, V070-510550, 1170666 MENASCO
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THENOSE LANDING GEAR WOULD NOT LOCK IN POSITION AND THE SHOCK
STRUT ASSEMBLY AND ITS ATTACHMENTS WOULD BE LOOSE IN_E NOSE
WHEEL AREA. THE WEIGHT OF THE NOSE LANDING GEAR AGAINST THE DOOR
COULD CAUSE AN INADVERTANT LANDING GEAR DEPLOY DURING LAUNCH OR
DURING DEORBIT
REFERENCES: VO70-510550
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10218 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: WEIGHT ON WHEELS SENSORS - NLG
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
S)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
WEIGHT ON WHEELS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: V070-510340
B[ P] C [P]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECHANICAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE WOULD BE NO SIGNAL CHANGE AFTER NLG SLAPDOWN. THE SIGNAL
IS ONE OF THREE THAT IS REQUIRED TO ACTIVATE THE NOSE WHEEL
STEERING. NWS CAPABILITIES COULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES: MC621-0012, V070-510502
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-21
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10219 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WEIGHT ON WHEELS SENSORS - NLG
SHORTED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
WEIGHT ON WHEELS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB!T: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: VO70-510340
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECHANICAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE WOULD BE A CONSTANT ERRONEOUS SIGNAL TO THE NWS WHICH COULD
CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE NWS CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: MC621-0012, VO70-510502
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10220 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: i/I
HDW/FUNC
1/I
1/1
1/1
I/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: i170583-I01 MENASCO, MC621-0012
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LOSS OF THE TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY WOULD CAUSE POSSIBLE
PROBLEMS WITH THE DEPLOY OF THE NOSE LANDING GEAR. IF BROKEN,
PROBLEMS WILL BE ENCOUNTERED WITH THE HYDRAULIC EXTENSION OF THE
NLG AND THE NLG LOCKDOWN. IF THE ASSEMBLY SEPARATES THE NLG WILL
COLLAPSE AT NLG SLAPDOWN CAUSING A PROBABLE LOSS OF THE CREW AND
THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: MC621-0012, VO70-510502
m
= REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-23
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10221 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
I/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRAG BRACE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
DRAG BRACE ASSEMBLY
UPPER DRAG BRACE STRUT (YOKE ASSEMBLY)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: 1170802-1 MENASCO, MC621-0012-0003
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE - CRACKING - MECHANICAL
SHOCK, MISHANDLING oR ABUSE' OVERLOAD.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE OF ONE OR BOTH OF THE ARMS OF THE UPPER YOKE ASSEMBLY
OF THE DRAG BRACE COULD CAUSE THE COLLAPSE OF THE NOSE LANDING
GEAR. A LOSS OF THE CREW AND THE VEHICLE WOULD BE POSSIBLE WITH
A FAILURE OF THIS NATURE.
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10222 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRAG BRACE TRUNION
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
DRAG BRACE ASSEMBLY
DRAG BRACE TRUNION (AT SHOCK STRUT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC621-0012-0003, 1170632-1 MENASCO, 1170358-1
MENASCO (2EA)
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE - CRACKING - MECHANICAL
SHOCK, MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, OVERLOAD.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LOSS OF THIS TRUNION AT TOUCHDOWN WOULD CAUSE A COLLAPSE OF THE
NOSE LANDING GEAR. THE LOSS OF THE CREW AND THE VEHICLE WOULD BE
A PROBABLE RESULT OF A FAILURE OF THIS NATURE.
REFERENCES: MC621-0012, V070-510502
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-25
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10223 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRAG BRACE TRUNION
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
DRAG BRACE ASSEMBLY
DRAG BRACE TRUNION (AT VEHICLE ATTACH POINT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LI FTO FF: 3/ 3 TAL: 1/1
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
0012-0003
NOSE LANDING GEAR
1170806 MENASCO (AT VEHICLE ATTACH POINT), MC621-
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE - CRACKING - MECHANICAL
SHOCK, MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, OVERLOAD.
EFFECTS/_TIoNALE:
THE LOSS OF EITHER OF THE UPPER TRUNIONS COULD CAUSE THE FAILURE
AND SUBSEQUENT COLLAPSE OF THE NOSE LANDING GEAR. A LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE AND CREW WOULD BE A PROBABLE RESULT OF A FAILURE OF THIS
NATURE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10224 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
I/i
ITEM: SUPPORT BEAM
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
DRAG BRACE ASSEMBLY
SUPPORT BEAM
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: i/1
3/3 TAL: i/i
3/3 AOA: 1/1
i/1 ATO: 1/l
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC621-0012-0003, 1170803-1 MENASCO
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, CORROSION / CRACKING, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING OR ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE SUPPORT BEAM WOULD CAUSE TORSION ON
THE DRAG BRACE ASSEMBLY THAT COULD CAUSE THE UPPER DRAG BRACE
TRUNIONS TO FRACTURE DUE TO TORSION. A FAILURE OF THIS NATURE
WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE AND THE CREW.
REFERENCES: MC621-0012
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-27
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 10401 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
FAILURE MODE: BROKEN ROD / LINKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NOSE LANDING GEAR
MC287-0033-0007
CAUSES: STRESS / FRACTURE, MISHANDLING OR ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LANDING GEAR WILL NOT EXTEND OR RETRACT HYDRAULICALLY.
GRAVITY AND AIRFLOW WILL EXTEND THE LANDING GEAR.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10402 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
FAILURE MODE: LEAK, EXTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NOSE LANDING GEAR
MC287-0033-0007
CAUSES: O-RING SEALS, VIBRATION, LOOSE BOLTS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF HYDRAULICS SYSTEM 1 AND THE LANDING GEAR WILL
NOT EXTEND OR RETRACT HYDRAULICALLY. THE LANDING GEAR WILL
EXTEND BY GRAVITY AND AIRFLOW WITH THE ASSIST OF THE NOSE LANDING
GEAR EXTENSION BOOSTER PYRO ACTUATOR.
REFERENCES: VO70-573001
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-29
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10403 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: LEAK, INTERNAL PISTON
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDO_ HI_CHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC287-0033-0007
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: SEAL DAMAGE, MISHANDLING OR ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE HYDRAULIC PUMP WILL COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS OF FLUID.
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REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-30
mDATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10404 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
RUPTURE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/i
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NOSE LANDING GEAR
MC287-0033-0007
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, MISHANDLING OR ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF HYDRAULIC SYSTEM i. GEAR MAY BE SLOW TO DEPLOY IF THE
ACTUATOR JAMS UP OR IT MAY NOT DEPLOY AT ALL.
m
b
REFERENCES: VO70-573001
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-31
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 10405 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
FILTER BLOCKED
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PI_ELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NOSE LANDING GEAR
MC287-0033-0007
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE WILL BE BI43CKED TO THE GEAR, BUT THE GEAR
WILL DEPLOY DUE TO G_VITY AND AIRFLOW AND WITH THE ASSIST OF THE
NOSE LANDING GEAR EXTENSION BOOSTER PYRO ACTUATOR.
REFERENCES: VO70-573001
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10406 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
CAVITATION ORIFICE BLOCKED
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC287-0033-0007
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE CAVITATION ORIFICE IS BLOCKED THE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE IS
BLOCKED TO THE GEAR, BUT THE GEAR WILL DEPLOY DUE TO GRAVITY AND
AIRFLOW AND WITH THE ASSIST OF THE NOSE LANDING GEAR EXTENSION
BOOSTER PYRO ACTUATOR.
REFERENCES: VO70-573001
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REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-33
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10407 ABORT:
ITEM: NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: CAVITATION CHECK VALVE - OPEN / CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC287-0033-0007
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE WILL BE BLOCKED TO THE GEAR, BUT THE GEAR
WILL DEPLOY DUE TO G_VITY AND AIRFLOWAND WITH THE ASSIST OF THE
NOSE LANDING GEAR EXTENSION BOOSTER PYRO ACTUATOR.
REFERENCES: VO70-573001
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10407 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
CAVITATION CHECK VALVE - OPEN / CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
2) NOSE LANDING GEAR
3) NOSE LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
4)
S)
6)
7)
a)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC287-0033-0007
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE WILL BE BLOCKED TO THE GEAR, BUT THE GEAR
WILL DEPLOY DUE TO GRAVITY AND AIRFLOW AND WITH THE ASSIST OF THE
NOSE LANDING GEAR EXTENSION BOOSTER PYRO ACTUATOR.
REFERENCES: VO70-573001
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-35
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 10408 ABORT:
ITEM: NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: SHUTTLE VALVE READY (OPEN)
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
2) NOSE LANDING GEAR
3) NOSE LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NOSE LANDING GEAR
MC287-0033-0007
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE NORMAL POSITION FOR INFLIGHT OPERATIONS IS OPEN.
REFERENCES: VO70-573001
I
J
=
m
B
i
ms
mm
l
I
B
m
B
I
I
z
g
l
m
m
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-36
i=
m
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10408 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: SHUTTLE VALVE READY (OPEN)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC287-0033-0007
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE NORMAL POSITION FOR INFLIGHT OPERATIONS IS OPEN.
REFERENCES: VO70-573001
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-37
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 10409 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
HIGH PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE - OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC287-0033-0007
CAUSES: BROKEN SPRING _ _ _ .... _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE RELIEF VALVE HELPS REGULATE THE FLUID FLOW DURING LANDING
GEAR EXTENSION. THE LANDING GEAR WILL STILL DEPLOY.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10410 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
HIGH PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE - CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NOSE LANDING GEAR
MC287-0033-0007
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE RELIEF VALVE HELPS REGULATE THE FLUID FLOW DURING LANDING
GEAR EXTENSION. THE LANDING GEAR WILL STILL DEPLOY.
m REFERENCES: VO70-573001
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 10411 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
LOW PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE - OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC287-0033-0007
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INTERNAL BYPASS OF FLUID RELIEVES PRESSURE WHEN THE GEAR IS
RETRACTED.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10412 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
CHECK VALVE - OPEN / CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
_)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC287-0033-0007
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CHECK VALVE HELPS REGULATE THE HYDRAULIC FLUID.
NEEDED FOR DEPLOYMENT.
IT IS NOT
REFERENCES: V070-573001
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-41
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT: i/I
MDAC ID: 10413 ABORT: I/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
SHUTTLE VALVE (CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 1/1
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 1/1
ONO_T: 3/3 AOA: i/I
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NOSE LANDING GEAR
MC287-0033-0007
CAUSES: BROKEN SPRING, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LANDING GEAR CANNOT EXTEND IF THE VALVE IS CLOSED.
FLUID CANNOT GET OUT OF THE BACK SIDE OF THE PISTON
HYDRAULIC
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REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-42
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SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10414 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
TIMING ORIFICE BLOCKED
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC287-0033-0007
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TIMING ORIFICE IS USED TO HELP REGULATE THE FLOW OF HYDRAULIC
FLUID DURING LANDING GEAR DEPLOYMENT. IF THE ORIFICE IS BLOCKED
THE GEAR WILL NOT EXTEND OR THE TIME OF EXTENSION WILL BE
INCREASED.
REFERENCES: V070-573001
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-43
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 10415 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
LOW PRESSURE RELIEF - OPEN / CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NOSE LANDING GEAR
MC287-0033-0007
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE GEAR WILL STILL DEPLOY. THE RELIEF VALVE WILL LIMIT THE
FLUID LOSS IF THE LEAK IS ON THE GROSS SIDE
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 10415 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: LOW PRESSURE RELIEF - OPEN / CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC287-0033-0007
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE GEAR WILL STILL DEPLOY. THE RELIEF VALVE WILL LIMIT THE
FLUID LOSS IF THE LEAK IS ON THE GROSS SIDE
u
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REFERENCES: V070-573001
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REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-45
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 10416 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR
TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER BOSS LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J, COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NOSE LANDING GEAR
MC287-0033-0007
CAUSES: SEAL DAMAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1 AND THE GEAR WILL NOT EXTEND
HYDRAULICALLY. THE GEAR WILL EXTEND BY GRAVITY AND AIRFLOW AND
WITH THE ASSIST OF THE NOSE LANDING GEAR EXTENSION BOOSTER PYRO
ACTUATOR.
REFERENCES: VO70-573001
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10501 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NLG DOOR EXTEND / RETRACT MECHANISM
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PHYSICAL BINDING / JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
NOSE LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM
DOOR EXTEND / RETRACT MECHANISM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: V070-510601
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, MISHANDLING OR ABUSE; DEBRIS LODGED IN LINKAGE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DOORS WON'T POSSIBLY OPEN. GEAR WILL TRYTO DEPLOY THROUGH THE
DOORS. DOOR HOOK(S) DOWNSTREAM OF THE FAILURE WON'T RELEASE.
GEAR WILL NOT DEPLOY IN TIME FOR LANDING.
REFERENCES:
VOL. 10D
VO70-510601, V070-510501, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 -
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REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-47
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10501 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NLG DOOR EXTEND / RETRACT MECHANISM
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PHYSICAL BINDING / JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
NOSE LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM
DOOR EXTEND / RETRACT MECHANISM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/I
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NOSE LANDING GEAR
V070-510601
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, DEBRIS LODGED IN LINKAGE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DOORS WON'T POSSIBLY OPEN. GEAR WILL TRY TO DEPLOY THROUGH THE
DOORS.- -DOOR HOOK(S) DO,STREAM 0F _HE FAILURE WON'T RELEASE.
GEAR WILL NOT DEPLOY IN TIME FOR LANDING.
REFERENCES: V070-510601, V070-510501, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 -
VOL. 10D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10601 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NLG DOOR OVER-CENTER BUNGEE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
NOSE LANDING GEAR DEPLOYMECHANISM
DOOR OVER-CENTER BUNGEE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FU_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NOSE LANDING GEAR
V070-510630-001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MISHANDLING OR ABUSE,
DEBRIS LODGED IN LINKAGE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DOORS MAY NOT STAY FULLY OPEN AFTER NOSE LANDING GEAR IS DEPLOYED
REFERENCES: VO70-510601, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 - VOL. 10D
i
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-49
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10701 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NLGUPLOCK HOOK ASSEMBLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PHYSICAL BINDING / JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
NOSE LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM
GEAR UPLOCK HOOK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/I
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NOSE LANDING GEAR
V070-5105S0
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MISHANDLING OR ABUSE,
DEBRIS LODGED IN LINKAGE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LANDING GEAR WILL NOT DEPLOY
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REFERENCES:
VOL. 10D
VO70-510550, VO70-510601, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 - m
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DINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT: I/I
10901 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NLG DOOR HOOK ACT LINKAGE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PHYSICAL BINDING / JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
NOSE LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM
DOOR HOOK ACTUATION LIKKAGE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NOSE LANDING GEAR
V070-510701-001, V070-510711-001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MISHANDLING OR ABUSE,
DEBRIS LODGED IN LINKAGE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LANDING GEAR WILL NOT EXTEND IN TIME FOR LANDING
REFERENCES: V070-510601, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 - VOL. 10D
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-51
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
10901 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NLG DOOR HOOK ACT LINKAGE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PHYSICAL BINDING / JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
NOSE LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM
DOOR HOOK ACTUATION LIKKAGE .... !
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RT LS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
1/1
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NOSE _DING GE_ ..... _t_ _
V070-510701-001, V070-510711-001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MISHANDLING OR ABUSE,
DEBRIS LODGED IN LINKAGE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALEz _i _ _
THE LANDING GEAR WILL NOT EXTEND IN TIME FORLANDING
REFERENCES: VO70-510601, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 - VOL. i0D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
11003 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR
LEAK EXTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR UPLOCK MECHANISM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORB IT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC287-0033-0002
B[F] c[p]
CAUSES: O-RING SEAL DAMAGE, VIBRATION, LOOSE BOLTS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1 AND THE GEAR WILL NOT RELEASE
HYDRAULICALLY. THE PYRO BACKUP WILL RELEASE THE GEAR ONE SECOND
AFTER THE COMMAND TO DEPLOY IF THE LANDING GEAR HOOK IS NOT OPEN
REFERENCES: VO70-573001
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-53
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
11004 ABORT:
ITEM: NLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: BROKEN ROD / LINKAGE
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
2) NOSE LANDING GEAR
3) NOSE LANDING GEAR UPLOCK MECHANISM
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
_ITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ON_B_: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
HDWIFUNC
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART_BER:
NOSE LANDING GEAR
MC287-0033-0002
CAUSES: STRESS /_FRACTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE GEAR WILL NOT RELEASE HYDRAULICALLY. THE PYRO BACKUP WILL
RELEASE THE GEAR ONE_SECgND AFTER THECQMMAND TO DEPLOY IF THE
LANDING GEAR HOOK IS NOT OPEN
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
11005 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR
RUPTURE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR UPLOCK MECHANISM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 2/ 1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC287-0033-0002
B[F] C [P]
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM i WILL BE LOST AND THE GEAR WILL NOT RELEASE
HYDRAULICALLY. THE PYRO BACKUP WILL RELEASE THE GEAR ONE SECOND
AFTER THE COMMAND TO DEPLOY IF THE LANDING GEAR HOOK IS NOT OPEN.
L
w
REFERENCES: VO70-573001
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_ REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-55
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 11006 ABORT:
ITEM: NLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: LEAK - INTERNAL PISTON
HDW/FUNC
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE _DING GEAR COMPARTMENT
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR UPLOCK MECHANISM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 -
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
B [NA ] C [NA ]
NOSE LANDING GEAR
MC287-0033-0002
CAUSES: SEAL DAMAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE HYDRAULIC PUMP WILL COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS OF FLUID.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
Iii01 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NLG B/U PYRO UPLOCKRELEASE MECH
INADVERTANT FIRING
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) NOSE LANDING GEAR
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
NOSE LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM
NOSE LANDING GEAR BACKUP PYRO UPLOCKRELEASE MECHANISM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LI FTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC325-0006-0002 (GFE)
CAUSES: THERMAL, ERRONEOUS SIGNAL
B [NA ] C [NA ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NOSE LANDING GEAR WILL EXTEND CAUSING LOSS OF VEHICLE.
ORBIT, RESCUE MUST BE MADE AVAILABLE.
HDW/FUNC
I/I
I/i
DURING
u
i
REFERENCES:
VOL. 10D
VO70-510601, V070-510501, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 -
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-57
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
11102 ABORT:
ITEM: NLG B/U PYRO UPLOCK RELEASE MECH
FAILURE MODE: FAIL TO FIRE
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
NOSE LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM k
NOSE LANDING GE_ BACKUP PYRO UPf_OCKRELEASE MECHANISM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: _ 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: I/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NOSE LANDING GEAR '--
MC325-0006-0002 (GFE)
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL FAILURE, _TBIDGEFAILURE .....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NOSE LANDING GEAR WILL NOT DEPLOY IF HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1 IS NOT
FUNCTIONING_ _ i_i _; _ =z_ "i_ ........ :
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VOL. 10D
VO70-510601, VO70-5i0501, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 - mm
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
11201 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NLG EXTENSION BOOSTER PYRO ACT
INADVERTANT FIRING
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
NOSE LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM
NOSE LANDING GEAR EXTENSION BOOSTER PYRO ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC325-0006-0002 (GFE)
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: THERMAL, ERRONEOUS SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PREMATURE OR INADVERTANT FIRING MAY CAUSE THE NLG TO DEPLOY AT AN
INOPPORTUNE TIME. IF THE ACTUATOR FIRES ON ORBIT THE NLG CANNOT
BE RETRACTED AND ENTRY WITH THE GEAR DEPLOYED WOULD CAUSE A LOSS
OF THE CREW AND VEHICLE. AN EARLY DEPLOY DURING DEORBIT
COULD CAUSE A LOSS OF VEHICLE CONTROL AND EXCESSIVE VEHICLE
DAMMAGE DUE TO DYNAMIC PRESSURES DURING SUPERSONIC FLIGHT WITH
THE NLG DEPLOYED. FAILURES OF THIS NATURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS
OF THE CREW AND THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
VOL. 10D
VO70-510601, VO70-510501, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 -
u
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-59
INDEPENDE_ ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
_DING/DECE_TION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
11202 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
i/i
ITEM: N_ EXTENSION BOOSTER PYRO ACT
FAIL_ MODE: FAIL TO FI_
_AD _ALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS T_AD: W. _ISSINGER
BRE_DO_ HIE_CHY:
i) NOSE _DING GEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE _DING GE_COMP_TME_
NOSE _DING GEM DEP_Y MEC_ISM
NOSE _DING GEM EXTENSION BOOSTER PYRO A_ATOR
CRITI_LITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: I/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 1/1
_D_D_CY SC_ENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
_TION:
P_T _BER:
NOSE _DING GEM
MC325-0006-0002 (GFE)
mUSES: E_CTRI_L FAIL_, C_TRI_E FAIL_
............... 7, :,,
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
_SS OF C_W _D VEHIC_ IF T_ NOSE _DING GEM DOESN'T EXTEND
IN TIME .....
I
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
11301 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NLG DOOR BUNGEE ASSIST ASSY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, FAILS TO RELEASE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
3)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
NOSE LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM
NOSE LANDING GEAR DOOR BUNGEE ASSIST ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 1/1
TAL: 1/1
AOA: 1/1
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: NOSE LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: V070-510751
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MISHANDLING OR ABUSE,
PHYSICAL BINDING / JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NOSE LANDING WILL FAIL TO EXTEND IN TIME FOR LANDING.
REFERENCES :
VOL. 10D
VO70-510601, VO70-510751, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 -
m
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 11302 ABORT:
ITEM: NLG DOOR BUNGEE ASSIST ASSY
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, INADVERTANT RELEASE
HDW/FUNC
i/1
1/1
LEAD ANALYST: W.WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NOSE LANDING GEAR
NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
NOSE LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM
NOSE LANDING GEAR DOOR BUNGEE ASSIST ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: i/i TAL: I/!_ _
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: I/i
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ] ......
LOCATION: NOSE _DING GEAR
PART NUMBER: V070-510751
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MISHANDLING OR ABUSE,
VIBRATiONS_ _:_i_: .....................................
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE PARTIAL DOOR DEPLOY OR FULL DEPLOY OF THE NOSE LANDING
GEAR. POSSIBLE_DOORAND_OR UPLOCK MEC_ISM DA_GEiN_HE AREA
OF IMPACT FROM THE BUNGEE.
REFERENCES:
VOL. 10D
V070-510601, VO70-510751, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 -
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20101 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TIRES, MLG TYPE I
RUPTURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MAIN LANDING GEAR - TIRES
2) TIRES
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: 006-866-1 B. F. GOODRICH, MC194-0007-0003
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, CUTS, CONSTRUCTION FLAWS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A RUPTURE OF A MAIN LANDING GEAR TIRE AT TOUCHDOWN WOULD CAUSE
OVERLOADING ON THE SECOND TIRE ON THAT LANDING GEAR WHICH COULD
RESULT IN A LOSS OF THE CREW AND THE VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
CONTROL. ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS COULD INCLUDE SHEARING AN AXLE,
DAMAGING A TORQUE ARM, RUPTURING THE BRAKE LINES ON THE TORQUE
ARM, AND CAUSING BRAKING / STEERING PROBLEMS FOR THE LANDING.
REFERENCES: MC194-0007 - THE ONLY DOCUMENT AVAILABLE FOR THE
EVALUATION IS THE PROCUREMENT SPECIFICATION.
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-63
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20201 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHOCK STRUT STRUCTURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/l
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
x)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
SHOCK STRUT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : I/1 _
LI"FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: 3/ 3
_DING/SAFING: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
XAIZ_Z,_DZNG
117O1OOMENASCO,MC62Z'OOZZ
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE,_pIECE-PAR T STRU_L FAILURE -
CORROSION- CRACKING, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A ST RUC_L FA_ILURE OF THE SHOCK STRUT IN EIT_HfER OF THE UPPER
ARMS, THE LOWER PISTON ASSEMBLY, OR THE AXLE RETAINING ASSEMBLY
AT THE MAIN LANDING GEAR TOUCHDOWN WOULD CAUSE A CONDITION WHERE
A LoSS OF--THE CREW AND THE VEHICLE WOU-LDBE PROBABLE.
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REFERENCES: MC621-0011,I170100, 1170101, 1170114, 1170182 _
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20202 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHOCK STRUT PISTON ASSEMBLY
INTERNAL / EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (HYDRAULIC FLUID
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN LANDING GEAR
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
SHOCK STRUT
SHOCK STRUT PISTON ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: 1170100 MENASCO, MC621-0011
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
SEAL FAILURE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITHOUT HYDRAULIC FLUID TO ACT AS THE DAMPING MEDIUM, THE
COLLAPSE OF THE SHOCK STRUT DURING LANDING WOULD CAUSE MECHANICAL
SHOCK TO THE UPPER STRUCTURE AND THE TRUNIONS THAT WOULD EXCEED
THE CAPABILITY OF THE PARTS. THE LANDING GEAR WOULD COLLAPSE AT
TOUCHDOWN CAUSING A PROBABLE LOSS OF THE CREW AND THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: MC621-0011,1170100, 1170101, 1170114, 1170182
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-65
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
I_d_DING/DECEI_I_TION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20203 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHOCK STRUT PISTON ASSEMBLY
INTERNAL / EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (NITROGEN)
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN LANDING GEAR
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
SHOCK STRUT
SHOCK STRUT PISTON ASSEMBLY
SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/1R
3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MAIN LANDING GEAR
1170100 MENASCO, MC621-0011
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
SEAL FAILURE. .........
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITHOUT NITROGEN THERE WOULD BE _A PARTIAL LOSS _E_EcTIVENES_
THE-_SSOF-_N'_'PRESSURE IN THE SH_K STR_ ASSEMBLY WILL
NOT PREVENT THE FUNCTIONING OF THE HYDRAULIC PORTION OF THE SHOCK
STRUT
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REFERENCES: MC621-0011,I170100, 1170101, 1170114, 1170182
l
B
mmm
M
REPORT DATE 02/i3/87 C-66
i
w=
W
w
w
nm_
n
7
L
w
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT: 1/1
20204 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TORQUE ARMASSEMBLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN LANDING GEAR
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
TORQUE ARM ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC621-0012, 1170353-1 MENASCO
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECHANICAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A STRUCTURAL FAILURE AT MLG TOUCHDOWN COULD CAUSE THE WHEELS TO
ROTATE CAUSING THE AFFECTED MLG TO COLLAPSE. THE TORQUE ARM
PREVENTS ROTATION OF THE PISTON AND AXLE ASSEMBLY. IF THE AXLE
WERE TO ROTATE THE MAIN GEAR WOULD COLLAPSE CAUSING A PROBABLE
LOSS OF THE CREW AND THE VEHICLE
REFERENCES: MC621-0011, VO70-510001, 1170300
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-67
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 20205 ABORT:
ITEM: AXLE KIT - MLG
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
AXLE KIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FU_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 1/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: I/1
ONORBYT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
P_T _MBE'R: MC621"0011, I170182-i03 MENASCO, ii70190-i01
MENASCO
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: - __ ...............
AN A_E--FAILIYREATTOUCHDOWNWOULD CAUSE A COLLAPSE OF THE
AFFECTED MAIN LANDING GEAR. THERE WOULD BE A PROBABLE LOSS OF THE
CREW AND THE VEHICLE AS A .RESULT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20206 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM: LOWER DRAG BRACE STRUT
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
DRAG BRACE ASSEMBLY
LOWER DRAG BRACE STRUT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : I/1
LI FTO FF: 3/ 3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MENAS CO
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MC621-0011-0009, 1170300-503 MENASCO, 1170301
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
OVERLOAD, MECHANICAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LOWER DRAG BRACE STRUT FAILURE WOULD CAUSE AN IMMEDIATE
COLLAPSE OF THE MAIN LANDING GEAR. THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE THE
LOSS OF THE VEHICLE AND THE CREW.
REFERENCES: MC621-0011,VO70-510201, 1170300, 1170301
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-69
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1I/28/86 HI GHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 20207 ABORT:
ITEM: UPPER DRAG BRACE TRUNIONS (2 EA)
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE _ .......
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MAIN LANDING GEAR
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
DRAG BRACE ASSEMBLY
UPPER DRAG BRACE TRUNIONS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUN_H: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: i_/--i
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/i;
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR ..................................
PART NUMBER: MC621-0011"_009, 1170_06"1 MENASCO
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE -
CORROSION - C_CKING, OVERLOAD, MECHANICAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LOSS OF EITHER OF THE UPPER DRAG BRACE TRUNIONS ON EITHER
MAIN LANDIN_G_EAR WOULD CAU_FA_L-URES T_T WOULD _AUSE_THE
COLLAPSE OF THE MAIN LANDING GEAR. A LOSS OF THE VEHICLE AND THE
CREW WOULD BE PROBABLE WITH THIS FAILURE
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REFERENCES: MC621-0011,VO70-510201, 1170300, 1170301 z
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20208 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LOCK BRACE ASSEMBLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
LOCK BRACE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/i
i/1
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC621"0011-0011, 1170350-507 MENASCO
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE -
CORROSION - CRACKING, OVERLOAD, MECHANICAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE LOCK BRACE ASSEMBLY ON EITHER MAIN
LANDING GEAR WOULD ALLOW THAT GEAR TO COLLAPSE DURING LANDING.
PROBABLE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE AND THE CREW.
REFERENCES: MC621-0011,V070-510201, 1170350, 1170300, 1170301
m
g
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-71
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 20209 ABORT:
ITEM: DOWN LOCK BUNGEE
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING / JAMMING (BENT BUNGEE)
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
LOCK BRACE ASSEMBLY
DOWN LOCK BUNGEE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONO_IT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: I/1
HDW/FUNC
1/1
3/IR
3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC621-0011, 1170315-103 MENASCO
C [NA ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE WOULD BE A POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE AFTER THE
HYDRAULICS SYSTEM 1 IS SHUT DOWN. THE LANDING GEAR COULD
COLLAPSE IF THE BUNGEE WERE NOT -AvA-fLABLE TO L6CK THETOCK BRACE
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INTO THE SAFE POSITION. HYDRAULICS SYSTEM 1 WILL LOWER AND
SECURE
THE GEAR THROUGH ROLLOUT BUT WHEN THE APUIS ARE SHUT DOWN THE
REDUNDANCY IS LOST AND THE GEAR COULD COLLAPSE DUE TO MINOR
VEHICLE MOVEMENTS.
REFERENCES: MC621-0011,VOT0-510201, 1170350, 1170300, 1170301
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20210 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DOWN LOCK BUNGEE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MAIN LANDING GEAR
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
LOCK BRACE ASSEMBLY
DOWN LOCK BUNGEE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC621-0011, 1170315-103 MENASCO
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE -
CORROSION - CRACKING, OVERLOAD, MECHANICAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE WOULD BE A POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE AFTER THE
HYDRAULICS SYSTEM 1 IS SHUT DOWN. THE LANDING GEAR COULD
COLLAPSE IF THE BUNGEE WERE NOT AVAILABLE TO LOCK THE LOCK BRACE
INTO THE SAFE POSITION. HYDRAULICS SYSTEM 1 WILL LOWER AND
SECURE
THE GEAR THROUGH ROLLOUT BUT WHEN THE APU'S ARE SHUT DOWN THE
REDUNDANCY IS LOST AND THE GEAR COULD COLLAPSE DUE TO MINOR
VEHICLE MOVEMENTS.
REFERENCES: MC621-0011,VO70-SI0201, 1170350, 1170300, 1170301
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-73
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20211 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MLG DOWN AND LOCK SENSORS
SHORTED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN _DING GEAR
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
MAIN LANDING GEAR DOWN AND LOCK SENSORS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: VO70-510340
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE - COI_ROSION,
VIBRATION. _ _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ............
THE CREWWOULD NOT BE ABLE TO_ERIFY THAT THEMAINLANDING GEAR
WAS DOWN AND LOCKED IN POSITION.
REFERENCES: MC621-0011, VO70-510201, 1170350
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20212 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MLG DOWN AND LOCK SENSORS
SHORTED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
MAIN LANDING GEAR DOWN AND LOCK SENSORS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: VO70-510340
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE - CORROSION,
VIBRATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CREW WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO VERIFY THAT THE MAIN LANDING GEAR
WAS DOWN AND LOCKED IN POSITION.
u
w
REFERENCES: MC621-0011,VOT0-510201, 1170350
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20213 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MLG DOWN AND LOCK SENSORS
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
e)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
MAIN LANDING GEAR DOWN AND LOCK SENSORS
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
B [NA ]
HDW/_C
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MAIN LANDING GEAR
V070-510340
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTACT WOULD NOT BE MADE IF THE STRUCTURAL FAILURE OCCURRED,
THEREFORE NO INPUT WOULD BE OBSERVEDE BY THE C_W. -
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REFERENCES: MC_21-0011,V070-SI0201, 1170350
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20214 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WEIGHT ON WHEELS SENSOR - MLG
SHORTED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MAIN LANDING GEAR
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
WEIGHT ON WHEELS SENSOR - MLG
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: V070-510340
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE - CORROSION,
VIBRATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE TO FUNCTION PROPERLY COULD RELUST IN A LOSS OF ANTI-
SKID PROTECTION DURING ROLLOUT. THE BRAKES WILL FUNCTION WITHOUT
THE ANTI-SKID FUNCTION.
REFERENCES: MC621-0011,VO70-510201
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20215 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WEIGHT ON WHEELS SENSOR - MLG
SHORTED CLOSED _
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BRE_OWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
WEIGHT ON WHEELS SENSOR - MLG
CRITI_LITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3 _
3/3--
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MAIN LANDING GEAR
VO70-5i0340
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE - CORROSION,
VIBRATION. .............. _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _
A FAILURE TO FUNCTION PROPERLY COULD RELUST IN A LOSS OF ANTI-
SKieD PR-OTECTIDITDU_ING ROLZ_UT. _ THE____TION_WITHOUT
THE ANTI-SKID FUNCTION.
REFERENCES: MC621-0011,VO70-510201
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20216 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
UPLOCK ROLLER RETAINING ASSEMBLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
UPLOCK ROLLER RETAINING ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LI FTO FF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: 1170149 MENASCO, MC621-0011
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, VIBRATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE UPLOCK ROL_RRETAINiNG _SSEMBLY WILL NOT SECURE THE MAIN
LANDING GEAR IN POSITION, THE MAIN LANDING GEAR WILL BE LOOSE IN
THE MANI LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT. THE WEIGHT OF THE MLG AGAINST
THE DOOR COULD CAUSE AN INADVERTANT LANDING GEAR DEPLOY
DURING LAUNCH OPERATIONS OF DURING DEORBIT. THIS WOULDCAUSE
MAJOR DAMAGE TO THE VEHICLE AND AFFECT VEHICLE PERFORMANCE.
THERE WOULD BE A PROBABLE _SS OF THE C_W AND THE VEHICLE, .....
REFERENCES:
1170101
MC621-0011,VO70-510201, VO70-510202, 1170100,
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-79
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20217 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM: TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/I ......
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MAIN LANDING GEAR .........
1170353-101 MENASCO, MC621-0011
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE MLG TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY COULD CAUSE
THE GEAR TO NOT DEPLOY IN TIME FOR LANDING, THE MLG LOCK BRACE _
ASSEMBLY WOULD NOT FUNCTION PROPERLY, AND IT WOULD POSSIBLY NOT
SECURE THE EXTENDED MLG. THIS COULD CAUSE A COLLAPSE OF THE
MAIN--LAN_NG GE_WHICH WOULD CAUSE THE PROBABLE _SS OF THE
VEHICLE AND THE CREW. _..... -
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REFEREES: MC621-001i,VO70-510201, V070-510202, 1170100,
1170101
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20218 ABORT:
HDW/ JNC
i/i
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHOCK STRUT ATTACHING TRUNIONS
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
SHOCK STRUT ATTACHING TRUNIONS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: _ 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MC621-0011, VO70-510476
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE -
CORROSION - CRACKING, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF ONE OR BOTH OF THE SHOCK STRUT TRUNIONS
WOULD CAUSE A COLLAPSE OF THE MAIN LANDING GEAR. A FAILURE AT
TOUCHDOWN WOULD CAUSE A LOSS OF THE VEHICLE AND PROBABLY THE
CREW.
REFERENCES:
1170100
MC621-0011,V070-510201, VO70-510300,V070-510476,
.... REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-81
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20219 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
UPPER DRAG BRACE STRUTS (2 EA)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HDW/FUNC
i/1
i/I
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2}
3}
4}
5)
6}
7)
8}
9}
SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
MAIS; LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
DRAG BRACE ASSEMBLY -_
UPPER DRAG BRACE STRUTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC621-001i'0009, 1170360-501 MENASCO, 1170300-503--
MENASCO
2
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, ....
OVERLOAD, MECHANICAL SHOCK.
A FAILURE OF ONE OF THE ARMS OF THE UPPER YOKE ASSEMBLY OF THE
DRAG BRACE WOULD CAUSE FAILURES WHICH WOULD RESULT IN THE
COLLAPSE OF THE MAIN LANDINGGEAR. A LOSS OF THE VEHICLE AND THE
CREW WOULD BE PROBABLE WITH THIS FAILURE.
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REFERENCES: MC6_I-00iI,VOT0-510201, VO70-510300, 1170300,
1170301
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT: I/i
20220 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTER DRAG BRACE TRUNION (AT LOCK BRACE)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
DRAG BRACE ASSEMBLY
CENTER DRAG BRACE TRUNION (AT LOCK BRACE)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 1/1
3/3 TAL: I/i
3/3 AOA: 1/1
1/1 ATO: 3/3
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC621-0011-0011, 1170301-1 MENASCO (2EA) OR,
1170301-3 MENASCO (2EA)
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE -
CORROSION - CRACKING, OVERLOAD, MECHANICAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LOSS OF THE CENTER DRAG BRACE TRUNION WOULD CAUSE AN
IMMEDIATE COLLAPSE OF THE MAIN LANDING GEAR. LOSS OF THE CREW
AND THE VEHICLE WOULD BE PROBABLE.
REFERENCES: MC621-0011,VO70-510201, 1170300, 1170301, 1170350
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:: 11/28/86 HIGHESTCRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 20221 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM: LOWER DRAG BRACE TRUNION (ATTACHES TO SHOCK STRUT)
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR
SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
DRAG BRACE ASSEMBLY
LOWER DRAG BRACE TRUNION (ATTACHES TO SHOCK STRUT)
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBERz
MAIN LANDING GEAR
Mc621-oo11-OOil
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE -
CORROSION - CRACKING, OVERLOAD, MECHANICAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LOSS OF THE LOWER DRAG BRACE TRUNION WOULD CAUSE AN
IMMEDIATE COLLAPSE OF THE MAIN LANDING GEAR. LOSS OF THE CREW
AND THE VEHICLE WOULD BE PROBABLE.
REFERENCES: MC621-0011,VO70-510201, 1170100, 1170301, 1170493
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20222 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LOCK BRACE CENTER TRUNION
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MAIN LANDING GEAR
2) SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LOCK BRACE ASSEMBLY
LOCK BRACE CENTER TRUNION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A ENA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC621-0011-0011, 1170360-1 MENASCO (2EA), AND
1170361-1 MENASCO
CAUSES: MISHANDLING OR ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE -
CORROSION - CRACKING, OVERLOAD, MECHANICAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE OF THE LOCK BRACE CENTRAL TRUNION WOULD CAUSE THE
AFFECTED MLG TO NOT LOCK DOWN WHEN IT IS DEPLOYED. THE GEAR
WOULD COLLAPSEAT LANDING AND ALOSS OF THE VEHICLE AND THE CREW
WOULD BE PROBABLE.
r
REFERENCES: MC621-0011,VOT0-510201, 1170350
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20223 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
i/I
ITEM: SUPPORT BEAM
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MAIN LANDING GEAR
2) SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY
3) DRAG BRACE ASSEMBLY
4) SUPPORT BEAM
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: I/i
ONOR_IT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: 1170303 MENASCO, MC621-0011
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, CORROSION / CRACKING, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING OR ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A STRUCTURAL FAIL. OF THE SUPPORT BEAM WOULD C_AUSETORSION ON
THE DRAG BRACE ASSEMBLY THAT COULD CAUSE THE UPPER DRAG BRACE
TRUNIONS TO FRACTURE DUE TO TORSION. A FAILURE OF THIS NATURE
WOULD RESULT IN!HE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE AND THE CREW.
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REFERENCES: MC621-0011
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 20401 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
FAILURE MODE: BROKEN ROD / LINKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W, WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC287-0033-0007
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: STRESS / FRACTURE, MISHANDLING OR ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LANDING GEAR WILL NOT EXTEND OR RETRACT HYDRAULICALLY.
GRAVITY AND AIRFLOW WILL EXTEND THE LANDING GEAR.
REFERENCES: V070-573001
l
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-87
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT: 2/1R
MDAC ID: 20402 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
LEAK, EXTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
_fN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT ...... ?_
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
O}_OI_I'T: ° 3/3 AOA: 2lIE
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MC287-0033-0007
CAUSES: O-RING SEALS, VIBRATION, LOOSE BOLTS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF HYDRAULICS SYSTEM 1 AND THE LANDING GEAR WILL
NOT EXTEND OR RETRACT HYDRAULICALLY. THE LANDING GEAR WILL •
EXTEND BY GRAVITY AND AIR-F_W. .....
REFERENCES: VO70-573001
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20403 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
LEAK, INTERNAL PISTON
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC287-0033-0007
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: SEAL DAMAGE, MISHANDLING OR ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE HYDRAULIC PUMP WILL COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS OF FLUID.
REFERENCES: VO70-573001
L REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-89
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSISWORKSHEET............
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20404 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
RUPTURE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
_IN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RET_CT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/i_:
LIFTOFF: ......3/3 TAL: I/%_:
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
_DING/SAFING: I/1 _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATIOn:
PART NUMBER:
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MC287-0033-0007
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, MIS_LING OR ABUSE ..............
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF HYDRAUL!CSySTEM i. GEAR MAY BE SLOW TO DEPLOY IF THE
ACTUATOR JAMS UP OR IT MAY NOT DEPLOY AT ALL.
REFERENCES: VO70-573001
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 20405 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
FAILURE MODE: FILTER BLOCKED
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
2) MAIN LANDING GEAR
3) MAIN LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC287-0033-0007
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE WILL BE BLOCKED TO THE GEAR, BUT THE GEAR
WILL DEPLOY DUE TO GRAVITY AND AIRFLOW.
REFERENCES: VO70-573001
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-91
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20406 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
CAVITATION ORIFICE BLOCKED
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
z)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
_CATION:
PART NUMBER:
MAIN LANDING GEAR _.
MC287-0033-0007
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE CAVITATION ORIFICE IS BLOCKED THE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE IS
BLOCKED TO THE GEAR, BUT THE GEAR WILL DEPLOY DUE TO GRAVITY AND
AIRFLOW.
REFERENCES: VO70-573001
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
_DING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20407 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
FAILURE MODE: CAVITATION CHECK VALVE - OPEN / CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MC287-0033-0007
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE WILL BE BLOCKED TO THE GEAR, BUT THE GEAR
WILL DEPLOY DUE TO GRAVITY AND AIRFLOW.
REFERENCES: VO70-573001
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REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-93
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDA_ ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECE_RATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:2_407 A_0_T:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
FAILURE MODE: CAVITATION CHECK VALVE - OPEN /= CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIE_CHY:
i) MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
2) MAIN LANDING GEAR
3) MAIN LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
0N0_BIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/_
313
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MC287-0033-0007
C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE WILL BE BLOCKED TO THE GEAR, BUT THE GEAR
WILL DEPLOY DUE TO GRAVITYAND A!RFLQW.
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REFERENCES: VO70-573001 mm
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20408 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
CHECK VALVE - OPEN / CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC287-0033-0007
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CHECK VALVE HELPS REGULATE THE HYDRAULIC FLUID.
NEEDED FOR DEPLOYMENT.
IT IS NOT
REFERENCES: VO70-573001
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-95
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20408 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
CHECK VALVE - OPEN / CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TA.L: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 ........
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MC287-0033-0007
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CHECK VALVE HELPS REGULATE THE HYDRAULIC FLUID. IT IS NOT
NEEDED FOR DEPLOYMENT.
REFERENCES: V070-573001
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20409 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: M"LG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
FAILURE MODE: HIGH PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE - OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
"7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
313 ATO: 313
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC287-0033-0007
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: BROKEN SPRING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE RELIEF VALVE HELPS REGULATE THE FLUID FLOW DURING LANDING
GEAR EXTENSION. THE LANDING GEAR WILL STILL DEPLOY.
REFERENCES: VO70-573001
w
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-97
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 20410 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
HIGH PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE - CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
2) MAIN LANDING GEAR
3) MAIN LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
_ CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC287-0033-0007
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE RELIEF VALVE HELPS REGULATE THE FLUID FLOW DURING LANDING
GEAR EXTENSION. THE LAN-DING GEAR WiLL STILL DEPLOY,_
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20411 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
LOW PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE - OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: ..... 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MC287-0033-0007
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INTERNAL BYPASS OF FLUID RELIEVES PRESSURE WHEN THE GEAR IS
RETRACTED.
REFERENCES: VO70-573001
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REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-99
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 20412 ABORT:
ITEM: MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
FAILURE MODE: SHUTTLE VALVE READY (OPEN)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3 ,_
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MC287-0033-0007
CAUSES : CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE NORMAL POSITION FOR INFLIGHT OPERATIONS IS OPEN.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20413 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
SHUTTLE VALVE (CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MC287-0033-0007
CAUSES: BROKEN SPRING, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LANDING GEAR CANNOT EXTEND IF THE VALVE IS CLOSED.
FLUID CANNOT GET OUT OF THE BACK SIDE OF THE PISTON
HYDRAULIC
REFERENCES: V070-573001
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-101
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20414 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
I/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
TIMING ORIFICE BLOCKED
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) _I_ LANDING GE_ cOMPARTMENT _ _
2) MAIN LANDING GEAR
3) MAIN LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LTFTOFF:__ 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MAIN LANDING GEAR __ _ .... _.....
Me287-0033-0007
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TIMING ORIFICE IS USED TO HELP REGULATE THE FLOW OF HYDRAULIC
FLUID DURING _DING G_AR DEPLOYMENT-.-_IF _HE ORIFICE _D
THE GEAR WiLL__TE-ND OR THE TrME OF EXTENSION WILL BE
INCREASED.
REFERENCES: VO70-573001
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REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-102
wu
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID"
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20415 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
FAILURE MODE: LOW PRESSURE RELIEF - OPEN / CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
2) MAIN LANDING GEAR
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC287-0033-0007
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE GEAR WILL STILL DEPLOY. THE RELIEF VALVE WILL LIMIT THE
FLUID LOSS IF THE LEAK IS ON THE GROSS SIDE
REFERENCES: VO70-573001
i
C-I03REPORT DATE 02/13/87
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20415 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
FAILURE MODE: LOW PRESSURE RELIEF - OPEN / CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
CRTITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI_: 3/3 TAL: 3/3_ _
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _...... _- _.........
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR _ .....................
P--A/_T_MBER: MC287-0033-0007
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE GEAR WILL STILL DEPLOY. THE RELIEF VALVE WILL LIMIT THE
FLUID LOSS IF THE LEAK IS ON THE GROSS SIDE .....
B
mm
m
m
i
mm
|
|
i
mm
mm
REFERENCES: VO70-573001 I
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REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-i04
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w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20416 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT
TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER BOSS LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR EXTEND / RETRACT HYDRAULIC STRUT ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MC287-0033-0007
CAUSES: SEAL DAMAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1 AND THE GEAR WILL NOT EXTEND
HYDRAULICALLY. THE GEAR WILL EXTEND BY GRAVITY AND AIRFLOW.
REFERENCES: VO70-573001
w
n
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-105
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20501 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BREAKING
DOOR EXTEND / RETRACT MECH
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PHYSICAL BINDING / JAMMING /
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIE_CHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM
DOOR EXTEND / RETRACT MECHANISM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTO?F: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
HDW/FUNC
i/i
1/1
I/I
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: V070-510426
B [NA ] C [NA ]
t ; ........... 7_ _ _ _ 7 :
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALEs ..... ................................. . .................................... ,_
DOORS WON'T POSSIBLY OPEN. GEAR WILL NOT DEPLOY IN TIME FOR
LANDi_G ..........................................
REFERENCES: VO70-510201, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D
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REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-106
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mw
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM :
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20501 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/i
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BREAKING
DOOR EXTEND / RETRACT MECH
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PHYSICAL BINDING / JAMMING /
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM
DOOR EXTEND / RETRACT MECHANISM
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS :
3/3 TAL:
3/3 AOA:
1/1 ATO:
1/1
A [NA ] B [NA ]
HDW/FUNC
I/1
i/i
i/I
3/3
C [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: V070-510426
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DOORS WON'T POSSIBLY OPEN.
LANDING
GEAR WILL NOT DEPLOY IN TIME FOR
REFERENCES: VO70-510201, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D
w
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-107
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BREAKING
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20501 ABORT:
DOOR EXTEND /RETRACT MECH
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PHYSICAL BINDING / JAMMING /
HDW/FUNC
1/l
1/i
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM ........
DOOR EXTEND / RETRACT MECHANISM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAD_CH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
_CATIO_: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: V070-510426
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-P_T STRUC_ FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DOORS WON, T POSSIBLY OPEN. GEAR WILL NOT DEPLOY IN TIME FOR
LANDING
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REFERENCES: VO70-510201, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D
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REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-I08
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20501 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BREAKING
DOOR EXTEND / RETRACT MECH
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PHYSICAL BINDING / JAMMING /
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM
DOOR EXTEND / RETRACT MECHANISM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
1/1
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: V070-510426
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DOORS WON'T POSSIBLY OPEN.
LANDING
GEAR WILL NOT DEPLOY IN TIME FOR
REFERENCES: VO70-510201, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D
m
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-109
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS FLIGHT: I/i
MDAC ID: 20501 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM: DOOR EXTEND / RETRACT MECH
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PHYSICAL BINDING / JAMMING /
BREAKING
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
MAIN LANDING GE_
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR DEP_LQY MECHANISM
DOOR EXTEND / RETRACT MECHANISM
HDW/FUNC
l/Z=- ......
=i/i ....
i/i
3/3
cRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/5 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: I/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: V070-510426
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTU_RAL FAILURE
C [NA ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DOORS WON' T POSSIBLY OPEN.
LANDING _ - -
GEAR WILL NOT DEPLOY IN TIME FOR
REFERENCES: VO70-510201, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D
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i
wm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20501 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BREAKING
DOOR EXTEND / RETRACT MECH
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PHYSICAL BINDING / JAMMING /
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN LANDING GEAR
2) MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
3) MAIN LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM
4) DOOR EXTEND / RETRACT MECHANISM
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/i
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
I/I
i/i
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: V070-510426
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DOORS WON'T POSSIBLY OPEN.
LANDING
GEAR WILL NOT DEPLOY IN TIME FOR
=
m
w
REFERENCES: VO70-510201, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D
_ REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-lll
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20601 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DOOR OVER-CENTER BUNGEE
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE - BROKEN ROD
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM
DOOR OVER-CENTER BUNGEE
{
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART _MBER: V070-510440
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, STRESS.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DOOR MAY NOT STAY OPEN ONCE THE LANDING GEAR IS DEPLOYED
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REFERENCES: VO70-510201, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D
B i
i
i Z
D
B
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-i12
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
ii/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
_DING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20601 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MLGUPLOCK HOOK ASSEMBLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PHYSICAL BINDING / JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN LANDING GEAR
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM
GEAR UPLOCK HOOK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RT LS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MAIN LANDING GEAR
V070-510301
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, STRESS,DEBRIS.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GEAR WILL NOT DEPLOY.
REFERENCES: VO70-510201, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D
u
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-I13
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20701 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MLGUPLOCK HOOK ASSEMBLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PHYSICAL BINDING / JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) MAIN LANDING GEAR
2) MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
3) MAIN LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM
GEAR UPLOCK HOOK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: i/i_ _
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART_BER:
MAIN LANDING GEAR
V070-510301
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUC_L FAILURE , VIBRATION , STRESS,DEBRIS.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
GEAR WILL NOT DEPLOY.
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REFERENCES: V070-S10201, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D
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REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-ll4 _
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20701 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MLGUPLOCK HOOK ASSEMBLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PHYSICAL BINDING / JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM
GEAR UPLOCK HOOK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: i/1
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: V070-510301
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, STRESS,DEBRIS.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GEAR WILL NOT DEPLOY.
REFERENCES: VO70-510201, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-i15
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 20701 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM: MLGUPLOCK HOOK ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PHYSICAL BINDING / JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) MAIN LANDING GEAR
2) MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
3) MAIN LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM
GEAR UPLOCK HOOK ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: i/i _ ..... _,
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MAIN LANDING GEAR
V070-510301
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUC_L FAILURE, VIBRATION, S_SS,DEBRIS.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GEAR WILL NOT DEPLOY.
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REFERENCES: VO70-510201, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20701 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MLGUPLOCK HOOK ASSEMBLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PHYSICAL BINDING / JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM
GEAR UPLOCK HOOK ASSEMBLY
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: i/1
3/3 TAL: 1/1
3/3 AOA: i/i
I/i ATO: 3/3
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: V070-510301
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, STRESS,DEBRIS.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GEAR WILL NOT DEPLOY.
REFERENCES: V070-510201, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-117
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT: I/i
MDAC ID: 20701 ABORT: i/i
ITEM: MLGUPLOCK HOOK ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PHYSICAL BINDING / JAMM!NG!_
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) MAIN LANDING GEAR
2) MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
3) MAIN LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM
GEAR UPLOCK HOOK ASSEMBL_ ....................
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: V070-510301
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE , VIBRATION, STRESS,DEBRIS.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GEAR WILL NOT DEPLOY.
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REFERENCES: VO70-510201, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D
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REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-i18 _ _......
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20901 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DOOR HOOK ACTUATUON LINKAGE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PHYSICAL BINDING / JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM
DOOR HOOK ACTUATION LINKAGE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 1/1
3/3 TAL: i/i
3/3 AOA: 1/1
I/i ATO: 3/3
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: ME162-0009, V070-510201
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, STRESS,DEBRIS.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GEAR WILL NOT EXTEND IN TIME FOR LANDING. IF ANY HOOK GETS
DISENGAGED, THE DOOR WILL PROBABLY CRACK OPEN DURING ENTRY
RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF TILES AND A POSSIBLE BURN THROUGH.
REFERENCES: VO70-510201, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-I19
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT: 1/1
MDAC ID: 20901 ABORT: i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DOOR HOOK ACTUATUON LINKAGE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PHYSICAL BINDING / JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LAN])I_G _!_EAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM
DOOR HOOK ACTUATION LINKAGE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN _DING GEAR
PART NUMBER: ME162-0009, v070'510201
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 1/1
TAL: 1/1
AOA: 1/1
ATO: 3/3
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, STRESS,DEBRIS.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
GEAR WILL NOT EXTEND IN TIME FOR LANDING. IF ANY HOOK GETS
DISENGAGED, THE DOOR WILL_PR0_BLY_CRACK OPEN _Gk_NTRY
RESULTING _IN __SS OF TI_[S =_D_A POSSIBLE B_==_0UGH.
REFERENCES: VO70-510201, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20901 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/l
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DOOR HOOK ACTUATUON LINKAGE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PHYSICAL BINDING / JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM
DOOR HOOK ACTUATION LINKAGE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: I/1
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MAIN LANDING GEAR
ME162-0009, V070-510201
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, STRESS,DEBRIS.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GEAR WILL NOT EXTEND IN TIME FOR LANDING. IF ANY HOOK GETS
DISENGAGED, THE DOOR WILL PROBABLY CRACK OPEN DURING ENTRY
RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF TILES AND A POSSIBLE BURN THROUGH.
REFERENCES: VO70-510201, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D
C-121REPORT DATE 02/13/87
INDEPENDE_ ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20901 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DOOR HOOK ACTUATUON LINKAGE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PHYSICAL BINDING / JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKD_ OWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM
DOOR HOOK ACTUATION LINKAGE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 1/1
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: i/I
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR ......
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, STRESS,DEBRIS.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GEAR WILL NOT EXTEND IN TIME FOR LANDING. IF ANY HOOK GETS
DISENGAGED, THE _OR WILL PROBABLY CRICK OPEN DURING ENTRY
RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF TILES AND A POSSIBLE BURN THROUGH.
REFERENCES: VO70-510201, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20901 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/I
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DOOR HOOK ACTUATUON LINKAGE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PHYSICAL BINDING / JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM
DOOR HOOK ACTUATION LINKAGE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/!
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: ME162-0009, V070-510201
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, STRESS,DEBRIS.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GEAR WILL NOT EXTEND IN TIME FOR LANDING. IF ANY HOOK GETS
DISENGAGED, THE DOOR WILL PROBABLY CRACK OPEN DURING ENTRY
RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF TILES AND A POSSIBLE BURN THROUGH.
REFERENCES: VO70-510201, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D
C-123REPORT DATE 02/13/87
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET ....
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
20901 ABORT:
FAILURE MODE:
DOOR HOOK ACTUATUON LINKAGE
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/i
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PHYSICAL BINDING / JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) MAIN LANDING GEAR
2) MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
3) MAIN LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM
DOOR HOOK ACTUATION LINKAGE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: I/i .......
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART _MBER:
MAIN LANDING GEAR
ME162-0009, V070-510201
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, STRESS,DEBRIS.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GEAR WILL NOT EXTEND IN TIME FOR LANDING. IF _ HOOK GETS
DISENGAGED, THE DOOR WILL PROBABLY CRACK_ OPEN DURING ENTRY _
RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF TILES AND A POSSIBLE BURN THROUGH.
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REFERENCES: VO70-510201, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
21003 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: MLGUPLOCK ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: LEAK EXTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
2) MAIN LANDING GEAR
3) MAIN LANDING GEAR UPLOCK MECHANISM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
3/3 TAL: 2/IR
3/3 AOA: 2/1R
3/3 ATO: 2/1R
2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC287-0033-0002
B[F] c[P]
CAUSES: O-RING SEAL DAMAGE, VIBRATION, LOOSE BOLTS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1 AND THE GEAR WILL NOT RELEASE
HYDRAULICALLY. THE PYRO BACKUP WILL RELEASE THE GEAR ONE SECOND
AFTER THE COMMAND TO DEPLOY IF THE LANDING GEAR HOOK IS NOT OPEN
REFERENCES: VO70-573001
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-125
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
21004 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MLGUPLOCK ACTUATOR
BROKEN ROD / LINKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR UPLOCK MECHANISM _
CRITI_LITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ON01_BIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 2/IR
TAL: 2/IR
AOA: 2/1R
ATO: 2/ 1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR _
PART NUMBER: MC287-0033-0002
c[P]
CAUSES: STRESS / FRACTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE GE_ARWILLN_Q_LEASE_HyD_ULICALLY. .....THE PYRO BACKUP WILL
RELEASE THEGEARONE SECOND AFTER THE COMMAND TO DEPLOY IF THE
LANDING GEAR HOOK IS NOT OPEN
REFERENCES: VO70-573001
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REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-126
mw
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
21005 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: MLGUPLOCK ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: RUPTURE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR UPLOCK MECHANISM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 2/ 1R
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 2/ 1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC287-0033-0002
B[F] C[P]
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1 WILL BE LOST AND THE GEAR WILL NOT RELEASE
HYDRAULICALLY. THE PYRO BACKUP WILL RELEASE THE GEAR ONE SECOND
AFTER THE COMMAND TO DEPLOY IF THE LANDING GEAR HOOK IS NOT OPEN.
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REFERENCES: VO70-573001
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REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-127
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
21006 ............. ABORT:
MLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR
LEAK - INTERNAL PISTON
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR UPLOCK MECHANISM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MC287-0033-0002
CAUSES: SEAL DAMAGE _ _ _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE HYDRAULIC PUMP WILL COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS OF FLUID.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT: 1/1
21101 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MLG PYRO UPLOCKRELEASE
INADVERTANT FIRING
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM
MAIN LANDING GEAR PYRO UPLOCK RELEASE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 1/1
TAL: 1/1
AOA: 1/1
ATO: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC325-0019-0001
CAUSES: THERMAL, ERRONEOUS SIGNAL
B [NA ] C [NA ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LANDING GEAR WILL EXTEND CAUSING LOSS OF THE VEHICLE,
ORBIT RESCUE WILL BE REQUIRED.
DURING
REFERENCES: V070-510201, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D
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REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-129
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
21102 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MLG PYRO UPLOCKRELEASE
FAIL TO FIRE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM
MAIN LANDING GEAR PYRO UPLOCK RELEASE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
O}_ORBI'T: 3/ 3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
HDW/FUNC
I/1
i/1
1/1
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: MC325-0019-0001
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL FAILURE, CARTRIDGE FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LANDING GEAR WILL NOT LOWER, CAUSING PROBABLE LOSS OF CREW AND
VEHICLE DURING LANDING. THIS IS A BACKUP SYSTEM, IT WILL NOT BE
USED UNLESS THE PRIMARY SYSTEM FAILS.
REFERENCES: VO70-510201, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
21301 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/l
1/l
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MLG DOOR BOOSTER BUNGEE
FAILS TO FUNCTION
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREI_DOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN LANDING GEAR
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MAIN LANDING GEAR RETAINING ASSEMBLY
MAIN LANDING GEAR DEPLOY MECHANISM
MAIN LANDING GEAR DOOR BOOSTER BUNGEE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: i/I
3/3 TAL: 1/1
3/3 AOA: I/i
1/1 ATO: 3/3
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR
PART NUMBER: V070-510101
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: FAILURE OF LINKAGE OR SPRING, DEBRIS LOCKS UP SYSTEM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MAIN GEAR FAILS TO EXTEND IN TIME FOR LANDING
REFERENCES: VO70-510201, 13.1 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-131
INDEPENDENTORBITER_SESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/_NC
SUBSYSTEM: _DING/DECE_TION SYSTEMS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 30101 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: _I-SKID SE_CT SWITCH
FAIL_ MODE: SWITCH MAL_CTION
_D _ALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS _AD: W. _ISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIE_CHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) B_S _D _TI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
2) SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
3) _TI SKID SE_CT SWITCH _
_ITICALITIES
FLIG_ P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
_O_T: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
_D_D_CY SC_ENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
_CATION:
P_T_MBER:
ORBITER _BIN _A, FLIG_ CONTROL _A _ _!_
ME452-0i02-7201
_USES: BROWN CO_CTOR, CO_OSION ..........
EFFECTS/_TIONAT._:
NONE; _D_D_T SWITCH. EVEN IF _D_D_CY IS _ST, THE VEHICLE
SAFELY BE _DED IN THE M_AL MODE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
30102 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BRAKE PEDAL TRANSDUCER
NO TRANSDUCER DEFLECTION
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BRAKE PEDAL ASSEMBLY
BRAKE PEDAL TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
BRAKE PEDAL TRANSDUCER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 2/ 1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: ORBITER CABIN AREA, FLIGHT CONTROL AREA
PART NUMBER: 40-899-1, MC621-00SS
CAUSES: BINDING OR BROKEN LINKAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO SIGNAL OUTPUT FROM TRANSDUCER, THEREFORE NO BRAKING FOR THAT
SIDE OF THE VEHICLE. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE VEHICLE HAS A
REDUNDANT SYSTEM (THE OTHER PILOT).
REFERENCES: 13.2 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D
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REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-133
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 30103 ABORT:
ITEM: BRAKE PEDAL TRANSDUCER
FAILURE MODE: SHORT / OPEN (LVDT)
HDW/nmC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
BRAKE PEDAL ASSEMBLY
BRAKE PEDAL TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
BRAKE PEDAL TRANSDUCER
_ITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: ORBITER CABIN AREA_ FLIGHT CONTROL AREA .... _:_
PART NUMBER_ ......_0_§§-I, _ MC_2i-00SB ....
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION ........ 5__ ! _....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE LVDT WILL RESULT IN SLIGHT LOSS IN BRAKING EFFICIENCY
FROM THAT BRAKE CONTROL. THE OTHER BRAKE CONTROL COULD
COMPENS£TE_.............
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REFERENCES: 13.2 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
30104 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BRAKE PEDAL TRANSDUCER
SHORT / CLOSED (LVDT)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BRAKE PEDAL ASSEMBLY
BRAKE PEDAL TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
BRAKE PEDAL TRANSDUCER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ORBITER CABIN AREA, FLIGHT CONTROL AREA
PART NUMBER: 40-899-1, MC621-0055
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CLOSED LVDT WILL RESULT IN HALF-WHEEL LOCKUP WITH ANTI-SKID OFF
AT TOUCHDOWN CAUSING POSSIBLE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE. ANTI-SKID
WILL PROVIDE TOUCHDOWN PROTECTION IF IT IS ON
REFERENCES: 13.2 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-135
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT: 1/1
MDAC ID: 30105 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM: BRAKE CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: OPEN OR SHORT CIRCUIT RESULTING IN AN OPEN VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
BRAKE / SKID CONTROL BOX
BRAKE CIRCUIT _
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
_: 3/3 AOA: i/I
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: I/i _ _ _ T_
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ORBITER CABIN AREA, FLIGHT CONTROL AREA
PART _MBER: ....4_-_i_ _D_O-AI_°,_C_i_5 _ ......
CAUSES: FAILURE OF A RESISTOR, TRANSDUCER, BROKEN WIRE, ETCi._
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
B_ PRESS_ IS APPLIEp TO ONE WHEEL AT TOUCHDOWN CAUSING A
LO-_OF__D PR_TECTION_DB_ / WH-E_"L / TIRE DAMAGE.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CONTROL D_INGROLLOUT.
REFERENCES: 13.2 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D, ORBITER BRAKE AD HOC
COMMITTEE VOL.I
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
30106 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BRAKE CIRCUIT
OPEN OR SHORT CIRCUIT RESULTING IN A CLOSED VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
BRAKE / SKID CONTROL BOX
BRAKE CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER CABIN AREA, FLIGHT CONTROL AREA
42-40314 HYDRO-AIRE, MC621-0055
CAUSES: FAILURE OF A RESISTOR, TRANSDUCER, BROKEN WIRE, ETC..
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE-HALF OF THE BRAKE PRESSURE TO ONE WHEEL.
w
REFERENCES: 13.2 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D, ORBITER BRAKE AD HOC
COMMITTEE VOL.I
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-137
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
30107 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SKID CIRCUIT
OPEN OR SHORT CIRCUIT RESULTING IN AN OPEN VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
2) SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
3) BRAKE / SKID CONTROL BOX
SKID CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI_qSlrF: 3/3 TAL: .....3/3 ....
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _ _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ORBITER CABIN AREA, FLIGHT CONTROL AREA
PART NUMBER "-_ 42-4-O31-_-:_O-AIRE,_C_2_'-00_ _
CAUSES: FAILURE OF A RESISTOR, TRANSDUCER, BROKEN WIRE, ETC--_
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH THE ANTI-SKID ON, THE BAD CIRCUIT WILL BE DESELECTED
RESULTING IN _D-UCED B_ING. ..........
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REFERENCEs-- I_.2_SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. iOD, ORBITER B_AD HOC
COMMITTEE VOL.I
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
30108 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SKID CIRCUIT
OPEN OR SHORT CIRCUIT RESULTING IN A CLOSED VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
BRAKE / SKID CONTROL BOX
SKID CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SA_ING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ORBITER CABIN AREA, FLIGHT CONTROL AREA
PART NUMBER: 42-40314 HYDRO-AIRE, MC621-005S
CAUSES: FAILURE OF A RESISTOR, TRANSDUCER, BROKEN WIRE, ETC..
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH THE ANTI-SKID ON, THE BAD CIRCUIT WILL BE DESELECTED
RESULTING IN REDUCED BRAKING.
i REFERENCES: 13.2 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D, ORBITER BRAKE AD HOC
COMMITTEE VOL.I
w
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-139
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
_DING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
30109 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: ANTI-SKID FAIL CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: OPEN OR SHORT CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
BRAKE / SKID CONTROL BOX
ANTI-SKID FAIL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ORBITER CABIN _, FLIGHT CONTROL AREA
PART NUMBER: 42-40314 HYDRO-_IRE, _MC621-0055
CAUSES: FAILURE OF A RESISTOR, TRANSDUCER, BROKEN WIRE, ETC..
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CIRCUIT TO DETECT FAILURE MAY SHOW FAILURE WHEN THERE ISN'T ONE
OR WON'T SHOW ONE WHEN THERE IS ONE. EITHER WAY, THIS BY ITSELF
IS NOT A PROBLEM. COULD DESELECT A GOOD CIRCUIT OR VALVE
RESULTING IN REDUCED BRAKING CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: 13.2 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
30109 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ANTI-SKID FAIL CIRCUIT
OPEN OR SHORT CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
BRAKE / SKID CONTROL BOX
ANTI-SKID FAIL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER CABIN AREA, FLIGHT CONTROL AREA
42-40314 HYDRO-AIRE, MC621-005S
CAUSES: FAILURE OF A RESISTOR, TRANSDUCER, BROKEN WIRE, ETC..
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CIRCUIT TO DETECT FAILURE MAY SHOW FAILURE WHEN THERE ISN'T ONE
OR WON'T SHOW ONE WHEN THERE IS ONE. EITHER WAY, THIS BY ITSELF
IS NOT A PROBLEM. COULD DESELECT A GOOD CIRCUIT OR VALVE
RESULTING IN REDUCED BRAKING CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: 13.2 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D.
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-141
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
30110 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYDRAULIC PRESSURE REGULATOR
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
BRAKE / SKID CONTROL MODULE
HYDRAULIC PRESSURE REGULATOR
_7 L
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/i
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER "_ 48-043/_MC62i-0055 _ _i_i_=
c[P]
CAUSES: BRO=A_N SPRING, CONTAM=INATION .....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
3000PSI HYDRAULICS (S/B 1500PSI) BEING PROVIDED CAUSINGHIGHER
MODULATION ON BRAKING SYSTEM - TWO WHEELS. ON ABORT, EXTRA
WEIGHT WILL c_AUSE__DOWN__-PRES_.
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REFERENCES: 13.2 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D, ORBITER BRAKE AD HOC
COMMITTEE VOL. I
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REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-142 _i_
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
30111 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYD PRESS REG (SYS 2 & 3)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
BRAKE / SKID CONTROL MODULE
HYDRAULIC PRESSURE REGULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
HDW/nmC
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: 48-043, MC621-0055
ccP]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT - SWITCHING VALVES WILL TRANSFER TO STANDBY SYSTEM.
THE FAILURE CAN BE DETECTED ON ORBIT WITH THE CIRC PUMPS
OPERATING. SEE MDAC IOA # 30129
=
REFERENCES: 13.2 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D, ORBITER BRAKE AD HOC
COMMITTEE VOL.I
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r REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-143
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
30112 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INLET FILTER, HYD MODULE ASSY
CLOGGED FILTER (SYSTEM 2 & 3) ....
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
BRAKE / SKID CONTROL MODULE
HYDRAULIC MODULE ASSEMBLY
INLET FILTER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ON01_IT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] c[P]
LO CAT I0N:
PART NUMBER:
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
33-017 HYDR0-AIRE, MC621-0055
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT - SWITCHING VALVES WILL TRANSFER TO STANDBY SYSTEM.
THE FAILURE CAN BE DETECTEDQNORBIT WITH THE CIRC PUMPS
OPERATING. SEE MDAC IOA # 30130
REFERENCES: 13.2 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D, ORBITER BRAKE AD HOC
COMMITTEE VOL.I
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
30113 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DISPLACEMENT LIMITER, HYD MODULE ASSY
CLOGGED LINE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
2) SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
BRAKE / SKID CONTROL MODULE
HYDRAULIC MODULE ASSEMBLY
DISPLACEMENT LIMITER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: , 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MAIN LANDING _EAR COMPARTMENT
33-017 HYDRO-AIRE, MC621-0055
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF OR PARTIAL LOSS OF HALF BRAKING PRESSURE TO ONE WHEEL.
REFERENCES: 13.2 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D, ORBITER BRAKE AD HOC
COMMITTEE VOL.I
u
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REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-145
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
30114 ABORT:
ITEM: DISPLACEMENT LIMITER, HYD MODULE ASSY
FAILURE MODE: LEAKING LINE
HDW/nmC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
BRAKE / SKID CONTROL MODULE
HYDRAULIC MODULE ASSEMBLY
DISPLACEMENT LIMITER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
3/1R
3/3
=
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: 33-017 HYDRO'AIRE, MC_2i'O05S
c[P]
CAUSES: BAD FITTING OR SEAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SOME HYDRAULIC FLUID, HOWEVER, LIMITER WILL LIMIT LOSS.
LOSS OFFAL LOSS OF HALF BRAKING PRESSURE TO ONE WHEEL.
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REFERENCES: 13.2 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D, ORBITER BRAKE AD HOC
COMMITTEE VOL.I
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
30115 ABORT:
ITEM: BY - PASS VALVE, HYD MODULE ASSY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
BRAKE / SKID CONTROL MODULE
HYDRAULIC MODULE ASSEMBLY
BY - PASS VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
33-017 HYDRO-AIRE, MC621-0055
CAUSES: BROKEN SPRING, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT - HYDRAULIC PRESSURE REMAINS AVAILABLE
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: 13.2 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D, ORBITER BRAKE AD HOC
COMMITTEE VOL.I
w
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-147
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
30116 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM: BY - PASS VALVE, HYD MODULE ASSY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (SYSTEM i)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
BRAKE / SKID CONTROL MODULE
HYDRAULIC MODULE ASSEMBLY
BY - PASS VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GE_ COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: 33-017 HYDRO-AIRE, MC621-0055
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
3/3
c[P]
CAUSES: BROKEN SPRING, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SYSTEM WILL SWITCH TO STANDBY SYSTEM IF PRESSURE ISN'T MAINTAINED
WITHIN LIMITS. SEE MDAC IOA_# _ 30131 _
REFERENCES:_= f3_'SSSH, JSC i2770 VOL. 10D, ORBITER BRAKE AD HOC
COMMITTEE VOL.I
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REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-148
i
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
30117 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SELECTOR VALVE, HYD MODULE ASSY
LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S)
BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
BRAKE / SKID CONTROL MODULE
HYDRAULIC MODULE ASSEMBLY
SELECTOR VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 1/1
DE ORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
33-017 HYDRO-AIRE, MC621-0055
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAK WILL DRAIN THE PRIMARY HYDRAULICS SYSTEM, THEN AFTER
PRESSURE DROPS, DRAIN SECONDARY SYSTEM. WILL ONLY HAVE HALF
BRAKING TO BOTH WHEELS.
REFERENCES: 13.2 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D, ORBITER BRAKE AD HOC
COMMITTEE VOL.I
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-149
\INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
30118 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SELECTOR VALVE, HYD MODULE ASSY
JAMMED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
BRAKE / SKID CONTROL MODULE
HYDRAULIC MODULE ASSEMBLY
SELECTOR VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
33-017 HYDRO-AIRE, MC621-0055
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
WON'T OPEN CAUSING LOSS OF HALF BRAKING TO BOTH WHEELS.
REFERENCES: 13.2 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D, ORBITER BRAKE AD HOC
COMMITTEE VOL.I
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-150
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
30119 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SELECTOR VALVE, HYD MODULE ASSY
JAMMED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
BRAKE / SKID CONTROL MODULE
HYDRAULIC MODULE ASSEMBLY
SELECTOR VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
B [NA ] C [NA ]
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
33-017 HYDRO-AIRE, MC621-0055
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT UNESS LOSS OF THE PRIMARY HYDRAULIC SYSTEM.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: 13.2 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D, ORBITER BRAKE AD HOC
COMMITTEE VOL.I
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-151
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
30120 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BRAKE / SKID CONTROL VALVE
LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
BRAKE / SKID CONTROL MODULE
HYDRAULIC MODULE ASSEMBLY
BRAKE / SKID CONTROL VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
HDWIFUNC
3/1R
3/1R
3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0055
c[P]
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTING IN SYSTEM CLOSING DOWN VALVE - LOSS HALF BRAKING
CAPABILITY TO ONE TIRE.
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
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REFERENCES: 13.2 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D, ORBITER BRAKE AD HOC
COMMITTEE VOL.I
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DATE:
SUBS YS TEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
30121 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BRAKE/ SKID CONTROL VALVE
JAMMED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
BRAKE / SKID CONTROL MODULE
HYDRAULIC MODULE ASSEMBLY
BRAKE / SKID CONTROL VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RT LS : 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MC621-0055
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, FILTER CLOGGED, ORIFICE CLOGGED, ETC..
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTINUAL PRESSURE TO BRAKE RESULTING IN BRAKE / TIRE / WHEEL
DAMAGE AND LOSS OF CONTROL ON LANDING.
u REFERENCES: 13.2 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D, ORBITER BRAKE AD HOC
COMMITTEE VOL.I
w
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-153
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
30122 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BRAKE/ SKID CONTROL VALVE
JAMMED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
BRAKE / SKID CONTROL MODULE
HYDRAULIC MODULE ASSEMBLY
BRAKE / SKID CONTROL VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PI_ELALTN CH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0055
c[p]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, FILTER CLOGGED, ORIFICE CLOGGED, ETC..
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF HALF BFAKING CAPABILITY TO THAT ONE TIRE
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REFERENCES: 13.2 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D, ORBITER BRAKE AD HOC
COMMITTEE VOL.I l
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REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-154 i
wDATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
30123 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: EXCITER RING - WHEEL SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: SHORT OR NO INPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
EXCITER RING - WHEEL SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0055
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, FOD, BROKEN WIRE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO WHEEL INFORMATION TO BRAKE / SKID CONTROL CIRCUIT, THEREFORE
NO SKID CONTROL. WILL DISABLE THE SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF
HALF BRAKING TO ONE WHEEL
REFERENCES: 13.2 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D, ORBITER BRAKE AD HOC
COMMITTEE VOL.I
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-155
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 30123 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: EXCITER RING - WHEEL SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: SHORT OR NO INPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
EXCITER RING - WHEEL SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: _IN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0055
C [NA ]
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, FOD, BROWN WIRE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO WHEEL INFORMATION TO BRAKE / SKID CONTROL CIRCUIT, THEREFORE
NO SKID CONTROL. WILL DISABLE THE SYSTEM RESULTING iN LOSS OF
HALF BRAKING TO ONE WHEEL
REFERENCES: 13.2 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D, ORBITER BRAKE AD HOC
COMMITTEE VOL.I
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
30123 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EXCITER RING - WHEEL SENSOR
SHORT OR NO INPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
EXCITER RING - WHEEL SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0055
C [NA ]
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, FOD, BROKEN WIRE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO WHEEL INFORMATION TO BRAKE / SKID CONTROL CIRCUIT, THEREFORE
NO SKID CONTROL. WILL DISABLE THE SYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF
HALF BRAKING TO ONE WHEEL
L
m
REFERENCES: 13.2 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D, ORBITER BRAKE AD HOC
COMMITTEE VOL.I
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-157
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 30123 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EXCITER RING - WHEEL SENSOR
SHORT OR NO INPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
B_S AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
EXCITER RING - WHEEL SENSOR ....
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LocATION: MAIN LANDING GEA R COMP_TMENT
PART _MBER: MC 62 i- 00_$ _
C [NA ]
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, FOD, BROKEN WIRE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NO WHEEL INFORMATION TO BRAKE / SKID CONTROL CIRCUIT, THEREFORE
NO _ CONT_QLt_WILL DISABLE THE sYSTEM RESULTING IN LOSS OF
HALF BRAKING TO ONE WHEEL
REFERENCES: 13.2 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D, ORBITER BRAKE AD HOC
COMMITTEE VOL.I
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
30124 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/I
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
STATORS, ROTORS, CLIPS
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
WHEEL AND BRAKE ASSEMBLY
STATORS, ROTORS, CLIPS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
HDW/nmC
1/1
1/1
1/1
3/3
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
B [ P] C [ P]
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
MC621-0051
CAUSES: THERMAL, TORSION, HYDRAULIC RESONANCE, ETC..
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEEL LOCKUP CAUSING BLOWN TIRE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW AND
VEHICLE WITH HEAVY WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: 13.2 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D, ORBITER BRAKE AD HOC
COMMITTEE VOL.I
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-159
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
30125 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RUDDER / BRAKE PEDAL ASSEMBLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) FLIGHT CONTROLS
2) RUDDER / BRAKE PEDAL ASSEMBLY
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ORBITER CABIN AREA, FLIGHT CONTROL AREA
PART NUMBER: V070-573U_ .............
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, CORROSION / CRACKING, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILLrRE, MIS_L_N_-O_ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A STRUCTURAL FALIURE OF THE RUDDER / BRAKE PEDAL ASSEMBLY THAT _
CAU-SED A BINDIN_OF THE CONTRO_WD_LD CAUSE FLIGHT CONTROL
PROBLEMS DURING ENTRY THAT WOULD CAUSE A LOSS OF THE VEHICLE AND
THE CREW.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
30126 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RUDDER / BRAKE PEDAL ASSEMBLY
BINDING / JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) FLIGHT CONTROLS
2) RUDDER / BRAKE PEDAL ASSEMBLY
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
_DING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ORBITER CABIN AREA, FLIGHT CONTROL AREA
PART NUMBER: V070-573001
CAUSES: DEBRIS, FOREIGN OBJECTS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEBRIS OR FOREIGN OBJECTS IN THE CONTROL SYSTEMS DURING DEORBIT
OR LANDING OPERATIONS THAT CAUSED BINDING OR JAMMING OF THE
CONTROLS COULD CAUSE THE VEHICLE TO BECOME UNCONTROLLABLE. A
FAILURE OF THIS NATURE WOULD CAUSE A LOSS OF THE CREW AND
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: V070-573001
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-161
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATIONSYSTEMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 30127 ABORT:
ITEM: TRANSDUCERS,SENSORS(INSTRUMENTATION)
FAILURE MODE: FAILURE - NO DATA
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
HDW/_'_NC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LANDING / DECELERATION SUBSYSTEMS
2) TRANSDUCERS, SENSORS
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
313
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ORBITER CABIN AREA, FLIGHT CONTROL AREA
PART NUM BEE:
CAUSES : CONTAMINATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ALL SENSOR TRANSDUCERS ON THE LANDING /_ECE_RATIQNSU_YSTEM .....
EXCEPT FOR THE NOSE WHEEL STEERING DATA.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
30128 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: BRAKE HYDRAULIC LINE HEATERS
FAILURE MODE: BROKEN WIRE, THERMOSTAT FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
2) MAIN LANDING GEAR
3) BRAKE HYDRAULIC LINE HEATERS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
3/3 TAL: 3/IR
3/3 AOA" 3/IR
3/3 ATO: 3/IR
311R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC363-0044, MC363-0046
CAUSES: SHOCK CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HEATERS ARE USED TO KEEP TO KEEP THE HYDRAULIC FULID WARM BETWEEN
THE BRAKE / SKID CONTROL MODULE AND THE BRAKE MASTER CYLINDER.
THE HEATERS HAVE TRIPLE REDUNDANCY ON EACH LINE.
w
REFERENCES: MC363-0044, MC363-0046
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-163
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
30129 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYD PRESS REG (SYS i)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
BRAKE SKID CONTROL MODULE
HYDRAULIC PRESSURE REGULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: MAIN LANDING GEM COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: 48-043, MC621-0055
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT - SWITCHING VALVES WILL TRANSFER TO THE STANDBY SYSTEM.
SEE MDAC IOA # 30111. ....
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REFERENCES: 13.2 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL.10D, ORBITER
COMMITTEE VOL. I
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
30130 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INLET FILTER, HYD MODULE ASSY (SYS i)
FILTER CLOGGED
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
BRAKE SKID CONTROL MODULE
HYDRAULIC MODULE ASSEMBLY
INLET FILTER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
33-017 HYDRO-AIRE, MC621-0055
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT - SWITCHING VALVES WILL TRANSFER TO THE STANDBY SYSTEM.
SEE MDAC IOA # 30112.
i REFERENCES: 13.2 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL. 10D, ORBITER BRAKE AD HOC
COMMITTEE VOL. I
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-165
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS FLIGHT:
30 !31 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN
BY - PASS VALVE, HYD MODULE ASSY (SYS 2&3)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: W. WEISSINGER
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BRAKES AND ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEMS
SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
BRAKE SKID CONTROL MODULE
HYDRAULIC MODULE ASSEMBLY
BY - PASS VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/iR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
MAIN LANDING GEAR COMPARTMENT
33-017 HYDRO'AI_, MC621-0055
CAUSES: BROKEN SPRING, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SYSTEM WILL SWITCH TO STANDBY SYSTEM IF PRESSURE ISN'T MAINTAINED
W_I_ LfMfTS\ ....K _FA_L_ OF THE SY'STEM WILL_BE_TECTED ON ORBIT
WITH THE CIRC PUMPS OPERATING. SEE MDAC IOA# 30116.
REFERENCES: 13.2 SSSH, JSC 12770 VOL.10D, ORBITER BRAKE AD HOC
COMMITTEE VOL. I
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/05/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31100
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: ISOLATION DIODE (12), 1 AMP
FAILURE MODE: ELEMENT OPENS, HIGH RESISTANCE, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECEPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
PANELS F6A5 & F8A5
ISOLATION DIODES (12, 6 PER PANEL F6A5 & F8A5)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C 3 C [ ]
LOCATION: PNLS F6A5 & F8A5 34V73A6AS-AICRI,2,3,4,5,6
34V73A8AS-AICRI,2,3,4,5,6
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SUPPRESSOR DIODES TO LD GR EVENT INDICATOR COILS, LOSS OF EVENT
INDICATION NOT CRITICAL TO FLIGHT.
w
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 4,7,82,84,101,103
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-167
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/04/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31101
ITEM: PROXIMITY SENSOR BOX (2)
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
BRE_DO_ HIE_CHY-
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FORWARD MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLIES 2 AND 3
PROXIMITY SENSOR ELECTRONIC BOXES 1 & 2
05-6BA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/ 1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AREA 81 FWD AVIONICS BAY NO. i, 81VSIAI AREA 82 FWD
AVIONICS BAY NO. 2, 82V51A2
PART NUMBER:- MC452-0i24-0009 _
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
ERRONEOUS INP_, T_RMAL STRESS
P_O_S THE ELECTRONICS FOR SENSING THE DISCRETE POSITION OF
MOVING PARTS/ASSEMBLIES WITHIN THE LANDING GEAR CONTROL SUB-
SYSTEM. PROVIDES POWER, REG., AMPLIFICATION, SELF-TEST &
SIGNALIZATION T_OUGHCIRCUIT CARD CHANNELS TO DESIGNATED REMOTE
INADVERTENT POWER OUTPUT FROM ONE OF TEN POSSIBLE CHANNELS WITHIN
ONE OF TWO PROXIMITY SWITCH PACKAGES. TWO FAILURES: (I) LOSS OF
BOX AND (2) MIGHT NOT FIRE NLG EXTENSION PYRO
BACKUP UPLOCKRELEASE EVEN IF HYD. SYSTEM RELEASED NLG.
LOSS OF LANDING GEAR PYRO ASSIST FUNCTION AFTER TWO FAILURES
COULD _SULT IN LOSS OF C_W/VEHICLE IF AIR LOADS PRECLUDE DOOR
OPENING DURING LANDING.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 6,12,18,78,84,91,102,109
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RINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/04/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31102
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: PROXIMITY SENSOR BOX (2)
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FORWARD MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLIES 2 AND 3
PROXIMITY SENSOR ELECTRONIC BOXES 1 & 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AREA 81 FWD AVIONICS BAY NO. i, 81VSIAI AREA 82 FWD
AVIONICS BAY NO. 2, 82VSIA2
PART NUMBER: MC452-0124-0009
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES THE ELECTRONICS FOR SENSING THE DISCRETE POSITION OF
MOVING PARTS/ASSEMBLIES WITHIN THE LANDING GEAR CONTROL SUB-
SYSTEM. PROVIDES POWER, REGULATION, AMPLIFICATION, SELF-TEST &
SIGNALIZATION THROUGH CIRCUIT CARD CHANNELS TO DESIGNATED REMOTE
SENSORS. LOSS OF OUTPUT ON BOTH SENSOR BOXES WILL NOT PREVENT
THE FIRING OF NLG EXTENSION PYRO POWERED ASSIST WHEN COMMANDED,
BUT WILL PREVENT THE FIRING OF NLG EXTENSION PYRO BACKUP UPLOCK
RELEASE. HYD. SYSTEM WILL STILL EXTEND THE NLG. FUNCTIONAL
CRITICALITY EFFECT - POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF
LOSS OF ABILITY TO EXTEND THE NLG.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 6,12,18,78,84,91,102,109
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-169
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/os/86
EPD&C
31103
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION DIODE (3), 1 AMP
ELEMENT OPENS, HIGH RESISTANCE, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FPCA 1,2,3
ISOLATION DIODES (3), LDG 'ARM' STATUS/PWR MONITORS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: FPCA - 1,2,3 81V76A22AICRI7, 82V76A23AICRI8,
83V76A24AICRI2
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/_TIONALE : ............... _ ..........
PROVIDES ISOLATION BETWEEN DIFFERENT MAIN DC BUSSES SUPPLYING
POWER TO MDM MONITORS AND PANEL ANNUNCIATORS THROUGH EACH 'ARM'
RELAY. NOT CRITICAL TO VEHIC_OPE_TION OR CREW SAFETY.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/06/86
EPD&C
31104
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION DIODE (3), 1 AMP
ELEMENT OPENS, HIGH RESISTANCE, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FPCA 1,2,3
ISOLATION DIODES (3) , LDG GR 'DOWN' STATUS/PWR MONITORS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FPCA - 1,2,3
83V76A24AICRI 3
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
81V76A22AICRI8, 82V76A23AICRI7,
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES ISOLATION BETWEEN DIFFERENT MAIN DC BUSSES SUPPLYING
POWER TO MDM MONITORS AND ANNUNCIATORS THROUGH EACH 'DOWN' RELAY.
NOT CRITICAL TO VEHICLE OPERATION OR CREW SAFETY.
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REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 33,37,39
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-171
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 31105 ABORT:
ITEM: TRANSIENT SUPPRESSOR DIODE (4), 3 AMPS
FAILURE MODE: ELEMENT OPENS, HIGH RESISTANCE, SHORTS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LANDING GEAR CONTROL
2) FPCA 1 & 2
3) TRANSIENT SUPPRESSOR DIODES (4)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] C C ]
LOCATION: FPCA i&2 81V76A22-AICRI3, 81V76A22-AICRI4,
82V76A23-AICRIS, 82V76A23-AICRI6
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
LOSS OF TRANSIENT_ SUPPRESSION CAPABILITY. REPEATED CIRCUIT I
OPERATION OF CO_LS_'_wo-ULD POSSIBLY _GE _Y CONTA_S_BECAUSE
OF ARCING CAUSED BY INDUCED VOLTAGE ON REMOVAL OF POWER FROM
SOLENOID COIL, ........... ..............
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/05/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31107
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/ZR
ITEM: BLOCKING DIODE (2) 12 AMP, 400V
FAILURE MODE: ELEMENT OPENS, HIGH RESISTANCE
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LANDING GEAR CONTROL
2) FWD PCA - 2 & 3
3) BLOCKING DIODES (2, 1 PER FPCA - 2 & 3)
4)
5)
6)
";)
8)
9) 05-6BA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD PCA 2 & 3 82V76A23-CRI4 83V76A24-CR9
JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIODES ISOLATE RETURN BUSES BETWEEN FWD PCA 2 AND FWD PCA 3.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER
TO REDUNDANT SHUTOFF VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 58,61
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-173
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 31108 ABORT:
ITEM: BLOCKING DIODE (2) 12 AMP, 400V
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS, LOW RESISTANCE
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD PCA - 2 & 3
BLOCKING DIODES (2, 1 PER FPCA - 2 & 3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] cC ]
LOCATTON: _D PCA 2 & 3 82V76A23-CRI4 83V76A24-CR9
PART NUMBER: JANTXIN1204RA
CAUSES: PIECE-P_T STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIODES IS0_TE RETURN BUSES BETWEEN FWD PCA 2 AND FWD PCA 3.
POSSIB_E_ Lo_S_dF_E_URN BU_ _IS_T_ON _E_TwE'EN ?wb _CA _UMBERS 2 &
3 AND POSSIBLE CIRCULATING CURRENT BETWEEN FWD PCA 2 & 3.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 58,61
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/os/86
EPD&C
31109
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/iR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BLOCKING DIODE (2) 12 AMP
ELEMENT OPENS, HIGH RESISTANCE
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD PCA - 2 & 3
BLOCKING DIODES (2, 1 PER FPCA - 2 & 3), RPC POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION: FWD PCA 2 & 3 82V76A23-CRI5 83V76A24-CRI0
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ISOLATES TWO DIFFERENT MAIN DC BUS VOLTAGES AT THE RPCIS OUTPUT
FOR POWERING THE REDUNDANT SHUTOFF VALVE IN PARALLEL. POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER TO
REDUNDANT SHUTOFF VALVE FROM AN RPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 57,61
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-17S
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 31110 ABORT:
ITEM: BLOCKING DIODE (2) 12 AMP, 400V
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY"
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD PCA - 2 & 3
BLOCKING DIODES (2, 1 PER FPCA - 2 & 3), RPC POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA
0NORBIT: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: FWD P_CA. 2 & 3 82V76A23-CRI5 83V76A24-CR10
PART NUMBER: _JASVTX_I204RA .........=- .......
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
VIB_TIO_, __=_=SHOCK =_ _ : .... i
EFFECTS/RAT I ONALE :ZSOLATES_O"DiF_NT MAIN DC SUSVOLTAGESAT THE_RPe-'S_O_PUT
FOR POWERI'NG_ THE -_EDITI_ANT SHUTOF_ VALVe'S:IN PARASOL: _: :_SS OF
UNIT CAPABILITY TO ISOLATE THE TWO RPC OUTPUTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 57,61
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/08/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31111
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKERS (2), LG SENSORS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
PANEL L4
CIRCUIT BREAKERS CB59 & CB62
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[ P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL L4 31V73A4-CB59 31V73A4-CB62
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION TO THE PROXIMITY SENSOR BOXES.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF LOSS OF LANDING GEAR
SENSOR INFORMATION. VISUAL POWER INDICATION FOR SENSOR BOXES.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 12,79
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-177
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/o8/86
EPD&C
31112
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
CIR_IT B_RS (2), _ SENSORS
FAI_ C_SED, SHORTED CONTACTS
T._AD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS T._AD: SCHMECKPEPER
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
i) _DING GE_ CONTROL
2) PANEL L4
3) CIR_IT B_A_ CB59 & CB62
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_E HDW/_C ABORT
P__CH: 3/3 RT_ :
LI FTO FF: /NA TAL:
ONORB IT: / NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
L_DING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/_C
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
_D_DANCY SC_ENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
_CATION: PANEL L4 31V73A4-CB59 31V73A4-CB62
P_T _MBER: MC454"0026-2030 ........
_USES: PIECE-P_T STRUC_L FAIL_, MEC_I_L SHOCK, _
VIB_TION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION TO THE PROXIMITY SENS_ BO_S.
FAILU_ _S NO EFFECT ON SUBSYSTEM.
_FERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 12,79
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/28/86
EPD&C
31113
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PUSHBUTTON SWITCH (2), LANDING GEAR DOWN
FAILS OPEN (SWITCHES NORMALLY OPEN)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
PANELS F6A5 & F8A5
LANDING GEAR DOWN PUSHBUTTON SWITCHES (2), ILLUMINATED
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PANELS F6A5 & F8A5
PART NUMBER: ME452-0061-4145
B[F] C[P]
$2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES REDUNDANT MANUAL 'ON' CONTROL OF 28VDC FROM CONTROL BUS
TO LATCHING RELAYS FOR LANDING GEAR DOWN CIRCUIT; ACTUATION
SWITCH LIGHT COMES ON WHEN PUSHED. TWO IDENTICAL SWITCHES
PROVIDE REDUNDANT CONTROL BUS POWER TO COMMON LOAD.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF LOSS OF ELECTRICAL
CONTROL POWER.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 27,31
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_- REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-179
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 31114 ABORT:
ITEM: PUSHBUTTON SWITCH (2), LANDING GEAR DOWN
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED, SHORTED CONTACTS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
PANELS F6A5 & F8A5
LANDING GEAR DOWN PUSHBUTTON SWITCHES (2), ILLUMINATED
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS •
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: PANELS F6A5 & F8A5 $2
PART NUMBER: ME452-0061-4145
c [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION ..........................
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ..........
PROVIDES REDUNDANT MANUAL 'ON' CONTROL OF 28VC FROM CONTROL BUS
TO-LATCHING REI__R-__G_-_O__-_FAILUREPOWERS
RELAY PICK UP COIL(S) AND LANDING GEAR DOWN CONTACTS ARE
ENERGIZED, SERIES CONTACTS PREVENT ACTUATION OF LANDING GEAR."
NO EFFECT O_ C_W/VEH_C_. .....
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
31115 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LANDING GEAR TOGGLE SWITCH, S13
FAILS OPEN (SWITCH NORMALLY OPEN), FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
PANEL AI2
LDG GEAR TOGGLE SWITCH ($13)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: PANEL AI2 36V73AI2-SI3
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7256
] c[ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES MAINTAINED IOFF l AND MOMENTARY IONl POWER TO THE LANDING
GEAR ARM/DOWN RESET CIRCUIT. RESETS LATCHING RELAYS IN
APPLICABLE CIRCUITS, THE USE OF RESET CIRCUIT IS NORMALLY A
GROUND FUNCTION. FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT ON SUBSYSTEM. CB60
REMAINS OFF' UNTIL NEEDED.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONE 37
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REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-181
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/_C
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/1R
31117 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILLE MODE:
PUSHBUTTON SWITCH, LDG GR_, 4PDT, I_UMINATED
FAILS OPEN (SWITCHES NO,ALLY OPEN)
_D _ALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS _AD: SCHMECKPEPER
B_AKDO_ HIE_CHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
_DING GEM CONTROL
P_E_ F6A5 & F8A5
_DING GEM _M PUSHBUTTON SWITCHES (2)
_ITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT
P__CH: 3/3 RTT_q:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEO_IT: 3/IR ATO:
_DING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
_TION: P_ F6A5 & F8A5
P_T _MB_: _452-0061-4146
HDW/_C
3/IR
3/I 
3/IR
3/1R
C [ P]
34V73A6AL-SI 34V73A8AL-SI
mUSES: PIECE-P_T STRUC_L FAIL_, MEC_ICAL SHOCK,
VIB_TION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_;
PROVIDES _DUND_T M_AL 'ON' CONTROL OF 28VDC _OM CONTROL BUS
TO _TCHING _YS FOR _DING G__ CIR_IT_AC_AT_ON _D
STA_S MONITORS. _0 IDENTICAL SWITCHES PROVIDE _D_D_T
CONTROL BUS PO_R TO COMMON _AD. SERIES CO,ACT P_VENTS ..........
AC_ATIONOF _--DING GE_ (_ CIR_IT_N). POSSIB_ LOSS OF
C_W/VEHICT._ BECAUSE OF _SS OF E_CTRICAL CO_ROL PO_R.
_FE_NCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 43,47
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
31118 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PUSHBUTTON SWITCH, LDG GRARM, 4 PDT, ILLUMINATED
FAILS CLOSED, SHORTED CONTACTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
PANELS F6A5 & F8A5
LANDING GEAR ARM PUSHBUTTON SWITCHES (2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANELS F6AS & F8A5 34V73A6AS-SI 34V73ASA5-SI
ME452-0061-4146
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES REDUNDANT MANUAL 'ON' CONTROL OF 28VDC FROM CONTROL BUS
TO LATCHING RELAYS FOR LANDING GEAR 'ARM' CIRCUIT.
FOR HW CRITICALITY - LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO REMOVE POWER FROM
RELAY SET (PICKUP) COIL, NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 43,47
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REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-183
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
31119 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVENT INDICATORS (6)
ERRATIC OPERATION, FAILS TO OPERATE
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LANDING GEAR CONTROL
2) PANELS F6 & F8
3) PANELS F6A5 & F8A5
4) EVENT INDICATORS (LANDING GEAR)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAD_NCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: PANELS F6A5 & FSA5
RIGHT (DS'3) -UP/DN
PART NUMBER: MC432-0222-0023
B [ ] C [ ]
LG GR-NOSE(DS-I) LEFT (DS-2)
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL, MECHANICAL SHOCK,VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ _ .....
PROVIDES VISUA_ND_AT_9_ OF _P OR DOWN STATUS_FOR THE
INDIVIDUAL OPERATION OF THE NOSE, LEFT, AND RIGHT LANDING GEAR.
THE UNIT 'BARBER POLES' WITHOUT POWER AND DISPLAYS THE APPLICABLE
POSITION WITH POWER APPLIED,
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 4,7,81,84,100,103
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/08/86
EPD&C
31120
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BLOCKING DIODE (6) 3 AMP
SHORTS, LOW RESISTANCE
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LANDING GEAR CONTROL
2) FLCA - 2 & 3
3) BLOCKING DIODES (6)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL"
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/n_C
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] cc ]
LOCATION: FLCA 2 & 3 82V76AITCR (3)
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
83V76A18CR (3)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF HYBRID DEVICE CONTROLLER LEAKAGE CURRENT PREVENTION TO
NLG, RMG, & LMG BRAKE UPLOCK RELEASE PICIS 1 & 2. NOT CRITICAL
TO CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 13,19,54,63,85,94
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° REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-185
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
HIGHEST CRITICALITYDATE: 12/08/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 31121 ABORT:
T
ITEM: BLOCKING DIODE (6) 3 AMP
FAILURE MODE: ELEMENT OPENS, HIGH RESISTANCE
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
31ZR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FLCA - 2 & 3
BLOCKING DIODES (6)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
/NA TAL: 3/1R
/NA AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] c[P]
LOCATION: FLCA 2 & 3 82V76AI7CR (3)
PART NUMBER: JANTXV1N5551
83V76A18CR (3)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ARM SIGNAL TO PICtS FOR NLG, RMG, & LMG 'BACKUP' UPLOCK
RELEASE MEC_ISMS, CAUSING POSSIB_ LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 13,19,54,63,85,94
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B
rINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/o6/86
EPD&C
31122
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BLOCKING DIODE (2) 1 AMP
ELEMENT OPENS, HIGH RESISTANCE, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LANDING GEAR CONTROL
2) FWD PCA2
3) BLOCKING DIODES (2), POSITION INDICATOR PWR LG STRUT
ACTUATORS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FWD PCA2 82V76A23AI-CRI9 82V76A23AI-CR20
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MONITORING FUNCTION NOT CRITICAL TO VEHICLE OR CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONE 140
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-187
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET :
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/12/86
EPD&C
31123
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER (3 AMP)
FAILS OPEN (CB NORMALLY OPEN), FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDQWN HIERARCHY:
1) LANDING GEAR CONTROL
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PANEL RI5
CIRCUIT BREAKER (3 AMP), LG ARM/DN RESET
05-6BA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANZL RlS 32V_3A15-CB60
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RA_TIONALE: ..............
PROVIDESCIRCUIT PROTECTION BETWEENBUSIBC AND THE LANDING GEAR
ARM/DN RESET LATCHING RELAYS. NO EFFECT, CIRCUIT BREAKER
NORMALLY OPEN, EXCEPT FOR GROUND TEST. MANUAL SWITCH PREVENTS
PREMATURE RESET OF RELAYS.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONE 37
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/13/86
EPD&C
31125
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE (5 AMP)
OPENS, PREMATURELY OPENS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) LANDING GEAR CONTROL
2) LANDING GEAR ARM CIRCUIT
3) FWD PCA NO. 1
GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE (5 AMP)
05-6BA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LKNDING/SAFING: 3/IR
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/iR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: FWD PCA-I 81V76A22-F9
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-1021
c[P]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CHEMICAL
DEGRADED MATERIALS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES OVERLOAD PROTECTION TO LANDING GEAR CONTROL ("ALL LDG GR
DOWN") AND PUMP VALVES. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF
LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONE 69
i
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-189
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/13/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
31126 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE, (8), 1 AMP
OPENS, PREMATURELY OPENS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDO_ HIERARCHY:
I) LANDING GEAR CONTROL
2) PANELS F6A5 & F8A5
3) GENERAL PURPOSE FUSES (8)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/1R
ONORB IT: /NA AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANELS F6A5 & F8A5 34V73A6A5-F5,F7,F6,F8
34V73ASAS-F5, F7, F6, F8
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CHEMICAL
DEGRADED MATERIALS
EFFECTS/_210_A_z _
PROVIDES OVERLOAD PROTECTION TO THE MAIN LANDING GEAR "DOWN"
CONTROL CIRCUIT. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF LOSS
OF CONTROL ELECTRICAL POWER.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 27,32
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/13/86
EPD&C
31127
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE (i AMP)
OPENS, PREMATURELY OPENS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
e)
7)
8)
9)
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
PANELS F6A5 & F8A5
GENERAL PURPOSE FUSES (8); 1 AMP, LANDING GEAR "ARM" CKT
0S-6BA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LI FTO FF: /NA TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: PANELS F6A5 & F8A5
34V73A8A5-FI, F2, F3, F4
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0100
B[F] C[P]
34V73A6AS-F1, F2, F3, F4
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CHEMICAL
DEGRADED MATERIALS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES OVERLOAD PROTECTION TO THE MAIN LANDING GEAR "ARM"
CONTROL CIRCUIT. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF LOSS
OF CONTROL BUS ELECTRICAL POWER.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 43,47
..... REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-191
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/21/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31128
ITEM: RESISTOR (12), 10.2 OHMS, 2W
FAILURE MODE: ELEMENT OPENS, HIGH RESISTANCE
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
BRE_O_ HIERARCHY:
I) LANDING GEAR CONTROL
2) FLCA 2 & 3
3) RESISTOR (12), PIC ARM C_RCUITS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLCA 2 & 3 82V76A17-R(6) 83V76A18-R(6)
RW'R80SIOR2BR
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
PROVIDES CURRENT LIMITING BETWEEN HDC "ARM" SIGNAL OUTPUT AND THE
_D_NG GEAR PIC'S. POSSIB__S OF CREW/VEHIC__AUSE OF
LOSS OF PIC _ CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 13,19,54,63,85,94
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/21/86
EPD&C
31129
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR (12), 10.2 OHMS, 2W
SHORTS, LOW RESISTANCE
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FLCA 2 & 3
RESISTOR (12), PIC ARM CIRCUITS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/nmC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cC ]
LOCATION: FLCA 2 & 3 82V76AI7-R(6)
PART NUMBER: RWR80S 10R2BR
83V76AI8-R(6)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES CURRENT LIMITING BETWEEN HDC "ARM" SIGNAL OUTPUT AND THE
LANDING GEAR PIC'S. FAILS SHORTED CONDITION WOULD STILL CONDUCT
"ARM" SIGNAL TO PICARM CIRCUITRY EVEN THOUGH PIC OVERCURRENT
PROTECTION HAS BEEN LOST.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 13,19,54,63,85,94
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-193
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/21/86
EPD&C
31130
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION RESISTORS (18); 5.1K, I/4W
ELEMENT OPENS, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN _HIE_CHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
VARIOUS MDM MONITORING CIRCUITS
ISOLATION RESISTOR (18)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: VARIOUS LOCATIONS
PART NUMBER: 'R_670Si(_-I-GR ........
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CHEMICAL
DEGRADED MATERIAI_
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_ -,_ _2,_,_ _ _ _ _ __ _ ±_ _ _ o_ _ _ _:
LIMITS CURRE__LDG GEAR SENSING CONTROL, _.PQ__WER_M_0NITORING
CIRt'UITSBE_E_L_TOMDMWS FOR LDG GE_ CONTROL SUBSYSTEM.
NONCRITICAL FUNCTION.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/21/86
EPD&C
31131
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 7.5K, 2W
ELEMENT OPENS, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LANDING GEAR CONTROL
2) PNL A12
3) RESISTOR, 7.5K, 2W
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: PNL A12 36V73A12-A13-RI
PART NUMBER: RLR42C7501GM
c[ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LIMITS CURRENT IN THE ARM/DN RESET POWER STATUS CIRCUIT BETWEEN
ESSENTIAL BUS AND MDM MONITORING CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONE 37
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-195
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/21/86
EPD&C
31132
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR (3), 1.2K, 2W
ELEMENT OPENS, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LANDING GEAR CONTROL
2) FWD PCA I, 2,3
3) RESISTOR (3), ARM STATUS/MONITOR
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _ :
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: _W-D PCA 1,2,3
83V76A24-AIR86
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES:
] B[ ] C[ ]
81V76A22-AIR93 82V76A23-AIR99
MECHANiCAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION BY LIMITING CURRENT BETWEEN A MAIN DC
BUSS AND "ARM" RELAY MON_T_RING:CIR_TS. NONCRITICAL FUNCTION.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 33,36,39
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/21/86
EPD&C
31133
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR (6), 100K, I/8W
ELEMENT OPENS, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FLCA 2 & 3
RESISTOR (6), GSE TEST CIRCUITS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLCA2 & 3
RLR05CI003GR
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c[ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LIMITS CURRENT BETWEEN ORBITER GSE TEST CONNECTIONS AND TESTING
OF ORBITER LANDING GEAR UPLOCK CIRCUITRY. GROUND TEST ONLY,
NONCRITICAL FUNCTION.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 8,81,104
m
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-197
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
31134 ABORT:
RESISTOR (2), 1.8K, I/4W
ELEMENT OPENS, SHORTS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD PCA 1,2,3
RESISTOR (2), BLEED-OFF, RPC/MDM MONITORING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART _MBER:
FWD PCA 2 & 3
RLRC7CI80 IGR
82V76A23-AIR80 83V76A24-A!R74
CAUSES: MEC_i_L SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRQV!DESA_BLEE_cQFFoLI_E_TQ THER_TURN BUSS IN CASE OF ALEAKING
BLOCKING DIe. THE ALTE_TEPARALLELRPC IS USEDTO PO_R THE
REDUNDANT SHUTOFF VALVE. ALSO PREVENTS FALSE TRIGGERING OF MDM'S
OF2 OR OF3.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 57,60
I
u
mm
I
[]
N
m
i
m
mm
mm
mm
_-!l
m
B
I
w
m
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-198 u
mm
=J
r-
w
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/2 I/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31135
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR (8), 17.4K, 1/4W
FAILURE MODE: ELEMENT OPENS, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FLCA 1 & 2
RESISTOR (8), GSE PROX. SENSOR BOX 1 & 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FLCA 1 & 2 81V76AI6-R(4)
PART NUMBER: RBR54LI7401BR
] c [
82V76AIT-R(4)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LIMITS CURRENT BETWEEN GSE COMMANDS AND PROX. SENSOR BOXES WHEN
PERFORMING GROUND TARGET TEST.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 9,76
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-199
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/21/86
EPD&C
31136
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR (3) , 1.2K, 2W
ELEMENT OPENS, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD PCA 1,2,3
RESISTOR (3), DOWN STATUS/MONITOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3_
_IFT_FF: /NA TAL: 3/_-
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FWD PCA 1,2,3 81V76A22-AIR94 82V76A23-AIR98
83V76A24-AIR87
PART NUMBER: RWR80S12 IIFR
_L ....
-_.-_ :_, _ _ _ _ _ _:
CAUSES: MECH_CAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALEs ....... _,_.i_ii_i_,o_ ........_i_i__i_ ....
PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION BY LIMITING CURRENT BE_EN A MAIN DC
BUSS AND "DOWN" RELAY MONITORING CIRCUITS. NONCRITICAL FUNCTION.
REFERENCES : VS70-510109 ZONES 31,36,39
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/21/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31137
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE (2), 5 AMP
FAILURE MODE: OPENS, PREMATURELY OPENS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FPCA 2 & 3
FUSE (2), 5 AMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FPCA 2 & 3 82V76A23-F24 83V76A24-F6
ME451-0018-0500
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CHEMICAL
DEGRADED MATERIALS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
PROVIDES OVERLOAD PROTECTION BETWEEN A MAIN DC BUS AND THE
LANDING GEAR SUBSYSTEM LOADS CONSISTING OF PIC'S - 1 & 2 FIRING
CIRCUITS FOR: PYRO UPLOCK RELEASE NLG PYRO ASSIST AND REDUNDANT
SHUTOFF VALVE. LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER AND NLG MAY FAIL TO
EXTEND IN REQUIRED TIME RESULTING IN CREW/VEHICLE LOSS.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 56,62
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-201
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/21/86
EPD&C
31138
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR (2), 2.2K, i/2W
ELEMENT OPENS, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD PCA 2 & 3
RESISTOR (2), RPC OUTPUT/MDM MONITOR
CRiTICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: FWD PCA 2 & 3 82V76A23-AIR45
PART NUMBER: _20C2201GR
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
cc ]
83V76A24-AIR42
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LIMITS CURRENT BETWEEN RPC OUTPUT AND MDM MONITORING FOR RPC
OPERATING STATUS.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZDNES 57,60
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/21/86
EPD&C
31139
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K, 2W
ELEMENT OPENS, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD PCA 2
RESISTOR, 1.2K, 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FWD PCA 2 82V76A23-AIR88
PART NUMBER: RWR8051211FR
] c[ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LIMITS CURRENT IN LANDING GEAR STRUT ACTUATOR POSITION INDICATORS
FOR NLG, LMG, AND RMG DOOR BOOSTER SPRING LOCKS AND SHUTTLE VALVE
INDICATORS.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONE 140
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-203
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
31140 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE I)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD LCA 2 & 3
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (2), TYPE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/1R_
ONORBIT: .... /NA AOA: 3/iR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD LCA 2 & 3 82V76AIT-AR 83V76AI8-AR
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .....
WHEN THE "NLG NO-WOW" SIGNAL IS RECEIVED THROUGH A PROX. SENSOR
ELE. BOX, THE HDC CONNECTS MAIN DC BUSS POWER TO WOW CIRCUITS
WITHIN A BRAKE/SKID CONTROL BOX AND SIGNALS A MONITORING MDM.
POSS_ LOSS OF_fVEHICLE WITH LOss'OF _PABILITY TO SEND
"NLG NO-WOW" SIGNALS TO B_/SKID BOXES A AND B.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 103,110 VS70-520109
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-204
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/21/86
EPD&C
31141
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE 1)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD LCA 2 & 3
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (2), TYPE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: / NA AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION: FWD LCA 2 & 3 82V76AIT-AR 83V76AI8-AR
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN THE "NLG NO-WOW" SIGNAL IS RECEIVED THROUGH A PROX. SENSOR
ELE. BOX, THE HDC CONNECTS MAIN DC BUSS POWER TO WOW CIRCUITS
WITHIN A BRAKE/SKID CONTROL BOX AND SIGNAL A MONITORING MDM.
PREMATURELY CONDUCTS ONE OF TWO "NLG NO-WOW" SIGNALS TO BRAKE AND
ANTI-SKID SUBSYSTEM; NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109: ZONES 103,110; VS70-520109
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-205
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/21/86
EPD&C
31142
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE i)
LOSS OF OUTPUT, INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD LCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/31_
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FWD LCA-2 82V76AI7-AR
PART NUMBER: ....._477'0261J0002 ........
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHO_V_RATION _.... ...........
EFFECTS/RATIONA_ ....... !_ _ _ _........ _.....
mm_ T_ _L_ _C_m_S_A_ _S _CEIWD T_mo__R0X. SE_SbR
ELE-__BDX, THE_HDCCo_T_'A MAIN DC _BusS_Po_T0 _ COILS OF
THE TWO NOSE LANDING GEAR EVENT INDICATORS AND SIGNAL A
MONITORING MDM. NONCRITICAL MONITOR.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/21/86
EPD&C
31143
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE i)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD LCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
HDW/_C
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD LCA-2 82V76AI7-AR
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
c[P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN THE NLG UPLOCKED SIGNAL IS RECEIVED THROUGH A PROX. SENSOR
ELE. BOX, THE HDC CONNECTS MAIN DC BUSS POWER FOR ARMING LOGIC TO
NLG UPLK PIC #2 AND NLG UPLOCK AND EVENT INDICATORS, AND SIGNALS
A MONITORING MDM. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE WITH LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT POWER TO ARM PIC-2.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONE 104
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-207
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
31144 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE I)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LANDING GEAR CONTROL
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
FWD LCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIPTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/ZR
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD _-2 82V76AI7-AR
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
c[P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCk, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/_TIONALE ;
WHEN THE NLG UPLOC_D SIGNAL IS RECEIVED THROUGH A P!_OX. SENSO_
ELE. BOX, THE HDC CONNECTS MAIN DC BUSS POWER FOR ARMING LOGIC TO
NLG UPLK PIC #2 AND NLG UPLOCK AND EVENT INDICATORS AND SIGNAL A
MONITORING MDM. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE WITH LOSS
OF CAPAB_ITY TO AS_ST _ EXTESSI_0N.
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REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONE 104
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/21/86
EPD&C
31145
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE I)
LOSS OF OUTPUT, INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6RA
SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD LCA 2 & 3
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (4), TYPE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD LCA 2 & 3 82V76AI7-AR(2)
MC477-0261-0002
83V76A18-AR(2)
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN THE LEFT/RIGHT MG UPLOCK AND/OR MG DOOR UPLOCK SIGNALS ARE
RECEIVED THROUGH A PROX. SENSOR ELE. BOX, THE HDC CONNECTS MAIN
DC BUSS POWER TO THE RELATED MONITORING FUNCTIONS (I.E.
LEFT/RIGHT MG EVENT INDICATORS, AND MDM'S. LOSS OF CAPABILITY:
(i) TO ENERGIZE EVENT INDICATORS (DS2 & DS3) AND (2) SIGNAL
STATUS TO AN MDM. ALTERNATE MONITORING STATUS PROVIDED.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 8,18,81,94
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-209
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/21/86
EPD&C
31146
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE i)
LOSS OF OUTPUT, INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD LCA 2 & 3
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (2), TYPE 1
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS:
/NA TAL:
/NA AOA:
3/3 ATO:
3/3
] B[ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD LCA 2 & 3 82V76AI7-AR(2)
MC477_026i,0002 _
83V76AI8-AR(2)
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION -i _-:_: .... _ :.....
EFFECTS/RATIONA_:
WHEN THE LEFT/R_ MG DOWN_: Si_NAL IS RECEIVED THROUGHA _ i
_, _S-_-_X, THE___A_I_ DC_BUS_ _OWE_ TO THE
DOWN COILS OF THE LEFT/RIGHT MG EVENT INDICATORS AND SIGNALS A
MONITORING MDM. NONCRITICAL MONITOR._ ...........
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REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 5,84
mm
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-210
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/21/86
EPD&C
31147
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE 1)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD LCA 3
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE 1
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
/NA TAL: 3/1R
/NA AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
311R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD LCA-3 83V76AIS-AR
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
c[P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN THE NLG DOOR UPLOCKED SIGNAL IS RECEIVED THROUGH A PROX.
SENSOR ELE. BOX, THE HDC CONNECTS MAIN DC BUSS POWER FOR ARMING
LOGIC TO PIC #I AN NLG UPLOCK AND EVENT INDICATORS, AND SIGNALS A
MONITORING MDM. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE WITH LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT POWER TO ARM PIC-I.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONE 109
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-211
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 31148 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE i)
LOSS OF OUTPUT, INADVERTENT OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD LCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
313
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FWD LCA-2 82V76Ai7-AR
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
] c [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK,: VIBRATION ......
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
WHEN THE N_ UPLOCK AND N_ DOOR UPLOCK SIGNALS ARE RECEIVED i_
THRO[_A -_____ __-H_DC _EC_AIN DC _usS _
POWER TO "UP" COILS OF NLG EVENT INDICATORS, AND SIGNALS A
MONITORING MDM. NONCRITICAL MONITORING FUNCTION.
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REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONE 106
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REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-212
mm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/21/86
EPD&C
31149
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE 1)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD LCA-3
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
HDW/nmC
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD LCA-3 83V76AIS-AR
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
ccP]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN THE NLG DOOR UPLOCKED SIGNAL IS RECEIVED THROUGH A PROX.
SENSOR ELE. BOX, THE HDC CONNECTS MAIN DC BUSS POWER FOR ARMING
LOGIC TO PIC #i AND NLG UPLOCK AND EVENT INDICATORS, AND SIGNALS
A MONITORING MDM. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE WITH LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO ASSIST NLG EXTENSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONE 109
W
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-213
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/21/86
EPD&C
31150
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
_BRID DRIVER CONTROL_R (TYPE 1)
_SS OF OUTPUT
T._AD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS T._AD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
a)
9)
_DING GEAR CONTROL
FWD LCA - 2 & 3
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROL_R (4), TYPE 1
05-6BA
FLIGHT PHASE
PRE_CH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBiT: /NA
DEORBIT: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
CRITICALITIES
HDW/_C ABORT
RT_:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/_C
2/IS
211R
2/1R
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
_CATION: _D LCA - 2 & 3
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
B[F]
82V76A!7-AR(2)
c[P]
83V76AI8-AR(2)
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION :.....
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
AFTER RECEIVING THE N_ "DOWN" STIMULI, _THE HDC'S CONDUCT "FIRE"
COMMAND TO NLG PIC'S 1 & 2 FIRE-1 & FIRE-2 CIR_ITS FOR CHARGE
INITIATION OF NLG EXTENSION POWERED ASSIST SUBSYSTEM. POSSIBLE
FAIL T0_X__IN THE _QUIRED T_ME. :
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 127,130
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/21/86
EPD&C
31151
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE i)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD LCA - 2 & 3
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (4), TYPE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/1R
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FWD LCA - 2 & 3
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
B [ F ]
82V76A17-AR(2)
c[P]
83V76AI8-AR(2)
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFTER RECEIVING THE NLG "DOWN" STIMULI, THE HDC'S CONDUCT "FIRE"
COMMANDS TO NLG PIC'S 1 & 2 FIRE-1 & FIRE-2 CIRCUITS FOR CHARGE
INITIATION OF NLG EXTENSION POWERED ASSIST SUBSYSTEM. POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF PREMATURE COMPLETION OF PIC
FIRING SEQUENCE.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 127,130
w
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-215
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 31152 ABORT:
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE II)
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
HDW/ru'NC
2/IR
2/1R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LANDING GEAR CONTROL
2) FWD LCA - 2 & 3
3) HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (4), TYPE II
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/1R
ONORB_T: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: FWD LCA - 2 & 3 82V76A17-AR(2)
PART NUMBER: MC477-0262-0002
83V76AI8-AR(2)
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUC_L FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THE_RMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION ....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN THE "ARM & DOWN" SIGNALS ARE RECEIVED , THE HDC CO I_h'ECTS_
INPUT POWER (AFTER A ONE SECOND DELAY) TO THE FIRE-1 CIRCUIT AND
SIGNALS A SERIES HDC WHICH DELAYS FIRE-2 COMMAND FOR ONE SECOND.
THEN A_G__"E3CTTU-T_CI_-PTL'c-_]_XT_S_0_
POWERED_-AS_ISTFUNCTION. _P6E_ LOSSbF CREW/vET_-BECAUSE
OF SECOND FAILURE; THE NLG MAY FAIL TO EXTEND IN REQUIRED TIME.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 127,130
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REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-216_
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/21/86
EPD&C
31153
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE II)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LANDING GEAR CONTROL
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
FWD LCA - 2 & 3
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (4), TYPE II
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD LCA - 2 & 3 82V76AI7-AR(2)
MC477-0262-0002
c[P]
83V76AI8-AR(2)
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN THE "ARM & DOWN" SIGNALS ARE RECEIVED, THE HDC CONNECTS
INPUT POWER (AFTER A ONE SECOND DELAY) TO THE FIRE-1 CIRCUIT AND
SIGNALS A SERIES HDC WHICH DELAYS FIRE-2 COMMAND FOR ONE SECOND.
THEN A SIGNAL IS SENT TO THE ASSOCIATED PIC FOR NLG EXTENSION
POWERED ASSIST FUNCTION. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE
OF PREMATURE COMPLETION OF PIC FIRING SEQUENCE.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 127,130
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-217
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/21/86
EPD&C
31154
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/iR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE 3)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
B_DOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD LCA- 2 & 3
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (2), TYPE III
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LO  ION: LCA- 2 82V76A1 - a
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
/NA TAL: 3/1R
/NA AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
311R
C[P]
83V76AI8-AR
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION .......
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
WHEN ARM & DOWN COMMANDS ARE RECEIVED BY NLG PIC'9_ i & 2, THE HDC
CONNECTS INPUT POWER TO THE PIC'S ARM LOGIC AND ENABLES THE FIRE-
2 AND PYRO ASSIST FOR NLG EXTENSION. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CRE_W/%'E_USE OF i-_i _ ELECTRiCA_ i_ TOI_ PIC'S.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 54,63
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/21/86
EPD&C
31155
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE 3)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD LCA - 2 & 3
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (2), TYPE III
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD LCA - 2 & 3 82V76A17-AR 83V76AIS-AR
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN ARM & DOWN COMMANDS ARE RECEIVED BY NLG PICWS 1 & 2, THE HDC
CONNECTS INPUT POWER TO THE PIC'S ARM LOGIC AND ENABLES THE FIRE-
2 AND PYRO ASSIST FOR NLG EXTENSION. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF PREMATURE COMPLETION OF PIC FIRING
SEQUENCE.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 54,63
w
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-219
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 31156 ABORT:
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE i)
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT _ •
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
_)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD LCA - 2 & 3
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (6), TYPE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/1R
ONORBiT: /NA AOA: 3/iR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION: FWD LCA - 2 & 3 82V76AI7-AR(3) 83V76AI8-AR(3)
PART NUMBER: _ M0477-0261-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_ z ....._.................... _ _.__ _ ..........=_ ...
WHEN FIRE COMMAND IS RECEIVED, THE HDC C0_ECTS DC_ INPUT pO_R TO
THE-FIRING CIRCUIT WITHINA PIC. THE HDC'S ARE USED FOR THE
FIRING CIRCUIT (FIRE-l) FOR THE LANDING GEAR PIC'S. POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/V-EH_I__E OF' _SS _E_CTRICAL_PO-W_-TD FIRE
PIC 'S.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 16,21,54,63,88,96
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/21/86
EPD&C
31157
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE I)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD LCA - 2 & 3
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (6), TYPE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/1R
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FWD LCA - 2 & 3
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
B [ F]
82V76AI7-AR(3)
c[P]
83V76A18-AR(3)
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN FIRE COMMAND IS RECEIVED, THE HDC CONNECTS DC INPUT POWER TO
THE FIRING CIRCUIT WITH A PIC. THE HDC'S ARE USED FOR THE FIRING
CIRCUIT (FIRE-l) FOR THE LANDING GEAR PIC'S. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF PREMATURE COMPLETION OF PIC FIRING
SEQUENCE.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 16,21,54,63,88,96
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-221
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
31158 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE i)
LOSS OF OUTPUT, INADVERTENT OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) LANDING GEAR CONTROL
2) FWD LCA - 2 & 3
3) HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (2), TYPE 1
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS:
/NA TAL:
/NA AOA:
3/3 ATO:
3/3
A [
HDW/FUNC
3/3 ....
3/3
3/3
3/3
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD LCA - 2 & 3
MC477-0261-0002
B [ ] C [ ]
82V76A17-AR 83V76AI8-AR
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN THE LEFT/RIGHT (MG-NO-WOW) SIGNAL IS _CEIVE_THROUGH A i_i_ii
PROX. SEIg_!_--E_._-_OX, +THE_'H_C_6NNE_TS A MAIN DC BUSS POWER FOR
STATUS INDICATION OF LEFT/RIGHT MG-NO-WOW, AND THEN SIGNALS A
MONITORING MDM. NONCRITICAL MONITOR.
REFERENCES: VS70-510i09 ZONES 7,80
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/21/86
EPD&C
31159
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE II)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD LCA - 2 & 3
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (2), TYPE II
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FWD LCA 82V76AI7-AR
PART NUMBER: MC477-0262-0002
B[F]
83V76AIS-AR
c[P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN THE "ARM", "DOWN", AND "NLG UPLOCK" SIGNALS ARE RECEIVED,
THE HDC CONNECTS INPUT POWER (AFTER A ONE SECOND DELAY) TO THE
FIRE-2 SIGNAL INPUT OF THE "NLG BACKUP UPLOCK RELEASE" CIRCUITRY
OF A NLG PIC. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF LOSS
OF FIRE-2 SIGNAL TO ONE OF THE TWO PIC'S.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 54,63
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-223
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
31160 ABORT:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE II)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIE_CHY:
i) LANDING GEAR CONTROL
2) FWD LCA - 2 & 3
3) HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (2), TYPE II
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/1R
DEORB7T: 3/ 1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD LCA 82V76AI7-AR 83V76AI8-AR
MC477'0262-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THE_AL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RA!IONALE •......................
WHEN THE "ARM", "DOWN", AND "NLG UPLOCK" SIGNALS _ RECEfVED,_ "
_'HD_-CONNE_TS I_-PUT POWER _FTEI_ A_'0}¢E SECOND DE_Y) TO THE
FIRE-2 SIGNAL INPUT OF THE "NLG BACKUP UPLOCK RELEASE" CIRCUITRY
oF A _L_ r_cI'_,,,-_O-SSiBLE_SS OF e_W/y_._C_ ' _.CA_S_ 0_ ....._ _
PREMATURE _D_DUCTION OF ONE OF TWO REQUIRED SIGNALS TO THE FIRE-2
LOGIC CIRCUITS.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES_54,63
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/21/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31161
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE1)
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD LCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 4 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: FWD LCA-2 82V76A17-AR
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
c[P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE HDC CONNECTS MAIN BUS DC POWER TO "WOW2" CIRCUITS WITHIN
BRAKE/SKID CONTROL BOX A. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE
OF LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO SEND "NLG NO-WOW2" SIGNAL TO BRAKE/SKID
CONTROL BOX A.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONE 102
t
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-225
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/21/86
EPD&C
31162
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE I)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT ....
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
_DING GEAR CONTROL
FWD LCA-2
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD LcA-2 82V76AI7-AR
MC477-0261-0002
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIB_T_ON
EFFECTS/RATIONALE : _ ............_ _ _.......
THE HDC CONNECTS MAIN BUS DC POWER TO "wOW2" CIRCUITS WITHIN
BRAKE/SKID CONTROL BOXES. PREMATURELY CONDUCTS POWER TO ANOTHER
HDC (WHICH IS INHIBITED), WHICH HAS NO EFFECT ON IT.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONE 102
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12121186
EPD&C
31163
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE II)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD LCA - 2 & 3
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (4), TYPE II
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 4 ]
LOCATION: FWD LCA - 2 & 3
PART NUMBER: MC477-0262-0002
B [ F ]
82V76AI7-AR(2)
c[P]
83V76AI8-AR(2)
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN THE "ARM & DOWN" SIGNALS ARE RECEIVED, THE HDC (AFTER A 1
SECOND DELAY) CONNECTS INPUT POWER TO THE FIRE-2 CIRCUIT OF THE
LEFT/RIGHT EMERGENCY UPLOCK RELEASE ON PIC'S 1 & 2. POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER TO SEND
FIRE-2 COMMAND TO LEFT/RIGHT PIC'S 1 & 2.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 14,20,87,94
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-227
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 31164 ABORT:
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE II)
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY x
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD LCA - 2 & 3
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (4), TYPE II
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LI?TOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 4 ]
LOCATION: FWD LCA - 2 & 3
PA_T-_R: MC477-0262-0002
..... L _2L, L_L
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
/NA TAL: 3/iR
/NA AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
311R
B [ F] C [ P]
82V76AIV-AR(2) S3VV6AlS-AR(2) _
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THEmAL
"S_[0-C_,V_O_ "__ _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
WHEN THE "ARM & DOWN" SIGNALS ARE RECEIVED, THE HDC (AFTER A 1
SEC0_D-D-E_) C_NNECTS YN_UT'_OW_-T__?I_-2 _IRCUIT:O? TH-E
LEFT/RIGHT EMERGENCY UPLOCK RELEASE ON PIC'S 1 & 2. POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF PREMATURE COMPLETION OF PIC
FIRING SEQUENCE. _ _ ........................
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/21/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31165
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/1R
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE III)
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD LCA - 2 & 3
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (4), TYPE III
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
/NA TAL: 3/ 1R
/NA AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 4 ]
LOCATION: FWD LCA - 2 & 3
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
B [ F ]
82V76AI7-AR(2)
c[P]
83V76AI8-AR(2)
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN LEFT/RIGHT UPLOCKED SIGNALS ARE RECEIVED, THE HDC CONNECTS
INPUT POWER TO "ARM" CIRCUIT OF LEFT/RIGHT MAIN GEAR UPLOCK
RELEASE PIC'S 1 & 2. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF
LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER TO SEND ARM COMMAND TO LEFT/RIGHT
PIC'S 1 & 2.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 12,19,85,93
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-229
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
31i66 _ ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
311R
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE III)
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD LCA - 2 & 3
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (4), TYPE III
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBI T: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 4 ]
LOCATION: FWD LCA - 2 & 3
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
B [ F ]
82V76AI7-AR(2)
c[P]
83V76A18-AR(2)_I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
_CK, VIBR_TI0_
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
WHEN LEFT/RIGHT UPLOCKED SIGNALS ARE RECEIVED_THE HDC CONNECTS _
INPUT POWER TO "ARM" cIRCUIT OF LEFT/RIGHT MAIN GEAR UPLOCK
RELEASE PIC'S 1 & 2. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF
PREMATURE COMPLETION OF PIC ARM SEQUENCE.
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uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/21/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31167
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE i)
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LANDING GEAR CONTROL
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
FWD LCA- 2 & 3
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (2), TYPE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD LCA- 2 & 3 82V76AIT-AR 83V76AIS-AR
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HDC'S POWER LEFT/RIGHT MAIN GEAR EVENT INDICATORS (DS3,DS2),
NONCRITICAL MONITORING FUNCTION.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 14,87
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-231
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 31168 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM: LATCHING RELAY (6), LDG GR 'ARM' CONTROL CIRCUITS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD PCA-I, 2,3
LATCHING RELAY (6), 4PDT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
c[p]
LOCATION: FWD PCA-I, 2,3 82V76A23-K7,KI5 81V76A22-K6,K7
83V76A24-K8, K11
PART NUMBER: MC455-0128-0001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, ME_HANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, CHEMICAL DEGRADED MATERIALS
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:_ ...._ .......i_i_ _....._ .........._ _.....i
! !THE _Y _S _D_CO_NECTS_=MONITORS ?OR THe._LDG_GR _CONTROL
VALVES, PYRO UPLOCK RELEASE CIRCUITS AND NLG EXT PYRO ASSIST
CKTS. THE ASSOCIATED LDG GR 'DOWN' RELAYS, _EN COMMANDED,
COMP_S __ES CIRCUIT _-AL_WS_FOR PROTECTION AGAINST
PREMATURES. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF SECOND
FAILURE; NLG MAY FAIL TO EXTEND IN THE REQUIRED AMOUNT OF TIME.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 33,38,41,57,62,68
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
31169 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LATCHING RELAY (6), LDG GR 'ARM' CONTROL CIRCUITS
FAILS CLOSED, SHORTED CONTACTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD PCA-I,2,3
LATCHING RELAY (6), 4PDT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P]
LOCATION: FWD PCA-I,2,3 82V76A23-K7,KI5
83V76A24-K8,KII
PART NUMBER: MC455-0128-0001
c[P]
81V76A22-K6,K7
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE RELAY 'ARMS'AND CONNECTS MONITORS FOR THE LDG GR CONTROL
VALVES, PYRO UPLOCK RELEASE CIRCUITS AND NLG EXT PYRO ASSIST
CKTS. THE ASSOCIATED LDG GR 'DOWN' RELAYS, WHEN COMMANDED,
COMPLETES THE SERIES CIRCUIT AND ALLOWS FOR PROTECTION AGAINST
PREMATURES. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF LOSS OF
'DOWN' RELAY REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 33,38,41,57,62,68
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-233
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/1R
31170 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LATCHING RELAY (6), LDG GR 'DOWN' CONTROL CIRCUITS
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) LANDING GEAR CONTROL
2) FWD PCA-I,2,3
3) LATCHING RELAY (6), 4PDT
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD PCA-1, 2,3 81V76A22-K8 82V76A23-K6, K8
83V76A24-K7, K9, KI0
PART NUMBER: MC455-0128-0001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATiONA 
: ..... _ 2 L
THE 'LDG GR DOWN' RELAYS WITH THE 'ARM' RELAYS ACTUATES THE
CIRCUITS FOR THE LDG GR CONTROL VALVES, PYRO UPLOCK RELEASE CRTS,
___ST _. -_PROTECTIO_ XGAiNS_'T PRE---MA_ES AND
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITHIN LDG GR CIRCUITS. POSSIBLE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF SECOND FAILURE; NLG MAY FAIL TO EXTEND
IN THE REQUIRED AMOUNT OF TIME .....
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 32,36,40,56,62,69
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=INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/1R
31171 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LATCHING RELAY (6), LDG GR 'DOWN' CONTROL CIRCUITS
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: G, BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) LANDING GEAR CONTROL
2) FWD PCA-1, 2,3
3) LATCHING RELAY (6), 4 PDT
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] c[P]
LOCATION: FWD PCA-1, 2,3 81V76A22-K8
83V76A24-K7, K9, KI0
PART NUMBER: MC455-0128-0001
82V76A23-K6, K8
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE ILDG GR DOWN l RELAYS WITH THE 'ARM' RELAYS ACTUATES THE
CIRCUITS FOR THE LDG GR CONTROL VALVES, PYRO UPLOCK RELEASE CRTS,
AND NLG EXT PYRO ASSIST CKTS. PROTECTION AGAINST PREMATURES AND
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITHIN LDG GR CIRCUITS. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF LOSS OF 'ARM' RELAY REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 32,36,40,56,62,69
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-235
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1105187
EPD&C
31172
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GENERAL PURPOSE RELAY (2)
FAILS OPEN, FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD MCA 2 & 3
GENERAL PURPOSE RELAY (2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FWDMCA 2 &_3 82V76AII2-K32 83V76AII3-K28
PART NUMBER: MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIB_TION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES THE MEANS TO SWITCH THE PROX. SENSOR BOXES TO A GSE
SOURCE DURING GROUND OPERATIONS TO RAISE AND LOWER THE MAIN GEAR.
GROUND FUNCTION ONLY.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 11,78
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 31173 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (2), 3 AMPS
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPENS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD PCA 2 & 3
RPC (2), REDUNDANT SHUTOFF VALVE
05-6BA
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
/NA TAL: 3/1R
/NA AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P]
LOCATION: FWD PCA-2 & 3 82V76A23-RPC42
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2030
c[P]
82V76A24-RPC43
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONNECTS MAIN DC BUSS POWER TO THE LDG REDUNDANT SHUTOFF VALVE.
REDUNDANT POWER AND CONTROL PROVIDED BY SECOND MAIN DC BUSS AND
RPC. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF LOSS OF ELECTRICAL
POWER TO RPC TO POWER SHUTOFF VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 57,61
w
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REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-237
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
31174 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (2), 3 AMPS
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD PCA 2 & 3
RPC (2), REDUNDANT SHUTOFF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI_0?F: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION" FWDPCA-2 & _3 82V76A23-RPC42
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2030
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/IR
c[p]
82V76A24-RPC43
CAUSES : PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
EFFECTS/_TIONALE: _ ......_E_
CONNECTS MAIN DC BUSS POWER TO'THE LDG REDUNDANT SHUTOFF VALVE.
REDUNDANT POWER AND CONTROL PROVIDED BY SECOND MAIN DC BUSS AND
RPC. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF INADVERTENT RPC
OUTPUT.
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REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 57,61
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31175
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (6)
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD LCA 2 & 3
PIC (6), NLG, LMG & RMG EMERGENCY UPLK RELEASE 1 & 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/1R
ONORB IT: /NA AOA: 3/ 1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: FLCA 2 & 3 82V76AIT-PIC(3)
PART NUMBER: MC450-0018-0005
c[P]
83V76AI8-PIC(3)
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFTER RECEIVING THE IARMI, IFIRE-II, AND FIRE-2 w STIMULI (LDG GR
DOWN COMMANDS), THE PIC'S ELECTRICAL OUTPUT FIRES THE SQI & SQ2
EXPLOSIVE INITIATORS FORNLG, LMG, & RMG BACKUP UPLK RELEASE 1 &
2. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO COMPLETE FIRING CIRCUIT
TO NLG, LMG, & RMG EMERGENCY UPLOCK RELEASES.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 14,21,52,65,87,94
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-239
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/05/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31176
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (6)
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) 0S-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD LCA 2 & 3
PIC (6), NLG, LMG & RMG EMERGENCY UPLK RELEASE i & 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: FLCA 2 & 3 82V76AIT-PIC(3)
PART NUMBER: MC450-0018-0005
c[P]
83V76AI8-PIC(3)
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBI_%TION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFTER _CEIVING THE 'ARM', 'FIRE-1', AND FIRE-2' STIMULI (LDG GR
DOWN COMMANDS), THE _IC'S ELECTRICAL OUTPUT FI_S-_ _SQI &_=_2_
EXPLOSIVE INITIATORS FOR NLG, LMG, & RMG BACKUP UPLK RELEASE 1 &
2. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF ALL PIC REDUNDANCY IS
LOST.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 14,21,52,65,87,94
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/o5/e7
EPD&C
31177
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (2)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LANDING GEAR CONTROL
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
FWD LCA 2 & 3
PIC (2), NLG EXTENSION POWERED ASSIST 1 & 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLCA 2 & 3 82V76AIT-PIC 83V76AIS-PIC
MC450-0018-0005
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFTER RECEIVING LANDING GEAR DOWN COMMANDS AND THE NLG DOES NOT
COME DOWN (NO GEAR RELEASE INHIBIT IS RECEIVED), THE SQI & SQ2
EXPLOSIVE INITIATORS WILL BE FIRED TO BRING THE NLG DOWN.
HARDWARE CRIT. 2 FOR TIME CRITICAL NLG DOWN ON APPROACH &
LANDING.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 126,132
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-241
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/05/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31178
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (2)
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD LCA 2 & 3
PIC (2), NLG EXTENSION POWERED ASSIST 1 & 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION: FLCA 2 & 3 82V76AI7-PIC 83V76AI8-PIC
PART NUMBER: MC450-0018-0005
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFTER RECEIVING LANDING GEAR DO_ COMMANDS AND TH_N_ DOES NOT
COME DOWN (NO GEAR RELEASE INHIBIT IS RECEIVED), THE SQI & SQ2
EXPLOSIVE INITIATORS WILL BE FIRED TO BRING THE NLG DOWN.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF LOSS OF PIC REDUNDANCY.
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REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 126,132
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11o7187
EPD&C
31179
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ANNUNCIATOR LIGHT (4)
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO INDICATE
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
e)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
PANELS F6A5 & F8A5
ANNUNCIATOR LIGHT (4), LDG GR 'ARM' & LDG GR 'DOWN'
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: PANELS F6A5 & F8A5
PART NUMBER: UNKNOWN
B [ ] C [ ]
34V73A6A5 (2) 34V73A8A5 (2)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VISUAL MONITORING OF LANDING GEAR IARM' AND 'DOWN' PUSH BUTTON
CIRCUITS. NONCRITICAL MONITORING FUNCTION.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONE 46
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-243
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/07/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
31180 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ANNUNCIATOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY (2)
LOSS OF OUTPUT (ON CHANNELS 31,33,36,40)
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
AREA 30 FLIGHT DECK
ANNUNCIATOR CONTROL ASSEMBLIES 2 & 3
05-6BA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: .... 30V73A!8 3QV73AI7
PART NUMBER: MC434-0283-0002
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALEz_ ................
PROVIDES POWER TO LANDING GEAR 'ARM' AND 'DOWN' _CIATOR
LIGHTS. NONCRITICAL OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONE 44
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/07/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31181
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: MAIN GEAR BRAKE UPLOCK RELEASE CIRCUITS 1 & 2
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF POWER, OPENS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LANDING GEAR CONTROL
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6BA
FLCA 2 & 3
LEFT & RIGHT MAIN GEAR BRAKE UPLOCK RELEASE CIRCUITS 1 & 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/1R
ONORBI T: /NA AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[ P] C [P]
LOCATION: FLCA 2 & 3 82V76AI7 83V76AI8
PART NUMBER: NA
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CIRCUIT SUPPLIES CONTROL POWER TO LEFT/RIGHT MAIN LANDING GEAR
BACK UPLOCK RELEASE SUBSYSTEM. THIS CIRCUIT IS A BACKUP TO THE
PRIMARY HYDRAULIC SYSTEM. MDAC IDIS 31120, 31128, 31129, 31156,
31157, 31163 THROUGH 31166 COVER ALL THE COMPONENTS IN THIS
CIRCUIT. COMPONENT LIST: PIC'S (4), HDC TYPE 1 (4), HDC TYPE 2
(4), HDC TYPE 3 (4), RESISTORS (8), DIODES (4).
i
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 14,21,87,94
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-245
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/07/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/1R
31182 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
NOIS 1 & 2
FAILURE MODE:
NOSE LANDING GEAR BRAKE UPLOCK RELEASE CIRCUIT
LOSS OF POWER, OPENS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FLCA 2 & 3
NOSE LANDING GEAR BRAKE UPLOCK RELEASE CIRCUIT NO'S 1 & 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/ 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION: FLCA 2 & 3 82V76AI7 83V76AI8
PART NUMBER: NA
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CIRCUIT SUPPLI_CONTROL POWER TO NOSE LANDING GEAR BRAKE UPLOCK
RELEASE SUBSYSTEM. THIS CIRCUIT IS A BACKUP TO THE PRIMARY
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM. MDAC ID'S 31120, 31121, 31128 THROUGH 31129,
31154 THROUGH 31160, AND 31175 THROUGH 31176 COVER ALL THE
COMPONENTS IN THIS CIRCUIT. COMPONENT LIST: PIC'S (2), HDC TYPE
1 (2), HDC TYPE 2 (2), HDC TYPE 3 (2), RESISTORS (4), DIODES (2).
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONES 54,63
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l
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31183
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: DIODE, 12 AMP
FAILURE MODE: ELEMENT OPENS, HIGH RESISTANCE
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LANDING GEAR CONTROL
2) FWD PCA 1
3) BLOCKING DIODE, 12 AMP, ARM & DOWN RELAY CIRCUIT
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) O5-6BA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION: FWD PCA 1 81V76A22-CRI2
PART NUMBER: JANTXVINSSSI
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ISOLATES K6 & K7 ARM RELAYS FROM THE K8 DOWN RELAY; ALSO IN
CIRCUIT SUPPLYING PO_R TO THE LDG GE_CONTROL VALVE AND THE LDG
GEAR DUMP CONTROL VALVE. POSSIBLE LOSS oF CREw/vEHICLE BECAUSE
OF LOSS OF POWER TO OPERATE THESE VALVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109: ZONE 68 HYD/WSB SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID'S
472,473,491,492
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-247
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/12/87
EPD&C
31184
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, 12 AMP
SHORTS, LOW RESISTANCE
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9) 05-6BA
LANDING GEAR CONTROL
FWD PCA 1
BLOCKING DIODE, 12 AMP, ARM & DOWN RELAY CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD PCA 1 81V76A22,CRI2
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ISOLATES K6 & K7 ARM RELAYS FROM THE K8 DOWN RELAY; ALSO IN
CIRCUIT SUPPLyIN_POWER TO THE LDG GEAR CONTROL VALVE AND THE LDG
GEAR DUMP CONTROL VALVE. POSSIBLE RELAY DAMAGE IF DIODE FAILS
SHORTED, BUT NO EFFECT ON MISSION CREW VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-510109: ZONE 68 HYD/WSB SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID'S
472,473,491,492
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/14/8v
EPD&C
31185
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, 12 AMP
ELEMENT OPENS, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LANDING GEAR CONTROL
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BA
FWD PCA 1
TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODE, 12 AMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FWD PCA 1 81V76A22-CR42
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
] cc ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION TO SOLENOID COILS OF LDG GEAR
CONTROL VALVE AND LDG GEAR DUMP CONTROL VALVE FROM GSE TESTS.
NOT USED IN FLIGHT.
w
w
REFERENCES: VS70-510109 ZONE 68
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-249
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/14/ 6
EPD&C
31200
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION RESISTOR, 5.1K, I/4W
ELEMENT OPENS, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
2) FWD PCA 1
3) ISOLATION RESISTOR (1), 5.1K,
4)
S)
6)
8)
9) 05-6BB
1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD PCA NO. 1
RLR07CSI0iGR
81V76A22-AIR80
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LIMITS CURRENT BETWEEN MDM AND ANTI-SKID BUSS C/A, NONCRITICAL
OPERATION_ ....
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/14/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31201
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM: GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE (8), 3 AMP
FAILURE MODE: OPENS, PREMATURELY OPENS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BB
BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
FWD PCA 1 & 2
GENERAL PURPOSE FUSES (8), BRAKE SUB-BUS, 3 AMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/1R
DE ORBIT: 3/ 1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION: FWD PCA 1 & 2 81V76A22-FIS,FI6,FI7,F21
F9,FI0,FII,FI2
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I003
82V76A23-
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, CHEMICAL
DEGRADED MATERIALS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION BETWEEN BRAKE SUB-BUSES AND
BRAKE/SKID CONTROL BOXES. POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE BECAUSE OF
LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER.
L
REFERENCES: VS70-520109 ZONES 9,19
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-251
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/14/86
EPD&C
31202
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE (5 AMP), 2
OPENS, PREMATURELY OPENS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BB
BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
FWD PCA 1 & 2
FUSE (2, 5 AMP), BRAKE SUB-BUS/ANTI-SKID POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
HDWIFUNC
3/1R
3/iR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD PCA 1 & 2 81V76A22-F28
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-1021
c[P]
82V76A23-F8
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, CHEMICAL
DEGRADED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES CURRENT PROTECTION TO BRAKE AND ANTI-SKID SUB-BUSSES.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF LOSS OF ELECTRICAL
POWER.
REFERENCES: VS70-520109 ZONES 30,31
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/14/86
EPD&C
31203
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ANNUNCIATOR
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO INDICATE
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD sUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BB
BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
PANEL F3
ANNUNCIATOR, ANTI-SKID FAIL LIGHT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL F3 34V73A3-XDS4
MC434-0075-0012
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VISUAL MONITORING OF ANTI-SKID FAILURE, NONCRITICAL OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-520109 ZONE 27
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-253
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
!2/14/86
EPD&C
31204
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 1 AMP
OPENS, PREMATURELY OPENS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
2) PANEL L2AI
3) FUSE, 1 AMP, BRAKE/SKI CONTROL CRT.
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9) 05-6BB
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3-
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: PANEL L2AI 3IV73A2A1-F7
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0100
] c [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, CHEMICAL
DEGRADED MATERIALS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .....
PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR WIRING IN ANTI-SKID FAIL CIRCUIT.
NONCRITICAL OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-520109 ZONE 30
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/14/86
EPD&C
31205
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE (8), 2 AMP
OPENS, PREMATURELY OPENS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BB
BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
FWD PCA 1 & 2
GENERAL PURPOSE FUSES (8), ANTI-SKID BUSES, 2 AMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION: FWD PCA 1 & 2
FI3,FI4,FIS,FI6
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I002
81V76A22-FI8, FI9, F20, F22 82V76A23-
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, CHEMICAL
DEGRADED MATERIALS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION BETWEEN ANTI-SKID BUSES AND
BRAKE/SKID BOXES. POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE BECAUSE OF LOSS OF
ELECTRICAL POWER.
REFERENCES: VS70-520109 ZONES 9,19
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-255
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/14/86
EPD&C
31206
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION RESISTOR (3), 5.1K, 1/4 WATT
ELEMENT OPENS, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BB
BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
FWD PCA 1,2 & 3
RESISTOR (3), BRAKE-SKID POWER/SWITCH SCAN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: FWD PCA 1,2 & 3
83V76A24"AIRI
PART NUMBER: RLR07CSI01GR
B[ ] C[ ]
8iV76A22-AIR64 82V76A23-AIR1
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRICTS CURRENT BETWEEN CONTROL CIRCUITS AND MDM MONITORING
CIRCUITS. NONCRITICAL FUNCTION.
REFERENCES: VS70-520109 ZONES 10,14,17
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/14/86
EPD&C
31207
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION RESISTOR (4), 2.2K, I/2W
ELEMENT OPENS, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BB
BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
FWD PCA-I, 2,3
ISOLATION RESISTORS (4), 2.2K, 1/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: FWD PCA - 1,2,3
83V76A24-AIRI8,AIRI9
PART NUMBER: RLR20C2201GR
81V76A22-AIR5 82V76A23-AIR22
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ISOLATES AND LIMITS CURRENT BETWEEN THE RPC OUTPUTAND THE MDM
MONITORING CIRCUIT FOR DETERMINING AN RPC'S OPERATING STATUS,
NONCRITICAL FUNCTION.
REFERENCES: VS70-520109 ZONES 11,14,17
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-257
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
= .
MDAC ID:
12/14/86
EPD&C
31208
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CURRENT LIMITING RESISTOR (4), 1.21K, 2W
SHORTS (LOW RESISTANCE)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) OS-6BB
BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
PANELS 014, 015, 016
CURRENT LIMITING RESISTOR (4), 1.21K, 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/5
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: PANELS 014, 015, 016
33V73AIS-AIRI, 33V73AI6-AIR2
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES:
B[ ] C[ ]
33V73AI4-AIRI, 33V73AI6-AIRI,
MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LIMITS _CURRENTTO THE RPC CONTROL CIRCUITS FOR POWER "ON" TO THE
BRAKE AND ANTI-SKID SYSTEM. NONCRITICAL OPERATION, RPC'S ARE
OVERCURRENT PROTECTED.
REFERENCES: VS70-520109 ZONES 11,13,15,17
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LDATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/14/86
EPD&C
31209
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODEz
RESISTOR (4), 1.8K, 1/4W
ELEMENT OPENS, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
2) FWD PCA-I,2,3
3) BLEED-OFF RESISTORS (4),
4)
s)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BB
1.8K, I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ]
LOCATION: FWD PCA-I,2,3
83V76A24-AIR49,AIRS0
PART NUMBER: RLR07CI801GR
81V76A22-AIR42
CAUSES:
_DW/nmc
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c[ ]
82V76A23-AIR57
MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES A BLEED-OFF LINE TO THE RETURN BUS, NONCRITICAL FAILURE.
REFERENCES: VS70-520109 ZONES 11,14,17
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-259
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 31210 ABORT:
ITEM: CURRENT LIMITING RESISTOR (4), 1.21K, 2W
FAILURE MODE: ELEMENT OPENS, HIGH RESISTANCE
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BB
BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
PANELS 014,015,016
CURRENT LIMITING RESISTOR (4), 1.21K, 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] c[p]
LOCATION: PANELS 014, 015,016
33V73AI6-AIRi -3-3V73AI6-AIR2
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI2 IIFR
33V73AI4-AIRI 33V73AIS-AIRI
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .........
LIMITS _NT TOTHE Rpcco_oL CIRCUITS FOR POWER "ON" TO THE
BRAKE AND ANTI-SKID SYSTEM. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
BECAUSE OF LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER.
REFERENCES: VS70-520109 ZONES 11,13,15,17
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/14/86
EPD&C
31211
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BLOCKING DIODE (4), 12 AMP
ELEMENT OPENS, HIGH RESISTANCE
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BB
BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
FWD PCA 1 & 2
BLOCKING DIODES (4), POWER "ON" BRAKE CIRCUIT
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
/NA TAL: 3/1R
/NA AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
311R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD PCA 1 & 2 81V76A22-CR7,CR8
JANTXINI204RA
c[P]
82V76A23-CR18, CRI9
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES BUS ISOLATION IN THE EVENT OF AN RPC FAILING CLOSED.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF LOSS OF SKID CONTROL
FUNCTION.
w
REFERENCES: VS70-520109 ZONES 11,16
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-261
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/14/86
EPD&C
31212
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BLOCKING DIODE (4), 12 AMP
SHORTS (LOW RESISTANCE)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BB
BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
FWD PCA 1 & 2
BLOCKING DIODES (4), POWER "ON" BRAKE CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORB IT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD PCA 1 & 2 81V76A22-CR7,CR8 82V76A23-CRI8,CRI9
JANTXlNI204RA
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES BUS ISOLATION IN THE EVENT OF AN RPC FAILING CLOSED.
EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF RPC OVERCURRENT PROTECTION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/14/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31213
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GENERAL PURPOSE RELAY, NONLATCHING (2)
FAILS OPEN (RELAYS NORMALLY OPEN)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BB
BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
FWD PCA 1 & 2
G.P. RELAYS (2), BRAKE SUB-BUS/WOW CKT POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION: FWD PCA-I &2 81V76A22-K9 82V76A23-KII
PART NUMBER: MC455-0129-0001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TRANSFERS BRAKE SUB-BUS POUR TO THE WOW CIRCUITS WITHIN THE
BRAKE/SKID CONTROL UNITS. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE
LOSS OF ANTI-SKID CAPABILITY, PILOT WOULD HAVE TO USE MANUAL
BRAKING.
REFERENCES: VS70-520109 ZONES 7,21 SHUTTLE SYSTEM HANDBOOK
DRAWING 13.2
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-263
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/14/86
EPD&C
31214
HIGHEST CRITI_LITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
GENE_L P_POSE _Y, NON_TCHING (2)
FAI_ C_SED
T_AD _ALYST: G. B_IRD SUBSYS _AD: SC_ECKPEPER
B__ HIE_CHY:
I) B_ & _TI-SKID
2) FWD PCA 1 & 2
3) G.P. _YS (2), B_ SUB-BUS/WOW C_ PO_R
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BB
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/_C
P_ _CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/1R
LI FTO FF: / NA TAL: 3/ IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
_DING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[ F] C [P]
_CATION:
P_T_MBER:
_D PCA-I &2 81V76A22-K9
MC455-0129-0001
82V76A23-KII
_USES: MEC_I_L SHOCK, VIB_TION, PIECE-P_T STRUC_L
FAIL_, CONT_INATION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
T_SFERS B_ SUB-BUS PO_R TO THE WOW CIR_ITS WITHIN THE
B_/SKID CONTROL _ITS. IF A _Y(S) FAI_ TO OPEN AT _ WOW
WITH _E _TI-SKID SWITCH ON, THE _TI-SKID FAIL LIGHT WILL COME
ON. THE PI_T WI_ SWITCH _TI-SKID "OFF" _D APPLY M_AL
B_KING. POSSIBT._ _SS OF _W/VEHIC_ BECAUSE OF _SS OF _TI-
SKID _CTION.
_FE_NCES:
D_WING 13.2
VS70-520109 ZONES 7,21 S_TT_ SYSTEM _DBOOK
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/14/86
EPD&C
31215
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BLOCKING DIODES (9), 3 AMP
ELEMENT OPENS, HIGH RESISTANCE, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
_)
8)
9)
BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
FWD LCA NO 1 & 2
BLOCKING DIODES (9), ANTI-SKID FAIL LIGHT/CONTROL CKT.
05-6BB
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
/NA TAL: 3/3
/NA AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: FWD LCA 1 & 2
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
] B [ ]
82V76AI7-CR(5)
c[ ]
8 IV76AI6-CR (4)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BLOCKS SIGNAL FEEDBACK ON VARIOUS SIGNALS IN ANTI-SKID FAIL
LIGHT/CONTROL CIRCUIT. NONCRITICAL FUNCTION.
REFERENCES: VS70-520109 ZONE 28
u
w
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-265
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/14/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31216
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (3), TYPE 1
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPENS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
2) FWD LCA 1 & 2
3) HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLERS (3), TYPE 1
05-6BB
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
ABORT
RTLS :
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDWIFUNC
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD LCA 1 & 2 81V76AI6-AR(2)
PART _UMBER: MC477-026i-0002
c [ p ]
82V76AI7-AR(1)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH ABEENCE DF WOW, THE Hb_'S CONNE-dT MAIN BUS PDWE_R TO RE_YS
WHICH T_SFER B_ POWER_IN THE B_/SKID_CONTROLUNIT. ON
LMG/RMG TOUCHDOWN, THE OPENING OF THE HDC'S ENERGIZES THE ANTI-
SKID CONTROL CIRCUITS. LOSS OF CONTROL POWER TO ONE "NO-WOW"
RELAY COIL, POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF LOSS OF
ELECTRICAL POWER.
REFERENCES: VS70-520109 ZONES 5,22
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/14/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31217
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (3), TYPE 1
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BB
FWD LCA
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLERS (3), TYPE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: FWD LCA 1 & 2
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
B [ ] C [ ]
81V76AI6-AR(2) 82V76AI7-AR(1)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH ABSENCE OF WOW, THE HDC'S CONNECT MAIN BUS POWER TO RELAYS
WHICH TRANSFER BRAKE POWER IN THE BRAKE/SKID CONTROLUNIT. ON
LMG/RMG TOUCHDOWN, THE OPENING OF THE HDC'S ENERGIZES THE ANTI-
SKID CONTROL CIRCUITS. TWO HDC FAILURES REQUIRED BEFORE
PREMATURELY CLOSING A RELAY CONTACT, NO EFFECT ON
MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-520109 ZONES 5,22
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-267
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 31218 ABORT:
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE 3)
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPENS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BB
BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
FWD LCA 2
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE 3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD LCA 2 82V76A17-AR(1)
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002-
c[P]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART
STRU_ FAILURE ....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .........
WITH ABSENCE oF_WoW,_ THE HDC_ CON_ECT_ MAIN BUS PO_ TO RELAY
(KII) WHICH TRANSFERS BRAKE POWER IN THE BRAKE/SKID CONTROL UNIT
B. ON LMG/RMG TOUCHDOWN, THE OPENING OF THE HDC'S ENERGIZES THE
ANTI-SKID CONTROL CIRCUITS. LOSS OF CONTROL POWER TO KII
_Y COIL, P_oSS_B_%_ OF CREW/VEH_ BEcAUsE OF _SS OF
ELECTRICAL POWER.
REFERENCES: VS70-520109 ZONE 22
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/14/86
EPD&C
31219
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE 3)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BB
BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
FWD LCA 2
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER' TYPE 3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FWD LCA 2 82V76AIT-AR(1)
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH ABSENCE OF WOW, THE HDC CONNECTS MAIN BUS POWER TO RELAY
(KII) WHICH TRANSFERS BRAKE POWER IN THE BRAKE/SKID CONTROL UNIT
B. ON LMG/RMG TOUCHDOWN, THE OPENING OF THE HDC'S ENERGIZES THE
ANTI-SKID CONTROL CIRCUITS. TWO HDC FAILURES REQUIRED BEFORE
PREMATURELY CLOSING A RELAY CONTACT, NO EFFECT ON
MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-520109 ZONE 22
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-269
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 31220 ABORT:
?
ITEM: TOGGLE SWITCH, DPST
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN (ONE POLE AFFECTED)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
2) PANEL L2AI
3) TOGGLE SWITCH (i), DPST, ANTI-SKID CONTROL CKT
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BB
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC
3/iR
/NA
/NA
3/1R
311R
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/JR
S/JR
3/JR
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/iR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL L2AI 3IV73A2AI-S5
ME452-0102-7201
c[P]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, C_TIOH
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MANUALLY SWITCHES "ON-OFF" ANTI-SKID CONTROL CIRCUIT. EACH POLE
CONTROLS POWER T-O 6N2 ANTI-SKID_ ....ONEPO_ _POSfTION_:_EN IN
"OFF" POSITION CONTROLS ANTI-SKID-FAIL-LIGHT "ON" INDICATION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO ENERGIZE ONE SKID BUS AND LOSS OF --__....
REDUNDANT SKID CONTROL CIRCUITS TO FOUR WHEELS. WITH LOSS OF
ANTI-SKID FUNCTION, SHUTTLE MIGHT BE SAFELY LANDED WITH MANUAL
BRAKING.
REFERENCES: VS70-520109: ZONE 31, MDAC 30101, AND 13.2 SSSH, JSC
12770 VOL. 10D
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/14/86
EPD&C
31221
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOGGLE SWITCH, DPST
FAILS CLOSED, SHORTED CONTACTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
2) PANEL L2A1
3) TOGGLE SWITCH (I), DPST, ANTI-SKID CONTROL CKT
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BB
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: PANEL L2AI 31V73A2AI-S5
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7201
] cc ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MANUALLY SWITCHES "ON-OFF" ANTI-SKID CONTROL CIRCUIT. EACH POLE
CONTROLS POWER TO ONE ANTI-SKID BUS. ONE POLE POSITION WHEN IN
"OFF" POSITION CONTROLS ANTI-SKID-FAIL-LIGHT "ON" INDICATION.
CLOSES - NO EFFECT - NORMAL OPERATING POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-520109: ZONE 31, MDAC 30101, AND 13.2 SSSH, JSC
12770 VOL. 10D
L REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-271
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
31222 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
311R
ITEM: TOGGLE SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6BB
BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
PANELS 014,015
TOGGLE SWITCH (2), MAIN BUS (A,B), "ON" CONTROL CKT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: /NA - TAL: 3/_I_
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANELS 014,0!5
ME452-0102-7i01
B [ P] C [ P]
33VV3AI4-Sl 33VV3AIS-Sl
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/_TIONALE : ...._ ..... __ ....._ _ ;
PROVIDES-M_AL _SWIT_NG :FOR RED_D_T CONTROL AND Dg_ POW ER TO
BRAKING CIRCUITS. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF LOSS
OF CONTROL TO MAIN DC CONNECTING/DISCONNECTING RPC'S.
REFERENCES: VS70-520109 ZONES 11,16 _
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rINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/14/86
EPD&C
31223
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOGGLE SWITCH
FAILS CLOSED, SHORTED CONTACTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9) 05-6BB
PANELS 014,015
TOGGLE SWITCH (2), MAIN BUS (A,B), "ON" CONTROL CKT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANELS 014,015 33V73AI4-SI 33V73AIS-SI
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES MANUAL SWITCHING FOR REDUNDANT CONTROL AND DC POWER TO
BRAKING CIRCUITS. FAILS CLOSED HAS NO EFFECT, NORMAL OPERATING
CONDITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-520109 ZONES 11,16
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-273
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ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/14/86
EPD&C
31224
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOGGLE SWITCH, DPST
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BB
BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
PANELS 014,015
TOGGLE SWITCH, MAIN BUS (C), "ON" CONTROL CKT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL 016 33V73AI6-SI
PART NUMBER: ME452"0102-720i
c[p]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ............................................
PROVIES MANUAL SWITCHING FOR REDUNDANT CONTROL AND DC POWER TO .
BRAKING CIRCUIT. POSSIBLE LOSS OF C?.EW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF LOSS
OF CONTROL TO MAIN C CONNECTING/DISCONNECTING RPC'S.
REFERENCES: VS70-520109 ZONE 14
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ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/14/86
EPD&C
31225
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOGGLE SWITCH, DPST
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
PANELS 014,015
TOGGLE SWITCH, MAIN BUS (C), "ON" CONTROL CKT
05-6BB
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL 016 33V73AI6-SI
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES MANUAL SWITCHING FOR REDUNDANT CONTROL AND DC POWER TO
BRAKING CIRCUIT. FAILS CLOSED HAS NO EFFECT, NORMAL OPERATING
CONDITION.
i
REFERENCES: VS70-520109 ZONE 14
w
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-275
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 31226 ABORT:
ITEM: REMOTEPOWERCONTROLLER(4), i0 AMP
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPENSo:_ .... _
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BB
B_ & ANTI-SKID
FWD PCA-I, 2,3
RPC'S (4), 10 AMP
CRTTICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/ 1R
ONORB IT: /NA AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDTNG/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD PCA-I, 2,3 81V76A22-RPC-5 82V76A23-RPC-4
83V76A24-RPC-4, RPC-5
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2100
CAUSES: MEC_ICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/_TIONA_" __ ............... ......._
CONNECTS OR DISCONNECTS MAIN DC BUS POWER TO THE ANTI-SKID AND
BRAKE CONTROL UNITS. PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION AGAINST
OVER.ADS. POSSIBLELOSSOF CREW/VEHICLEBECAUSEOF LOSSOF
ELECTRICALPOWER.
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uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/14/86
EPD&C
31227
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (4), i0 AMP
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
2) FWD PCA-I,2,3
3) RPC'S (4), 10 AMP
4)
S)
6)
7)
e)
9) 05-6BB
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ]
LOCATION: FWD PCA-I,2,3 81V76A22-RPC-5
83V76A24-RPC-4, RPC-5
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-2100
c[ ]
82V76A23-RPC-4
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONNECTS OR DISCONNECTS MAIN DC BUS POWER TO THE ANTI-SKIDAND
BRAKE CONTROL UNITS. PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION AGAINST
OVERLOADS. RPC'S ARE OVERCURRENT PROTECTED IN THE EVENT TWO MAIN
BUSSES ARE POWERING THE BRAKE SUB-BUS AT THE SAME INSTANT.
REFERENCES: VS70-520109 ZONES 11,13,15,17
=
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86
EPD&C
31228
HIGHEST CRITI_LITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_NC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
TOGG_ SWITCH (3)
FAI_ C_SED, SHORTED CONTACTS
_AD _ALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMEC_EPER
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
i) B_ & _TI-SKID
2) P_EL R4
3) TOGGt_ SWITCH (3),
HEATER
4)
S)
6)
7)
e)
9) 05-6BB
CONTROL BUS (AB1,BCI,CA1) HYD B_
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONO_IT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEO_IT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
_D_D_CY SC_ENS: A [ ] B [ ]
_TION: P_EL R4 32V73A4-S28,S29,S30
P_T _MBER: _O_
c [ ]
CAUSES: MEC_I_L SHOCK, VIB_TION, PIECE-P_T S_UC_L
FAIL_
EFFECTS/_TIONAt._:
PROVIDES M_AL SWITCHING FOR REDUND_T DC PO_R TO THE BREAK
HYD_ULIC LINE HEATERS. FAILU_ mS NO EFFECT BECAUSE SWITCH IS
IN NORMALLY C_SED POSITION.
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ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
31229 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOGGLE SWITCH (3)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
2) PANEL R4
3) TOGGLE SWITCH (3),
HEATER
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BB
CONTROL BUS (AB1,BCI,CA1) HYD BRAKE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
LOCATION: PANEL R4
PART NUMBER: UNKNOWN
A[ 2 ] B[ P]
32V73A4-S28, $29, $30
c[P]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES MANUAL SWITCH FOR REDUNDANT DC POWER TO THE BREAK
HYDRAULIC LINE HEATERS. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF
LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER TO BRAKE HEATERS.
REFERENCES: VS70-958102; 58GC, ZONE 7H; 58GA, ZONES 7H, 19H
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-279
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31230
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: CURRENT LIMITING RESISTOR (3), 1.21K, 2W
FAILURE MODE: ELEMENT OPENS, HIGH RESISTANCE
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
"I)
8)
9) 05-6BB
BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
PANEL R4
RESISTORS (3), 1.21K, 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
LOCATION: PANEL R4
PART NUMBER: UNKNOWN
A[2 ] B [ P]
32V73A4-A6RI, A6R2,A6R3
c[p]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LIMITS CURRENT TO THE RPC CONTROL CIRCUITS FOR POWER "ON" TO THE
BRAKE HYDRAULIC LINE HEATERS. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
BECAUSE OF LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER TO BRAKE HEATERS.
REFERENCES: VS70-958102; 58GC, ZONE 7H; 58GA, ZONES 7H, 19H
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 31231 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CURRENT LIMITING RESISTOR (3), 1.21K, 2W
SHORTS, LOW RESISTANCE
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BB
BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
PANEL R4
RESISTORS (3), 1.21K, 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL R4 32V73A4-A6RI, A6R2, A6R3
PART NUMBER: UNKNOWN
c[ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LIMITS CURRENT TO THE RPC CONTROL CIRCUITS FOR POWER "ON" TO THE
BRAKE/HYDRAULIC LINE HEATERS. FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT ON
SUBSYSTEM.
REFERENCES: VS70-958102; 58GC, ZONE 7H; 58GA, ZONES 7H,19H
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-281
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 31232 ABORT:
ITEM: REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (3), i0 AMP
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPENS
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
7)
S)
9) 05-6BB
BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
PANEL R4
MID PCA 1,2,3
RPC (3), HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MID PCA 1,2,3 RPC-37,39,24
PART NUMBER: UNKNOWN
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONNECTS OR DISCONNECTS MAIN DC BUS POWER TO THE HYDRAULIC BRAKE
HEATER COILS. _POSSIB_LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF LOSS OF
ELECTRICAL POWER TO HEATER COILS.
REFERENCES: VS70-958102; 58GC, ZONE 7E; 58GA, ZONES 7E,19E
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/19/86
EPD&C
31233
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (3), 10 AMP
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6BB
BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
PANEL R4
MID PCA 1,2,3
RPC (3), HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: MID PCA 1,2,3 RPC-37,39,24
PART NUMBER: UNKNOWN
c[P]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONNECTS OR DISCONNECTS MAIN DC BUS POWER TO THE HYDRAULIC BRAKE
HEATER COILS. RPC'S ARE OVERCURRENT PROTECTED, INADVERTENT
OUTPUT WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON HEATER COILS.
REFERENCES: VS70-958102; 58GC, ZONE 7E; 58GA, ZONES 7E,19E
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-283
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EPD&C FLIGHT:
31234 ABORT:
ISOLATION RESISTOR (3), 5.1K, i/4W
FAILURE MODE: ELEMENT OPENS, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BB
BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
PANEL R4
MID PCA 1,2,3
ISOLATION RESISTOR (3), S.IK, I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3_
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: MID PCA 1,2,3 40V76A25-AIR28 , 40V76A26-AIR27,
40V76A27-AIR29
PART NUMBER: UNKNOWN
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
RESTRICTS CURRENT BETWEEN HEATER CONTROL CIRCUITS AND MDM
MONITORING CIRCUITS. NONCRITICAL FUNCTION.
REFERENCES: VS70-958102; 58GC, ZONE 6E; 58GA, ZONES 18E,6E
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31235
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: ANNUNCIATOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT (CHANNEL 12)
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BB
BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
FWD LCA NO 2
ANNUNCIATOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY NO. 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B c ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT DECK AREA 30 30V73AIT-NO. 2
MC434-0283-0002
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES POWER TO ANTI-SKID FAIL ANNUNCIATOR LIGHT, NONCRITICAL
OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-520109, ZONE 27
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-285
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31237
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: SIGNAL CONDITIONER
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT, LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BB
BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
FWD BAY i, AREA 81W8
BRAKE/SKID BOX A SIGNAL CONDITIONER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD BAY 1 _A 81W8 81V75AI6
V070-753251
=
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES V0LTAGEREDUCTIONAND MDM-OFI MoNITORING TOBRAKE/SKID -
CONTROL BOX A. MONITORING FUNCTION HAS NO EFFECT ON
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-520109 ZONES 36,185
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/19/86
EPD&C
31239
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SIGNAL CONDITIONER
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
X)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6BB
BRAKE & ANTI-SKID
FWD BAY 2, AREA 82W9
BRAKE/SKID BOX B SIGNAL CONDITIONER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCHz 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION: FWD BAY 2 AREA 82W9 82V75AI7
PART NUMBER: V070-753252
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES VOLTAGE REDUCTION AND MDM-OF2 MONITORING TO BRAKE/SKID
CONTROL BOX B. MONITORING FUNCTION HAS NO EFFECT ON
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-520109 ZONES 41,190
REPORT DATE 02/13/87 C-287
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MDAC-ID
i0101
10201
10202
10203
10204
10205
10206
10209
10210
10211
10212
10213
I0215
10216
i0217
10220
10221
10222
10223
10224
10402
10404
10413
10414
10416
10501
10701
10901
11003
11004
11005
lll01
11102
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
ITEM
TIRES, NLG TYPE II
NOSE LANDING GEAR TRUNION
DRAG BRACE
DRAG BRACE TRUNION
LOCK BRACE ASSEMBLY
DOWNLOCK BUNGEE
DOWNLOCK BUNGEE
STEERING COLLAR ASSEMBLY
STEERING DISCONNECT LOCK
TORQUE ARM ASSEMBLY
NOSE WHEEL RETAINING BOLT
AXLE
SHOCK STRUT
SHOCK STRUT
UPLOCK ROLLER RETAINING
ASSEMBLY
TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
DRAG BRACE
DRAG BRACE TRUNION
DRAG BRACE TRUNION
SUPPORT BEAM
NLG EXTEND/RETRACT HYD
STRUT ACT
NLG EXTEND/RETRACT HYD
STRUT ACT
NLG EXTEND/RETRACT HYD
STRUT ACT
NLG EXTEND/RETRACT HYD
STRUT ACT
NLG EXTEND/RETRACT HYD
STRUT ACT
NLG DOOR EXTEND/RETRACT
MECHANISM
NLG UPLOCK HOOK ASSEMBLY
NLG DOOR HOOK ACT LINKAGE
NLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR
NLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR
NLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR
NLG B/U PYRO UPLOCK
RELEASE MECH
NLG B/U PYRO UPLOCK
RELEASE MECH
FAILURE MODE
RUPTURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
CORROSION, STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
CORROSION, STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
(HYDRAULIC FLUID)
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
(NITROGEN)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAK, EXTERNAL
RUPTURE
SHUTTLE VALVE (CLOSED)
TIMING ORIFICE BLOCKED
TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER BOSS
LEAK
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAK EXTERNAL
BROKEN ROD/LINKAGE
RUPTURE
INADVERTANT FIRING
FAIL TO FIRE
D-I
L
MDAC-ID
11201
11202
ll301
11302
20101
20201
20202
20203
20204
20205
20206
20207
20208
20209
20210
20216
20217
20218
20219
20220
20221
20222
20223
20402
20404
20413
20414
20416
20501
20601
20701
ITEM
NLG EXTENSION BOOSTER
PYRO ACT
NLG EXTENSION BOOSTER
PYRO ACT
NLG DOOR BUNGEE ASSIST ASSY
NLG DOOR BUNGEE ASSIST ASSY
TIRES, MLG TYPE I
SHOCK STRUT STRUCTURE
SHOCK STRUT PISTON ASSEMBLY
SHOCK STRUT PISTON ASSEMBLY
TORQUE ARM ASSEMBLY
AXLE KIT - MLG
LOWER DRAG BRACE STRUT
UPPER DRAG BRACE TRUNIONS
(2 EA)
LOCK BRACE ASSEMBLY
DOWN LOCK BUNGEE
DOWN LOCK BUNGEE
UPLOCK ROLLER RETAINING
ASSEMBLY
TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
SHOCK STRUT ATTACHING
TRUNIONS
UPPER DRAG BRACE STRUTS
(2 RA)
CENTER DRAG BRACE TRUNION
LOWER DRAG BRACE TRUNION
LOCK BRACE CENTER TRUNION
SUPPORT BEAM
MLG EXTEND/RETRACT HYD
STRUT ACT
MLG EXTEND/RETRACT HYD
STRUT ACT
MLG EXTEND/RETRACT HYD
STRUT ACT
MLG EXTEND/RETRACT HYD
STRUT ACT
MLG EXTENDED/RETRACT HYD
STRUT ACT
DOOR EXTEND/RETRACT MECH
MLG UPLOCK HOOK ASSEMBLY
MLG UPLOCK HOOK ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE
INADVERTANT FIRING
FAIL TO FIRE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, FAILS
TO RELEASE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
INADVERTANT RELEASE
RUPTURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
(HYDRAULIC FLUID
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
(NITROGEN)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
(BENT BUNGEE)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAK, EXTERNAL
RUPTURE
SHUTTLE VALVE (CLOSED)
TIMING ORIFICE BLOCKED
TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER
BOSS LEAK
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING/
BREAKING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
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MDAC-ID
20901
21003
21004
21005
21101
21102
21301
30102
30104
30105
30106
30110
30111
30112
30116
30117
30118
30121
30124
30125
30126
30129
30130
30131
31101
31107
31109
31113
31117
31125
31126
31127
31128
31137
31144
ITEM FAILURE MODE
DOOR HOOK ACTUATUON LINKAGE
MLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR
MLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR
MLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR
MLG PYRO UPLOCK RELEASE
MLG PYRO UPLOCK RELEASE
MLG DOOR BOOSTER BUNGEE
BRAKE PEDAL TRANSDUCER
BRAKE PEDAL TRANSDUCER
BRAKE CIRCUIT
BRAKE CIRCUIT
STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAK EXTERNAL
BROKEN ROD/LINKAGE
RUPTURE
INADVERTANT FIRING
FAIL TO FIRE
FAILS TO FUNCTION
NO TRANSDUCER DEFLECTION
SHORT/CLOSED (LVDT)
OPEN OR SHORT CIRCUIT
RESULTING IN AN OPEN VALVE
OPEN OR SHORT CIRCUIT
RESULTING IN A CLOSED
VALVE
HYDRAULIC PRESSURE REGULATOR FAILS OPEN
HYD PRESS REG (SYS 2 & 3)
INLET FILTER, HYD MODULE
ASSY
BY - PASS VALVE, HYD
MODULE ASSY
SELECTOR VALVE, HYD
MODULE ASSY
SELECTOR VALVE, HYD
MODULE ASSY
BRAKE/SKID CONTROL VALVE
STATORS, ROTORS, CLIPS
RUDDER/BRAKE PEDAL ASSEMBLY
RUDDER/BRAKE PEDAL ASSEMBLY
HYD PRESS REG (SYS i)
INLET FILTER, HYD MODULE
ASSY (SYS i)
BY - PASS VALVE, HYD MODULE
ASSY (SYS 2&3)
PROXIMITY SENSOR BOX (2)
BLOCKING DIODE (2) 12 AMP,
400V
BLOCKING DIODE (2) 12 AMP
PUSHBUTTON SWITCH (2),
LANDING GEAR DOWN
PUSHBUTTON SWITCH, LDG
GR ARM, 4PDT, ILLUMINATED
FAILS CLOSED
CLOGGED FILTER (SYSTEM 2&3)
FAILS TO OPEN (SYSTEM l)
LEAKAGE
JAMMED CLOSED
JAMMED OPEN
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
BINDING/JAMMING
FAILS CLOSED
FILTER CLOGGED
FAILS TO OPEN
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
ELEMENT OPENS, HIGH
RESISTANCE
ELEMENT OPENS, HIGH
RESISTANCE
FAILS OPEN (SWITCHES
NORMALLY OPEN)
FAILS OPEN (SWTICHES
NORMALLY OPEN)
GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE (5 AMP) OPENS, PREMATURELY OPENS
GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE, (8) , OPENS, PREMATURELY OPENS
1 AMP
GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE (i AMP) OPENS, PREMATURELY OPENS
RESISTOR (12), 10.2 OHMS, 2W ELEMENT OPENS, HIGH RESISTANCE
GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE (2) , OPENS, PREMATURELY OPENS
5 AMP
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER INADVERTENT OUTPUT
(TYPE i)
u D-3
MDAC-ID ITEM
31149 HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
(TYPE i)
31150 HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
(TYPE i)
31151 HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
(TYPE i)
31152 HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
(TYPE II)
31153 HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
(TYPE II)
31154 HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
(TYPE 3)
31155 HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
(TYPE 3)
31156 HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
(TYPE i)
31157 HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
(TYPE i)
31159 HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
(TYPE II)
31160 HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
(TYPE II)
31161 HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
(TYPE i)
31163 HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
(TYPE II)
31164 HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
(TYPE II)
31165 HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
(TYPE III)
31166 HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
(TYPE III)
31168 LATCHING RELAY (6), LDG GR
'ARM_CONTROL CIRCUIT_
31170 LATCHING RELAY (6), LDG GR
'DOWN' CONTROL CIRCUITS
31177 PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER
(2)
31181 MAIN GEAR BRAKE UPLOCK
RELEASE CIRCUITS 1 & 2
31182 NOSE LANDING GEAR BRAKE
UPLOCK RELEASE CIRCUIT
NO'S 1 & 2
31183 DIODE, 12 AMP
31201 GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE (8) ,
3 AMP
31205 GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE (8) ,
2 AMP
31210 CURRENT LIMITING RESISTOR
(4), 1.21K, 2W
FAILURE MODE
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LOSS OF POWER, OPENS
LOSS OF POWER, OPENS
ELEMENT OPENS, HIGH
RESISTANCE
OPENS, PREMATURELY OPENS
OPENS, PREMATURELY OPENS
ELEMENT OPENS, HIGH
RESISTANCE
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MDAC-ID
31214
31213
ITEM
GENERAL PURPOSE RELAY,
NONLATCHING (2)
GENERAL PURPOSE RELAY,
NONLATCHING (2)
FAILURE MODE
FAILS CLOSED
FAILS OPEN (RELAYS
NORMALLY OPEN)
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